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Game theory and law: The example of the World trade organization law
The ultimate goal of game theory is to provide a theoretical model for strategic situations' analysis, i.e. for situations where one actor's choice depends on the behavior of other players in the game. As a concept, game theory is also applicable to the legal context. Legal dialectics and processes are often conducted in some form of strategic interactions. Game theory is a way to see how legal rules affect particular actors' behavior. International Economic Law has its own dynamics which makes the process similar to the analysis through the game theoretical tools. Therefore, the rules of international law are considered as the rules of the game that are taking place among different actors. Game theoretical considerations clarify the substance of the interaction and cooperation of players involved (states, international organizations and other actors). Game theory provides a basis for normative analysis of the issue of implementation of the rules of international law and improves understanding of those rules. The topic of the paper is the application of the game theory in the context of the legal framework established by the World Trade Organization. The member states' dilemma between using the advantages and liberalization options provided by the WTO on the one hand, and joining the regional trade agreements, on the other one, is strategic by nature. Therefore, game theory can contribute to understanding and resolving, using the game of 'prisoner's dilemma' as a model. It is the game which clearly shows that a group of rational egoists can end up worse than a group of actors that acts prima facie contrary to their own interests. 'Prisoner's dilemma' demonstrates why society and law has the need for coordination as well as mechanisms for co-operation. WTO member states put emphasis on the process of liberalization conducted in the framework of regional trade agreements (RTAs); at the same time, their participation in WTO negotiations is not effective and efficient enough to make a breakthrough in the multilateral framework. A solution of the game for Member States is not to cooperate: i. e, liberalization is primarily achieved through regional agreements rather than within the WTO. The rational decision of the Member States (opting for a regional approach) has resulted in a suboptimal result, which is a basic characteristic of the game model based on a prisoner's dilemma: in this case, the optimal solution would be cooperation through a multilateral framework (World Trade Organization).
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Medjunarodna konferencija "Building professional institutions in Central and Eastern European political science"
In: Politička misao, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 218-219
World Affairs Online
East European journal of economics, politics and law: EEJEPL
ISSN: 2297-0223
Zbornik radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Nišu: Collection of papers, Faculty of Law, Niš
ISSN: 2560-3116
Interdependence between constitutional order and political parties: Three cases of Germany: 70 years of the Basic Law
Political parties are an indispensable factor in any modern parliamentary democracy. It would be impossible to parliamentary democracy to function properly without them. Political parties are a constitutional category and they have to act in accordance with constitution, but due to their importance it is already observed that sometimes they go beyond constitution. Each country should find its own way in order to face that challenge. Germany is a good example for that, by giving political parties the freedom to act on the basis of the provisions of the Basic Law, but with the care that the entire system does not endanger itself. That could be seen in three examples. First example is the relationship between the parliamentary group as the emanation of political parties in parliament and deputies. Second example is banning of anti-constitutional political parties. Third example is the election process of judges of the Constitutional Court. The paper concludes that it is necessary to find an ideal formula for the freedom of their actions, according to which political parties are allowed to perform any action that is beneficial to the constitutional order, while not all of them are forbidden, but only the actions that have a devastating effect on the system as a whole.
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Phenomenology of Paramilitarism – Contribution to Overcoming the Terminological Dilemmas of the Language of Security Sciences ; Феноменологија парамилитаризма – прилог превазилажењу терминолошких дилема језика безбедносних наука
In addition to national and international armies - armed forces of states and alliances, paramilitary armed formations (the so-called paramilitary) play aprominent role in contemporary international and non-international armed conflicts. They are made up of so-called voluntary fighters (patriots, contracts), i.e. mercenaries or "looters" (so-called war dogs) within armed formations that are not officially part of, and most often not under the command, of regular armed forces. As a rule, they are formed, armed, equipped, trained, paid and controlled by certain political centers of power - foreign governments and intelligence, hostile political emigration, political parties, criminal and other extremist (pseudo-patriotic, nationalist and para-religious) organizations (the so-called warlords) for whose account the paramilitary formations occupied part of the territory of the sovereign state in which the armed conflict took place and established power on it. They are often associated with numerous war crimes, terrorist attacks and robberies. Since the terms 'warlords', 'paramilitary', 'mercenaries', and 'war dog' are oftenincorrectly usedin everyday communication of media, public and even scholars, this paper attempts to conceptualize and make a clear distinction between these phenomena. ; Осим националних и међународних војски – оружаних снага држава и савеза држава, у савременим међународним и немеђународним оружаним сукобима све значајнију улогу узимају паравојне оружане формације (тзв. паравојске). Њих чине тзв. добровољни борци (патриоте, уговорци), односно плаћеници или "пљачкаши" (тзв. пси рата) који су део наоружаних формација које званично нису у саставу, а најчешће ни под командом регуларних оружаних снага. Паравојске по правилу формирају, наоружавају, опремају, обучавају, плаћају и контролишу извесни политички центри моћи – иностране владе и обавештајне службе, непријатељска политичка емиграција, политичке партије, криминалне и друге екстремистичке (псеудопатриотске, националистичке и параверске) организације (тзв. господари рата) за чији рачун су паравојне формације и заузеле део територије суверене државе у којој се одвија оружани конфликт и на њој "успоставиле власт". За њих се неретко везују бројни ратни злочини, терористички напади и пљачке. Како се у животу, а неретко и у теорији безбедности не разликују и погрешно употребљавају термини "господари рата", "паравојске", плаћеници и "пси рата", у раду је учињен покушај појмовног одређења и дистанцирања ових појава.
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