A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries. This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries.This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contraast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
Method factors represent variance common to indicators from the same data source. Detecting method factors can help uncover systematic bias in data sources. This article employs confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to detect method factors in 23 democracy indicators from four popular data sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Freedom House, Polity IV, and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Using three different multi-dimensional concepts of democracy as starting points, we find strong evidence for method factors in all sources. Method-specific factors are strongest when yearly changes in the scores are assessed. The sources find it easier to agree on long-term average scores. We discuss the implications for applied researchers.
Die Messung staatlicher Fragilität scheint auf den ersten Blick eine rein akademische Übung zu sein. Jedoch ist sie eine grundlegende Voraussetzung, um überhaupt angemessen mit fragilen Staaten umgehen zu können. Politik und Durchführungsorganisationen haben erkannt, dass es nicht möglich ist, Armut effektiv zu reduzieren, ohne fragile Staaten zu "reparieren". Fragilen Staaten fehlen grundlegende Staatsfunktionen. Vor allem sind sie nicht in der Lage, Sicherheit zu gewährleisten und eine Verwaltung aufrechtzuerhalten. Unter diesen Umständen fehlen Gebern handlungsfähige Regierungen als wichtigste Partner zur Umsetzung entwicklungsorientierter Reformen. Es wird auch vermutet, dass übliche Entwicklungsansätze in fragilen Staaten nicht funktionieren. Für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit können Fragilitätsindizes zu verschiedenen Zwecken nützlich sein: • zur Identifizierung von Ländern, die einen anderen Entwicklungsansatz benötigen; • zur Evaluierung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; • zur Beobachtung globaler Fragilitätstrends; • und zur Untersuchung von staatlicher Fragilität. All diese Verwendungen könnten die Hilfe für fragile Staaten effektiver machen. Unser Wissen über staatliche Fragilität beruht heute weitgehend auf Fallstudien. Dahingegen würden quantitative Studien besser generalisierbare Politikempfehlungen zulassen. Solche Studien, die sich auf Ursachen und Folgen von Fragilität beziehen, setzen jedoch sehr genaue Messinstrumente voraus. Was leisten also aktuelle Fragilitätsindizes? Sie versuchen alle, die fragilsten Staaten zu identifizieren und stimmen dabei in vielen Fällen überein, wie etwa bezüglich Somalia, Irak und Afghanistan. Die Nennung dieser Länder überrascht allerdings nicht. Indizes müssten weitere Leistungen erbringen – insbesondere eine hohe Genauigkeit bei der Unterscheidung von weniger eindeutigen Fällen – um einen Mehrwert gegenüber spontanen und weniger systematischen Klassifizierungen zu erbringen. Demgegenüber wird eine Vielzahl weiterer Länder unterschiedlich bewertet. So stimmen die Indizes in der Bewertung von Ländern wie Kuba und Nordkorea nicht überein – beides autoritäre, aber verhältnismäßig handlungsfähige Staaten. Dies wirft eine Frage über die Natur autoritärer Systeme auf: Müssen repressive aber stabile Regime als fragil eingestuft werden, nur weil angenommen wird, dass sie auf lange Sicht nicht in der Lage sein werden, gesellschaftliche Bedürfnisse ähnlich gut befriedigen zu können wie Demokratien? Wir argumentieren, dass eine solche Klassifizierung unzulässig ist und dass sich "fragil" nur auf Staaten beziehen sollte, deren Regierungen weitgehend handlungsunfähig sind. Diese Analyse fasst die Botschaft aktueller Fragilitätsindizes zusammen, beschreibt ihre Schwächen und zeigt, wie das Potential der Indizes besser genutzt werden kann. Es wir erläutert, was derzeitige Indizes leisten und wie Praktiker und Forscher dazu beitragen können, bessere Indizes zu erstellen, die für die Bildung von Strategien zur Reduzierung staatlicher Fragilität genutzt werden können.
Weltweit stehen westliche Geber in der Demokratieförderung vor einem Dilemma. Demokratie ist zwar ein wichtiges politisches Ziel, aber sie fürchten, dass der Weg dorthin ein ebenso wertvolles Ziel – politische Stabilität – unterminieren und in den Empfängerstaaten vermehrt Gewalt auslösen könnte. Wir gehen hier der Frage nach, ob es für diese Befürchtungen empirische Belege gibt, und wie Geber bei potenziellen Zielkonflikten zwischen Demokratisierung und Stabilität abwägen können. Jüngste Forschungsarbeiten des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) zeigen, dass es für die Sorge, Demokratisierung könne destabilisierend wirken, tatsächlich gewisse empirische Belege gibt (Leininger et al. 2012; Ziaja 2013). Diese Befürchtungen sollten allerdings nicht vom größeren Problem ablenken, "auf halber Strecke stehen zu bleiben". Hybride Regime mit autoritären Merkmalen, die sich hinter einer Fassade formal-demokratischer Institutionen verstecken, stellen auf lange Sicht ein größeres Sicherheitsrisiko dar als Versuche, in hybriden Regimen Demokratie zu fördern. Demokratieförderung ist also wünschenswert, aber häufig ein Risiko. Laut einer neuen Studie des DIE, die 47 afrikanische Staaten einbezieht, führt Demokratieförderung zwar kurzfristig zu mehr Demonstrationen und Ausschreitungen, nicht aber zu Bürgerkriegen. Somit deutet stärkere Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung eher auf die Wirksamkeit von Hilfe hin, als dass sie ein Grund zur Besorgnis wäre. Damit Demokratieförderung langfristig wirken und die Forderungen der Bevölkerung kanalisieren kann, muss sie lokalen Akteuren beim Aufbau von bedarfsgerechten Institutionen helfen. Häufig ließen sich Eliten aus Angst vor möglichen destabilisierenden Folgen von Bürgerbeteiligung zur Beschneidung des Wettbewerbs in jungen Demokratien verleiten. Dies ist keine gute Idee: Elitäre Transitionen führen laut unserer Forschung zu weniger nachhaltigen politischen Konstellationen als offener Wettbewerb. Externe Förderung gelingt am besten, wenn Geber mar¬ginalisierte Gruppen darin unterstützen, sich am Institutionenaufbau zu beteiligen. Das wird am besten durch gleichzeitiges Engagement vieler Geber erreicht. Diversität auf der Geberseite erhöht die Chancen, eine kontextgemäße institutionelle Struktur zu finden, anstatt dem Partnerland eine solche überzustülpen. Daraus ergibt sich, dass es für die Notwendigkeit eines Sequenzierungsansatzes in der Demokratieförderung - d. h. erst Stabilität, dann Demokratie – kaum empirische Belege gibt. Die meisten Länder haben bereits vor über zwei Jahrzehnten (formal) den Weg zur Demokratie einge¬schlagen. Ein gradualistischer Ansatz mit gleichzeitigem Aufbau von staatlichen Institutionen und der Förderung breiter Beteiligung ist darum der vielversprechendere Weg. Unsere Empfehlungen lauten daher in Kürze: Die Demokratieförderung diversifizieren. Endogene, inklusive politische Entwicklung fördern. Beim Aufbau politischer Institutionen durch den Einsatz von Konditionalität auf Konfliktlösungsmechanismen bestehen. Zielkonflikte in Phasen demokratischer Transition abwägen.
Measuring state fragility across countries may at first sight seem a purely academic exercise. Yet, the measurementof fragility is a prerequisite for adequately dealing with fragile states in the first place. Decision makers and development practitioners have come to acknowledge that effectively reducing poverty is not possible without "fixing" fragile states. Fragile states lack core state functions, most importantly the maintenance of security and basic administration. In such a deficient environment, international donors do not encounter capable governments – the most important partners to implement development-oriented reforms. Certain aid instruments are assumed to be less effective under these circumstances, and some actors argue that standard development approaches do not work well in fragile states. Fragility indices could be of use for development policy as a tool for • determining which countries need a different aid approach; • monitoring larger trends of global political stability; • evaluating the overall impact of development aid; • and for investigating the dynamics of state fragility. All of these applications could make aid to fragile countries more efficient. While most of today's knowledge on state fragility is based on case studies, quantitative approaches could generate more generalizable findings to inform future policies. The applications listed above – especially the latter two, which refer to the causes and consequences of state fragility – presuppose very precise easurements. So what can the currently available indices tell us? All of them try to identify the most fragile countries, and they agree in many cases, including Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries do not come as a surprise, however. Indices would have to incorporate other features – especially a high degree of precision regarding the distinction of the remaining countries – should they aspire to provide an added value compared with ad-hoc classifications based on common sense. Upon closer examination, one also finds differences in how indices classify certain countries. They do not agree on cases such as Cuba and North Korea, both authoritarian but reasonably capable states. The indices' discrepancy brings forward a fundamental question regarding the nature of authoritarian states: Must repressive but stable regimes be considered fragile, just because it is assumed that, in the long run, they will not be able to accommodate social demands as democracies can? We argue that such a classification obscures more than it clarifies and that 'fragile' should refer only to countries with incapable governments that are likely to break down soon. This briefing paper gives a short summary of the messages that current fragility indices convey, portrays their limitations and delineates how development cooperation could better exploit their potential. It shows how current indices can be applied, and how both policy makers and researchers can contribute to improving future indices for ultimately supporting development in fragile states.
Western donors attempting to promote democracy across the globe face a dilemma. Democracy is a highly valued policy goal, but they are fearful that the path to democ¬racy will undermine another highly valued goal – political stability – and potentially cause widespread violence in the recipient countries or beyond. We ask whether these fears have empirical support and how donors can balance the potentially conflicting objectives of democratisation and stability when intervening in governance matters. Recent research at the German Development Institute shows that fears about the destabilising effects of democratisation do indeed have some empirical support (Leininger et al 2012; Ziaja 2013). But these fears deflect attention from the bigger problem of "getting stuck in the middle". Hybrid regimes that exhibit authoritarian traits under a façade of formal democratic institutions constitute, in the long run, a larger security risk than attempts to make these countries more democratic. Hybrid regimes also hamper economic development, thus constituting an additional, indirect, risk of violent conflict. The promotion of democracy is hence a laudable effort, but it may itself carry risks. A recent DIE study of 47 African countries suggests that support for democracy increases popular mobilisation in the short run, leading to increased demonstrations and riots. However, the same study produced no evidence that democracy support is likely to spark civil wars. Increased mobilisation is thus rather a sign of aid effectiveness than a reason to worry. Yet, to be effective in the long run and to help steer popular demands into peaceful channels, democracy support must assist domestic actors in building institutions that fit the needs of their society. In the past, the potentially de¬stabilising consequences of popular participation have seduced would-be engineers of social change into re¬stricting competition in young democracies. This is a bad idea, as our recent research shows: narrow, elite pacts have, on average, led to worse political outcomes than open competition. The best contribution that donors can make from the out¬side is to enable marginalised groups to participate in crea¬ting the institutional setup. This is best achieved when many donors promote democracy simultaneously. Only then can they avoid the "blueprint trap", which snaps shut when donors try to impose – advertently or inadvertently – an institutional setup on the partner country that does not fit its society's needs. Diversity on the donor side increases the chances of finding a context-adequate institutional design. These findings suggest that an overly cautious sequencing approach to democracy promotion – stability first, only then democracy – has little empirical support. Most countries in the world embarked on a (formally) democratic path more than two decades ago. A gradualist approach that builds institutions while at the same time encouraging mobilisation is thus the more viable approach. Recommendations in brief: Promote democracy now Keep democracy aid diverse Encourage endogenous, inclusive polity design Enforce conditionality on conflict resolution mechanisms in institutional design Balance trade-offs of democratic transitions.
We review the aid effectiveness literature to assess whether foreign aid given to areas of limited statehood can be expected to promote economic and social outcomes in the recipient country. We distinguish different types of aid, motives for granting it, recipient country policies and characteristics, and modalities by which aid is delivered, as these factors have been argued to influence the effectiveness of aid. In short, aid is most likely to be successful if given for non-strategic motives, and if given to recipient countries with "good" policies and democratic institutions. Fragmented aid and aid amounts that exceed the absorptive capacity of the recipient reduce the effectiveness of aid. We then compare these properties between recipients most affected by limited statehood and those least affected. This allows us to assess the relative effectiveness of aid in countries with areas of limited statehood. We conclude that on average aid given there is less likely to be effective than elsewhere.
Aid fragmentation is widely denounced, though recent studies suggest potential benefits. To reconcile these mixed findings, we make a case for studying differences across aid sectors and levels of analysis. Our cross-national time-series analysis of data from 141 countries suggests aid fragmentation promotes child survival and improves governance. However, just looking across countries has the potential to blur important within-country differences. We analyse subnational variation in Sierra Leone and Nigeria and find that the presence of more donors is associated with worse health outcomes, but better governance outcomes. This suggests that having more donors within a locality can be beneficial when they are working to improve the systems through which policies are implemented, but harmful when they target policy outcomes directly. A survey of Nigerian civil servants highlights potential mechanisms. Fragmentation in health aid may undermine civil servants' morale, whereas diversity in governance aid can promote meritocratic behaviour.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, empirically, state fragility – conceptualised as a multi-dimensional phenomenon along the categories of authority, capacity and legitimacy – comes in several distinct configurations, yet that the number of such configurations is rather limited. We suggest that this finding has useful, previously unexplored implications for policy design vis-à-vis fragile states. We do not intend to call into question the necessity of country-specific analysis. A better grasp of "typical" forms of fragility, however, should help development agencies to better prepare for the types of situations they are most likely to be confronted with. The final section of the paper explores some of the practical implications that can be derived from our classification.
This paper examines official country selection and resource allocation of German aid after the end of the Cold War and embeds the analysis into the broader debate about German foreign policy. Based on new data, we take into account several peculiarities of the German aid system. Overall, we find that neediness and democracy levels of recipients have been guiding principles in both, country selection and resource allocation. Nevertheless, geo-strategic considerations and the avoidance of conflict-affected countries also impacted on country selection but less on resource allocation. Moreover, non-linear estimation techniques identify a relatively high threshold of income levels below which the poverty orientation disappears; a finding that refines previous studies identifying a middle-income-country bias of German aid allocation. Finally, official selection decisions to concentrate aid on a reduced number of countries did not have the intended concentration effect. This strong path dependency and development-orientation is compatible with research that sees German foreign policy after re-unification as being subject only to very gradual changes and led by the role model of a Civilian power.
Most actors in the field of foreign aid agree with the call for coordinated engagement in fragile states in order to more effectively counter the consequences and origins of state failure. However, despite such demands, governments from OECD countries as well as multilateral agencies that are engaged in fragile states often continue to act in an uncoordinated manner and fail to reach higher levels of harmonisation. Why is effective coordination so hard to achieve? This article argues that three major challenges explain the persistent problems of donor harmonisation in fragile states: (1) the cognitive challenge of explaining the origins of state fragility and deducing effective instruments and interventions; (2) the political challenge of reconciling divergent political motives for engagement; as well as (3) the challenge related to the organisational logic of competing aid agencies.
Social cohesion is key for sustainable development. While social cohesion has suffered in many societies from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, high levels of social cohesion have helped to overcome critical situations during the pandemic in other societies. As a consequence, protecting and strengthening social cohesion has become an increasingly central goal for most countries and the international community. Despite the strong interest in the topic, the questions of how to define social cohesion and make it an observable phenomenon through proper measurement are still contested, in both academia and policy circles. To date, no consistent, temporally and geographically spread-out data on the different elements of social cohesion exists that would allow for a global analysis of social cohesion. This rather fragmented picture of analytical approaches calls for a more universal definition and measurement of social cohesion. This paper aims to provide a narrow and measurable definition of social cohesion that travels across regions and countries. Conceptually, it proposes a definition of social cohesion that incorporates the core elements of existing and widely used definitions of social cohesion across disciplines (trust, identity, cooperation for the common good). Our contribution is to offer a definition of social cohesion that is broad enough to cover the essentials holding societies together while at the same time keeping it lean enough to analyse the causes and consequences of social cohesion, for instance the relationship between social cohesion and inequalities or political institutions. Methodologically, we propose an application of our concept to the African context. It is not only a first step towards a more global and inter-regional measurement of social cohesion, but also the basis for further knowledge-creation, the identification of patterns of social cohesion and the analysis of its causes and consequences. From a policy-oriented perspective, a more unified definition of the core elements of social cohesion and its measurement can inform policies that aim at protecting and fostering social cohesion. In development cooperation, it will help not only to build indicators for designing programme objectives and for evaluation and monitoring, but also to advance evidence-based theories of change.
This study assesses whether the use of electronic government (e-government) services affects political attitudes. The results, based on evidence generated in Botswana, indicate that e-government services can, in fact, have an impact on political attitudes. E-government services are rapidly being rolled out around the globe. Governments primarily expect efficiency gains from these reforms. Whether e-government in particular, and information and communication technology (ICT) in general, affect societies is hotly debated. There are fears that democracy may be compromised by surveillance, censorship, fake news, interference in elections and other strategies facilitated by digital tools. This discussion paper adds to the nascent literature by investigating if the expanding e-government usage in Botswana affects individual support for democracy, regime satisfaction and interpersonal trust. Methodologically, the study relies on observational and experimental evidence. The observational approach assesses the impact of the usage of different e-services such as e-payments and electronic tax return filings on political attitudes. The experimental approach incentivises taxpayers to file their tax returns electronically. Both approaches build on an original in-person survey gauging the political attitudes of 2,109 citizens in Greater Gaborone. The survey was conducted in February and March 2020. In terms of results, we do not identify a general substantive effect for the impact of all e-services on political attitudes. For some of the e-services and attitudes tested, however, we find significant evidence. Furthermore, our study yields significant results for several of the linkages between the causal steps within our causal mechanisms. For instance, we find that e-government can empower citizens to engage in political activities and that, although e-government users on average report that the government is not addressing their needs, a simple incentivising message can significantly improve people's feelings in this regard.
This study assesses whether the use of electronic government (e-government) services affects political attitudes. The results, based on evidence generated in Botswana, indicate that e-government services can, in fact, have an impact on political attitudes. E-government services are rapidly being rolled out around the globe. Governments primarily expect efficiency gains from these reforms. Whether e-government in particular, and information and communication technology (ICT) in general, affect societies is hotly debated. There are fears that democracy may be compromised by surveillance, censorship, fake news, interference in elections and other strategies facilitated by digital tools. This discussion paper adds to the nascent literature by investigating if the expanding e-government usage in Botswana affects individual support for democracy, regime satisfaction and interpersonal trust. Methodologically, the study relies on observational and experimental evidence. The observational approach assesses the impact of the usage of different e-services such as e-payments and electronic tax return filings on political attitudes. The experimental approach incentivises taxpayers to file their tax returns electronically. Both approaches build on an original in-person survey gauging the political attitudes of 2,109 citizens in Greater Gaborone. The survey was conducted in February and March 2020. In terms of results, we do not identify a general substantive effect for the impact of all e-services on political attitudes. For some of the e-services and attitudes tested, however, we find significant evidence. Furthermore, our study yields significant results for several of the linkages between the causal steps within our causal mechanisms. For instance, we find that e-government can empower citizens to engage in political activities and that, although e-government users on average report that the government is not addressing their needs, a simple incentivising message can significantly improve people's feelings in this regard.
