The article focuses on the controversies of WWII, how the intertwining of history and politics impacts evaluation of the events of the war, the emphasis that is placed on historical memory and the possibilities of "forgetfulness", and politicization of the holocaust memory. On the basis of diaries and contemporary notes, the situation in German-occupied Lithuania, episodes of the holocaust, the activities of the Lithuanian police battalions, and the actions of the Soviet Army in occupied German territory is analyzed.
The article focuses on the controversies of WWII, how the intertwining of history and politics impacts evaluation of the events of the war, the emphasis that is placed on historical memory and the possibilities of "forgetfulness", and politicization of the holocaust memory. On the basis of diaries and contemporary notes, the situation in German-occupied Lithuania, episodes of the holocaust, the activities of the Lithuanian police battalions, and the actions of the Soviet Army in occupied German territory is analyzed.
In this article there is the analysis of specifics of the interpretation of the events of the end of the Second World War in the Russian historical politics from the point of view of the subject integration (historical, cultural-anthropological and psychological). The main concepts, defining the evaluation of the situation of the Soviet occupation of the region of Koenigsberg in Russian historical politics and culture, are presented. Also there is the analysis of the problem of the impact of the conception of the "genocide of the Lithuania Minor" on the Lithuanian historical politics. The problems, presented in the article, haven't been analyzed in complex in Lithuania so far.
In this article there is the analysis of specifics of the interpretation of the events of the end of the Second World War in the Russian historical politics from the point of view of the subject integration (historical, cultural-anthropological and psychological). The main concepts, defining the evaluation of the situation of the Soviet occupation of the region of Koenigsberg in Russian historical politics and culture, are presented. Also there is the analysis of the problem of the impact of the conception of the "genocide of the Lithuania Minor" on the Lithuanian historical politics. The problems, presented in the article, haven't been analyzed in complex in Lithuania so far.
Based on various sources, the article analyses the tendencies of waiting for war in Lithuania after the Second World War. The examples of the Lithuanian partisan movement are the most analysed, because armed fighters were waiting for a new war more than other residents of the country and it was a relevant problem for them. The recollections of witnesses analysed in the work clearly reflect the tendencies of waiting for war and Western help, as well as the subsequent 191Istorija. 2021, t. 121, Nr. 1Articlesdisappointments of the unfulfilled alleged promises of Western countries (mainly America) and foreign Lithuanians. The specific sources of the time studied show that such assessments of past events are not merely the later inventions of witnesses, but impressions taken from the past. The wait for the war of 1945–1953 was stimulated by the experience of 1940–1941, when the predicted German-USSR war began. During the war, the anti-national underground hopes for liberation began to be associated with Britain and the United States, and this view became even stronger after the end of World War II, especially in the United States. The difficult post-war situation, the ongoing Soviet repression, and the difficult financial situation especially encouraged the public to wait for war. The sources of war predictions were foreign and Soviet radio stations, the Soviet press, and various rumours. There is no evidence that representatives of Western governments called for an open, armed struggle, but the biased interpretation of true and false knowledge led people to expect rapid change. Waiting for war is tied not only to general reflections, but also to specific events in the world, such as statements by foreign leaders, military clashes in the world (such as the Korean War), the emergence and use of the atomic bomb, the North Atlantic military bloc, and so on. The mood of waiting for war determined the tactics of Lithuanian partisan fighting. Waiting tactics are established, that is, the accumulation of strength for a decisive moment. The date of the beginning of the predicted war can often be found in the documents of the time. Lithuanian partisans tried to maintain the confidence of the people of the country in their own strength and faith in the impending war, sometimes responding quite harshly to those who doubted these statements. With no help coming from the West, the number of sceptics and frustrations steadily increased. The increase in frustration with the West and Lithuanian emigrants was sharply criticised by the West, which allegedly betrayed the promises made. The motive of the alleged betrayal crept into the memory and later moved into the collective memories
Based on various sources, the article analyses the tendencies of waiting for war in Lithuania after the Second World War. The examples of the Lithuanian partisan movement are the most analysed, because armed fighters were waiting for a new war more than other residents of the country and it was a relevant problem for them. The recollections of witnesses analysed in the work clearly reflect the tendencies of waiting for war and Western help, as well as the subsequent 191Istorija. 2021, t. 121, Nr. 1Articlesdisappointments of the unfulfilled alleged promises of Western countries (mainly America) and foreign Lithuanians. The specific sources of the time studied show that such assessments of past events are not merely the later inventions of witnesses, but impressions taken from the past. The wait for the war of 1945–1953 was stimulated by the experience of 1940–1941, when the predicted German-USSR war began. During the war, the anti-national underground hopes for liberation began to be associated with Britain and the United States, and this view became even stronger after the end of World War II, especially in the United States. The difficult post-war situation, the ongoing Soviet repression, and the difficult financial situation especially encouraged the public to wait for war. The sources of war predictions were foreign and Soviet radio stations, the Soviet press, and various rumours. There is no evidence that representatives of Western governments called for an open, armed struggle, but the biased interpretation of true and false knowledge led people to expect rapid change. Waiting for war is tied not only to general reflections, but also to specific events in the world, such as statements by foreign leaders, military clashes in the world (such as the Korean War), the emergence and use of the atomic bomb, the North Atlantic military bloc, and so on. The mood of waiting for war determined the tactics of Lithuanian partisan fighting. Waiting tactics are established, that is, the accumulation of strength for a decisive moment. The date of the beginning of the predicted war can often be found in the documents of the time. Lithuanian partisans tried to maintain the confidence of the people of the country in their own strength and faith in the impending war, sometimes responding quite harshly to those who doubted these statements. With no help coming from the West, the number of sceptics and frustrations steadily increased. The increase in frustration with the West and Lithuanian emigrants was sharply criticised by the West, which allegedly betrayed the promises made. The motive of the alleged betrayal crept into the memory and later moved into the collective memories
Based on various sources, the article analyses the tendencies of waiting for war in Lithuania after the Second World War. The examples of the Lithuanian partisan movement are the most analysed, because armed fighters were waiting for a new war more than other residents of the country and it was a relevant problem for them. The recollections of witnesses analysed in the work clearly reflect the tendencies of waiting for war and Western help, as well as the subsequent 191Istorija. 2021, t. 121, Nr. 1Articlesdisappointments of the unfulfilled alleged promises of Western countries (mainly America) and foreign Lithuanians. The specific sources of the time studied show that such assessments of past events are not merely the later inventions of witnesses, but impressions taken from the past. The wait for the war of 1945–1953 was stimulated by the experience of 1940–1941, when the predicted German-USSR war began. During the war, the anti-national underground hopes for liberation began to be associated with Britain and the United States, and this view became even stronger after the end of World War II, especially in the United States. The difficult post-war situation, the ongoing Soviet repression, and the difficult financial situation especially encouraged the public to wait for war. The sources of war predictions were foreign and Soviet radio stations, the Soviet press, and various rumours. There is no evidence that representatives of Western governments called for an open, armed struggle, but the biased interpretation of true and false knowledge led people to expect rapid change. Waiting for war is tied not only to general reflections, but also to specific events in the world, such as statements by foreign leaders, military clashes in the world (such as the Korean War), the emergence and use of the atomic bomb, the North Atlantic military bloc, and so on. The mood of waiting for war determined the tactics of Lithuanian partisan fighting. Waiting tactics are established, that is, the accumulation of strength for a decisive moment. The date of the beginning of the predicted war can often be found in the documents of the time. Lithuanian partisans tried to maintain the confidence of the people of the country in their own strength and faith in the impending war, sometimes responding quite harshly to those who doubted these statements. With no help coming from the West, the number of sceptics and frustrations steadily increased. The increase in frustration with the West and Lithuanian emigrants was sharply criticised by the West, which allegedly betrayed the promises made. The motive of the alleged betrayal crept into the memory and later moved into the collective memories
The article comprehensively analyses the tendencies of waiting for war in Lithuania in 1945-1953, showing the influence of the experience of waiting for war in 1940-1944 on later time based on specific examples. The reflections of the expectation of war and the alleged promises of Lithuanian emigrants in the memories of witnesses - which did not always coincide with the realities of the past - are examined. The article focuses on the moods and actions of Lithuanian partisans directly related to these tendencies, because it was one of the most topical issues for the anti-Soviet fighters. The article examines the possible sources (press, radio, rumours) on the basis of which the war between East and West was predicted. The influence of German, US and British factors on forecasts is considered. It identifies events that may have fuelled the anticipation of military conflict and stormed people's imaginations, showing what actions the population was led to. Based on archival and published sources, the importance of the mood of waiting for war for the activities of Lithuanian partisans and the attitude of the population is determined. The frustrations of the Lithuanian population about the non-commencement of the war and the unfulfilled forecasts are also examined.
The article analyses the cases of military actions in the territory of Western Lithuania and Latvia from 1915 to 1945. At the same time, attention is paid to the operational plans of the Lithuanian and Latvian military forces in the second half of the 1930s. Using this method of analysis, based on military history research, an alternative defence concept for small countries whose defence depends on allies not only with ground capabilities but also with naval military capabilities and capabilities to conduct air operations, is disclosed. The strategic directions in which armies invade and retreat in the Eastern Baltic region in the first half of the twentieth century are essentially the same. Only changing technologies, capability of mobility and firepower, and growing/increasing opportunities have affected the pace and geography of military action. In 1915, the Russian army did not concentrate its forces in Courland, and through it the German army saw the possibility of manoeuvring in the northern wing. This helped to defeat the enemy on the Venta-Dubysa river line and take advantage of the success and maintain the initiative to occupy the entire territory of Lithuania by the autumn and reach the left bank of the Daugava. These operations influenced the military planning of interwar Lithuania and Latvia. In 1941, the German forces invaded to the east in the same direction as in 1915, the only difference being that the enemy failed to stop them in Samogitia and Courland, although there was some stopping at Raseiniai near Dubysa. In 1944, the Red Army (RA) broke into the Baltic Sea near Palanga – which is what it failed to do in 1919 – forming the Courland pocket, a bridgehead in which German forces, defending the sea with a sea connection to Germany, were cut off for seven months, from 10 October to 9 May 1945. The Curonian Boiler/bridgehead forces surrendered only after the German capitulation. Klaipėda was defended by the German military for more than 3 months: from October 10, 1944 to January 28, 1945, when there was a threat that the land route through the Curonian Spit would be interrupted; they abandoned the city and left it to the Red Army without a battle.
The article analyses the cases of military actions in the territory of Western Lithuania and Latvia from 1915 to 1945. At the same time, attention is paid to the operational plans of the Lithuanian and Latvian military forces in the second half of the 1930s. Using this method of analysis, based on military history research, an alternative defence concept for small countries whose defence depends on allies not only with ground capabilities but also with naval military capabilities and capabilities to conduct air operations, is disclosed. The strategic directions in which armies invade and retreat in the Eastern Baltic region in the first half of the twentieth century are essentially the same. Only changing technologies, capability of mobility and firepower, and growing/increasing opportunities have affected the pace and geography of military action. In 1915, the Russian army did not concentrate its forces in Courland, and through it the German army saw the possibility of manoeuvring in the northern wing. This helped to defeat the enemy on the Venta-Dubysa river line and take advantage of the success and maintain the initiative to occupy the entire territory of Lithuania by the autumn and reach the left bank of the Daugava. These operations influenced the military planning of interwar Lithuania and Latvia. In 1941, the German forces invaded to the east in the same direction as in 1915, the only difference being that the enemy failed to stop them in Samogitia and Courland, although there was some stopping at Raseiniai near Dubysa. In 1944, the Red Army (RA) broke into the Baltic Sea near Palanga – which is what it failed to do in 1919 – forming the Courland pocket, a bridgehead in which German forces, defending the sea with a sea connection to Germany, were cut off for seven months, from 10 October to 9 May 1945. The Curonian Boiler/bridgehead forces surrendered only after the German capitulation. Klaipėda was defended by the German military for more than 3 months: from October 10, 1944 to January 28, 1945, when there was a threat that the land route through the Curonian Spit would be interrupted; they abandoned the city and left it to the Red Army without a battle.
The article analyses the cases of military actions in the territory of Western Lithuania and Latvia from 1915 to 1945. At the same time, attention is paid to the operational plans of the Lithuanian and Latvian military forces in the second half of the 1930s. Using this method of analysis, based on military history research, an alternative defence concept for small countries whose defence depends on allies not only with ground capabilities but also with naval military capabilities and capabilities to conduct air operations, is disclosed. The strategic directions in which armies invade and retreat in the Eastern Baltic region in the first half of the twentieth century are essentially the same. Only changing technologies, capability of mobility and firepower, and growing/increasing opportunities have affected the pace and geography of military action. In 1915, the Russian army did not concentrate its forces in Courland, and through it the German army saw the possibility of manoeuvring in the northern wing. This helped to defeat the enemy on the Venta-Dubysa river line and take advantage of the success and maintain the initiative to occupy the entire territory of Lithuania by the autumn and reach the left bank of the Daugava. These operations influenced the military planning of interwar Lithuania and Latvia. In 1941, the German forces invaded to the east in the same direction as in 1915, the only difference being that the enemy failed to stop them in Samogitia and Courland, although there was some stopping at Raseiniai near Dubysa. In 1944, the Red Army (RA) broke into the Baltic Sea near Palanga – which is what it failed to do in 1919 – forming the Courland pocket, a bridgehead in which German forces, defending the sea with a sea connection to Germany, were cut off for seven months, from 10 October to 9 May 1945. The Curonian Boiler/bridgehead forces surrendered only after the German capitulation. Klaipėda was defended by the German military for more than 3 months: from October 10, 1944 to January 28, 1945, when there was a threat that the land route through the Curonian Spit would be interrupted; they abandoned the city and left it to the Red Army without a battle.
The article analyses the cases of military actions in the territory of Western Lithuania and Latvia from 1915 to 1945. At the same time, attention is paid to the operational plans of the Lithuanian and Latvian military forces in the second half of the 1930s. Using this method of analysis, based on military history research, an alternative defence concept for small countries whose defence depends on allies not only with ground capabilities but also with naval military capabilities and capabilities to conduct air operations, is disclosed. The strategic directions in which armies invade and retreat in the Eastern Baltic region in the first half of the twentieth century are essentially the same. Only changing technologies, capability of mobility and firepower, and growing/increasing opportunities have affected the pace and geography of military action. In 1915, the Russian army did not concentrate its forces in Courland, and through it the German army saw the possibility of manoeuvring in the northern wing. This helped to defeat the enemy on the Venta-Dubysa river line and take advantage of the success and maintain the initiative to occupy the entire territory of Lithuania by the autumn and reach the left bank of the Daugava. These operations influenced the military planning of interwar Lithuania and Latvia. In 1941, the German forces invaded to the east in the same direction as in 1915, the only difference being that the enemy failed to stop them in Samogitia and Courland, although there was some stopping at Raseiniai near Dubysa. In 1944, the Red Army (RA) broke into the Baltic Sea near Palanga – which is what it failed to do in 1919 – forming the Courland pocket, a bridgehead in which German forces, defending the sea with a sea connection to Germany, were cut off for seven months, from 10 October to 9 May 1945. The Curonian Boiler/bridgehead forces surrendered only after the German capitulation. Klaipėda was defended by the German military for more than 3 months: from October 10, 1944 to January 28, 1945, when there was a threat that the land route through the Curonian Spit would be interrupted; they abandoned the city and left it to the Red Army without a battle.
The goal of the study was to analyze communication about parents' experiences of political oppression in Lithuania (deportation to Siberia or political imprisonment) among second generation survivors during the Communism regime. We assumed that survivors' traumatic experiences have an impact on adult o.spring of survivors, and communication might involve avoidance in talking about parents political violence experiences. Materials and methods. One Hundred Forty-Five second generation survivors, who had at least one parent whom experienced political imprisonment or forced displacement during the Soviet occupation in Lithuania participated in our study. Mailed questionnaires included demographic data and open questions about communication with their parents concerning the parents political oppression. Thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. Results and conclusions. Second generation participants found out about the forced displacement and political imprisonment of their parents during childhood. For some of the participants these memories were interesting and had a positive impact, for example, they were proud of their parents. For other participants, the topic of their parents oppression was painful and caused negative feelings such as fear and anger. While there was no direct question in the questionnaire concerning the topic of oppression, it was still mentioned in the participants' answers. One characteristic feature of communication about oppression is silence and mystery. This was partly determined by the social and political circumstances of the soviet regime.
The goal of the study was to analyze communication about parents' experiences of political oppression in Lithuania (deportation to Siberia or political imprisonment) among second generation survivors during the Communism regime. We assumed that survivors' traumatic experiences have an impact on adult o.spring of survivors, and communication might involve avoidance in talking about parents political violence experiences. Materials and methods. One Hundred Forty-Five second generation survivors, who had at least one parent whom experienced political imprisonment or forced displacement during the Soviet occupation in Lithuania participated in our study. Mailed questionnaires included demographic data and open questions about communication with their parents concerning the parents political oppression. Thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. Results and conclusions. Second generation participants found out about the forced displacement and political imprisonment of their parents during childhood. For some of the participants these memories were interesting and had a positive impact, for example, they were proud of their parents. For other participants, the topic of their parents oppression was painful and caused negative feelings such as fear and anger. While there was no direct question in the questionnaire concerning the topic of oppression, it was still mentioned in the participants' answers. One characteristic feature of communication about oppression is silence and mystery. This was partly determined by the social and political circumstances of the soviet regime.
The goal of the study was to analyze communication about parents' experiences of political oppression in Lithuania (deportation to Siberia or political imprisonment) among second generation survivors during the Communism regime. We assumed that survivors' traumatic experiences have an impact on adult o.spring of survivors, and communication might involve avoidance in talking about parents political violence experiences. Materials and methods. One Hundred Forty-Five second generation survivors, who had at least one parent whom experienced political imprisonment or forced displacement during the Soviet occupation in Lithuania participated in our study. Mailed questionnaires included demographic data and open questions about communication with their parents concerning the parents political oppression. Thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. Results and conclusions. Second generation participants found out about the forced displacement and political imprisonment of their parents during childhood. For some of the participants these memories were interesting and had a positive impact, for example, they were proud of their parents. For other participants, the topic of their parents oppression was painful and caused negative feelings such as fear and anger. While there was no direct question in the questionnaire concerning the topic of oppression, it was still mentioned in the participants' answers. One characteristic feature of communication about oppression is silence and mystery. This was partly determined by the social and political circumstances of the soviet regime.
