In: Wivel , A 2017 , ' What Happened to the Nordic Model for International Peace and Security? ' , Peace Review , bind 29 , nr. 4; Peace Journalism , 9 , s. 489-496 . https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1381521
The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.
In the coming decade, Denmark will initiate replacement of its current fleet of F-16 fighters. In the spring Of 2009, most indicators suggest that politicians will have a choice of one of three options: the American F-35 joint Strike Fighter (JSF) & F-18 Super Hornet, produced by Lockheed Martin & Boeing, respectively, & the Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen. Denmark is thus on the verge of taking the first step in a process broadly similar to the one preceding the purchase of the F-16 in 1975. Also back then there was a choice between three candidates: the American F-16, the Swedish Saab 37E Viggen & the European Dassault Mirage FiE (of French origin). The purpose of the present article is to analyze the foreign policy considerations preceding the purchase of the F-16 in 1975 & to discuss their relevance in regard to the present pending decision. Adapted from the source document.
In: Højstrup Christensen , G , Kammel , A , Nervanto , E , Ruohomäki , J & Rodt , A P 2018 ' Successes and Shortfalls of European Union Common Security and Defence Policy Missions in Africa : Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic ' Royal Danish Defence College , Copenhagen .
This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.
A Danish researcher tells about his experiences with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in the 1970's, 80's and 90's and how the institute has changed over the years. Earlier the institute was heavily focused on security policy research, but in the late 20th century this focus widened into other research areas. L. Pitkaniemi
In: Vestenskov , D (red.) 2014 ' 10 YEARS AFTER NATO MEMBERSHIP : An anniversary in the shadow of a crisis ' Forsvarsakademiets Forlag , FAK , s. 1-112 .
"10 years after NATO Membership. An Anniversary in the Shadow of a Crisis", indeholder artikler fra politiske aktører, diplomater og forskere, der alle bidrog til til konferencen af samme navn, hvor den 10-året for baltisk medlemskab af NATO var omdrejningspunktet. Udover den danske forsvarsminister, er den estiske og litauiske forsvarsminister og NATO's vicegeneralsekretær blandt bidragyderne. Konferencens formål var at fejre, inddrage og diskutere 10 års forsvarspolitisk NATO-samarbejde i Østersøområdet. Den internationale udvikling i Europa betød at konferencens dagsorden i stedet for kom til at stå i skyggen af krisen i Ukraine, og det anspændte europæiske forhold til Rusland. Dette afspejledes ikke kun på selve konferencen, men har også sat et dybt fodaftryk på publikationen, der dels belyser det forsvarspolitiske samarbejde mellem Danmark og de baltiske stater, dels tegner et billede af hvordan den russiske aggression på Krimhalvøen blev italesat af de repræsenterede landes Forsvarsministre samt fra hovedkvarteret i NATO. Konferencen blev afholdt tidligere i år i København, og var et resultat af et tæt samarbejde mellem Forsvarsakademiet, Forsvarsministeriet og ambassadørerne for Estland, Letland og Litauen i Danmark. ; Since the recognition of their independence in 1921, the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enjoyed a special status in Danish foreign policy that has continued into present-day times. Being one of the few countries that never officially recognized the Soviet annexation in 1940, Denmark became an early advocate in relation to Baltic membership of NATO in the wake of the Cold War. Defence cooperation, such as the joint contribution to the missions in the Balkans in the early 1990s, as well as the present air policing mission, first initiated in 2004, has been an important part of the political relationship. A conference celebrating and evaluating the first ten years of NATO membership was quite naturally a high-level event to be placed in Copenhagen. As progress with planning the conference proceeded, the international security community suddenly faced a crisis in Crimea, when separatists, with Russian support, gradually took control of the Crimean Peninsula. In only 24 days, what had initially been demonstrations and protests evolved into a complete Russian annexation, through a very dubious local democratic election, where independence from Ukraine, as well as affi liation to Russia, was declared with 96% of voters in favor of joining Russia. These events naturally had a massive impact on this conference, which resulted in an anniversary in the shadow of a crisis. This turn of events forced a new discussion upon the member states of NATO: What is the main purpose of the Alliance? This question became a focal point for the conference, as well as the articles presented here.
I denne studien ser vi nærmere på hva som har skjedd med det som en gang var et utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitisk fokus, rettet mot våre umiddelbare nærområder i nord. Vi spør: I hvilken grad er dagens nordområdepolitikk egnet til å ivareta aktuelle sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i våre nordlige nærområder? Svaret denne gjennomgangen gir, er nedslående. Over flere år er norsk nordområdepolitikk blitt så utvannet og strukket at den i dag omhandler nær sagt alt. Dagens nordområdepolitikk er ispedd vel så mye regional- og næringspolitikk som utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Satsingen er i beste fall redusert til en slags samordningspolitikk, men uten entydige mål. Konfrontert med en rekke tunge sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nord kan norske myndigheter fort oppleve at en altomfattende strategi bare blir en distraksjon. For en nordområdemelding om alt er gjerne også en nordområdemelding om ingenting.
Abstract in EnglishA Norwegian High North Policy about Everything – or Nothing?This study examines what happened to Norway's nordområdepolitikk, or High North policy, erstwhile a targeted effort to address foreign and security policy challenges in Norway's immediate neighboring northern areas. It finds that the current High North policy, after rounds of extensive revision, has become less suited to cope with Norway's pressing security challenges in the said areas. Over the years, the Norwegian High North policy has become so diluted and all-including that it encompasses virtually anything and everything with a northern dimension, including regional development and industrial policies, to the neglect of foreign and security policy considerations. The High North initiatives have, at best, gradually transformed into a broad policy coordination effort, but without clear or prioritized policy objectives. Faced with a number of weighty security challenges in its immediate neighboring northern areas, Norway is currently guided by a policy that has metamorphosed into a distraction. A High North white paper about everything resembles a white paper about nothing.
Slik forholdet til Sovjetunionen historisk har vært avgjørende for utformingen av norsk nordområdepolitikk, står forholdet til Russland sentralt også i dag. Artikkelen drøfter tre aspekter ved sikkerhetspolitikkens plass i norsk syn på nordområdene og i norsk nordområdepolitikk etter årtusenskiftet. I første del ser vi overordnet på sammenhengen mellom norsk sikkerhetspolitikk og norsk nordområdepolitikk de siste tjue årene. I andre del analyserer vi russiske perspektiver på sikkerhet Arktis og forholdet til Norge, før vi i siste del tar for oss tillitsskapende samarbeid på det militære området mellom Norge og Russland ved å gi en analyse av hva som karakteriserer den bilaterale Incidents at Sea-avtalen (INCSEA).
Abstract in English:Between Heat Wave and Ice Front: The High North, Security and Great Power PoliticsAs the relationship with the Soviet Union historically was decisive for the development of Norwegian policy towards the European Arctic, the High North, relations with Russia remain a core concern also today. This article analyses three aspects of the significance of security policy in the Norwegian view of the High North in general and in Norwegian High North policy in particular after the turn of the millennium. In the first part, we assess the relationship between Norwegian security policy and High North policy in the last twenty years. The second part examines Russian perspectives on the Arctic and relations with Norway. The third and final analysis assesses the bilateral Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement as part of Russian-Norwegian military confidence building measures.
In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Along- side this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aes- thetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activi- ties are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice that has consequences beyond the digital, the semi- otic, and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment. ; In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Alongside this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aesthetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activities are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice which has consequences beyond the digital, the semiotic and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment.
Aktivisme bruges hyppigt blandt forskere og praktikere som en "overordnet etikette på dansk udenrigspolitik" (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017, s. 339). Der er ikke konsensus om, hvornår Danmark blev aktivistisk, eller om etiketten passer lige godt på alle områder af udenrigspolitikken. Ikke desto mindre er der bred enighed om, at Danmarks militære engagement i de seneste årtier, herunder særligt deltagelsen i Irak- og Afghanistan-krigene, udgør et højdepunkt i dansk aktivisme. Vores analyse diskuterer og nuancerer denne karakteristik ved at formulere en alternativ forståelse af politisk aktivisme inspireret af Hannah Arendts politiske teori. Med vores konceptualisering gentænker vi centrale begreber i litteraturen – initiativ, risiko og deltagelse – og sondrer mellem militært engagement og egentlig politisk aktivisme. Ud fra denne begrebslige ramme genbesøger vi Danmarks krigsdeltagelse i 2000'erne. Vi argumenterer for, at dansk udenrigspolitik, selv hvad angår krigsdeltagelsen, har været reaktiv, risikoavers og med begrænset folkelig forankring og derfor mindre aktivistisk, end litteraturen hidtil har antaget. Ved at fjerne den aktivistiske etikette forsøger vi at rejse nye spørgsmål om, hvad udenrigspolitisk aktivisme fremadrettet kan og bør være.
Abstract in English:Military Activism Without Political Action? Towards a New Conception of Activism in Danish Foreign and Security Policy Inspired by Hannah ArendtActivism is frequently used by researchers and practitioners alike as "a general label on Danish foreign policy" (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017, p. 339, authors' translation). There is no consensus as to when Denmark became activist or if the label is equally fitting to all foreign policy issue areas. However, there is broad agreement that the military engagements in recent decades, particularly the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, constitute a high point in Danish activism. Our analysis challenges and nuances this characterization by exploring an alternative understanding of political activism inspired by Hannah Arendt's political theory. Our alternative concept of activism revisits the central elements of activism; initiative, risk and participation, and distinguishes between military engagement and political activism. Drawing on this conceptual framework, we revisit Denmark's war engagements focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s. We argue that from a political perspective even Denmark's war engagements have been reactive, risk averse, and with limited popular anchorage, and are therefore, less activist than hitherto argued. By tearing off the activist label we aim to revitalize the discussion about what Danish Foreign and Security policy can and should be at a time when such questions have rarely had more relevance.
The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.
Nordområdene har vært på den norske utenrikspolitiske agendaen i 15 år. Mye har endret seg i denne perioden. Det som preger debatten i 2020, er forestillinger om stormaktpolitikk og rivalisering i nord. Samtidig hevdes det fra de arktiske hovedstedene at regionen er preget av samarbeid, og at de arktiske statene har fellesinteresser som gjør konflikt lite sannsynlig. Hvordan kan to så ulike oppfatninger om Arktis opptre samtidig? I dette bidraget foretar vi en lagdeling mellom tre ulike nivåer av sikkerhetspolitikk i og om nordområdene og Arktis. Dette tydeliggjør hvordan regionen kan være preget av både samarbeid og rivalisering på samme tid. Samarbeid og rivalsering vektes ulikt avhengig av tid og sted, men de er ikke gjensidig utelukkende.
Abstract in English:Great Power Politics and Increased Tension? The Art of Differentiating Analyses in the ArcticThe High North has been on the Norwegian foreign policy agenda for 15 years. Much has changed over this period. What characterizes the debate in 2020 are notions of great power politics and rivalry in the north. At the same time, Arctic states claim that the region is defined by cooperation and that the Arctic states have common interests that make conflict unlikely. How can two such different perceptions of the Arctic exist simultaneously? In this contribution, we separate between three different levels of security policy in and around the High North and the Arctic. This helps clarify how the region can be characterized by both cooperation and rivalry at the same time. Cooperation and rivalry differ depending on time and place, but they are not mutually exclusive.
Rusland er en vigtig aktør for de nordiske lande ikke bare i Østersø-området, men også i Barents-regionen og i Arktis. For at opnå et fuldgyldigt billede af de involverede dynamikker bør de enkelte nordiske landes Ruslands-relationer studeres samlet. De dansk-russiske, norsk-russiske, svensk-russiske og finsk-russiske relationer har udviklet sig ret forskelligt siden år 2000. Der eksisterer to barrierer for nordisk sikkerhedspolitisk samarbejde: (1) landenes forskellige geografiske beliggenhed og (2) bestemte indbyrdes idiosynkrasier, der ofte bunder i forskellige opfattelser af deres fælles historie. Derfor har det traditionelt været muligt for stormagter at praktisere 'del og hersk' i forhold til de nordiske lande, og det synes også at være lykkedes for Rusland siden år 2000. Men i kølvandet på Ukraine-konflikten og valget af Donald Trump til USA's præsident er der sket en konvergens mellem trusselsopfattelserne og dermed de geopolitiske interesser i de nordiske hovedstæder. I fravær af idiosynkrasier vil det nordiske sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitiske samarbejde derfor blive styrket, om end en fælles Ruslands-politik er urealistisk. Alle fire lande, ikke mindst Sverige, står over for vanskelige dilemmaer.
Abstract in English
The Nordic countries interact with Russia not only in the Baltic Sea region, but also in the Barents region and in the Polar Arctic. In order to get a full picture of the underlying dynamics, individual Nordic Russia-relations should be studied in a comprehensive framework. Swedish-Russian, Danish-Russian, Norwegian-Russian, and Fenno-Russian relations have developed differently since about 2000. There are two barriers to Nordic security policy cooperation: (1) the countries' different geographical locations, and (2) various idiosyncrasies between pairs of Nordic countries, typically rooted in different interpretations of their common history. Thus, the Nordic soil has traditionally been fertile for great powers seeking to 'divide and rule', and Russia has apparently succeeded in this since about 2000. However, in the wake of Russia's involvement in the Ukraine conflict and the election of Donald Trump as US president, geopolitical interests seem to be converging with fairly even threat perceptions being found in Nordic capitals. In the absence of idiosyncrasies, this will strengthen security and defence cooperation, although a common Nordic Russia-policy will not materialize. All four countries, in particular Sweden, face difficult dilemmas in this new situation.