Recollections of the Past, Present, and Future
In: Russian politics and law, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 73-91
ISSN: 1558-0962
In: Russian politics and law, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 73-91
ISSN: 1558-0962
In: Svobodnaja mysl' - XXI: teoretičeskij i političeskij žurnal, Band 57, Heft 11, S. 94-107
ISSN: 0869-4435
In: International affairs: a Russian journal of world politics, diplomacy and international relations, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 161-164
ISSN: 0130-9641
In: Russian politics and law: a journal of translations, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 73
ISSN: 1061-1940
"July 2006." ; Caption title. ; Introduction -- Terminology: coup, "revolution," or revolution? -- Shevardnadze's civil society -- Driving forces of the revolution -- Kmara: breaking through political apathy -- Opposition groups -- The media -- Civil society and international actors -- Should the security forces defend the regime or the people? -- Conclusion. ; Mode of access: Internet.
BASE
In: International affairs: a Russian journal of world politics, diplomacy and international relations, Band 56, Heft 6
ISSN: 0130-9641
The author traces the idea of international, cosmopolitan ideas of government throughout Western history to the present. The article is particularly interested in how Russians have received these ideas, with attention to the ideas of pro-Western Soviet intellectuals such as Eduard Shevardnadze. The author also discusses the intellectual climate that engendered the Helsinki Process, noting that it was the product of the West's determination to advance its doctrine of the supranational nature of the human rights issues. K. Cargill
In: International affairs: a Russian journal of world politics, diplomacy and international relations, Band 54, Heft 6, S. 154-177
ISSN: 0130-9641
Three revolutions, one after another, replaced the three post-communist leaders of Georgia: (1) the Round Table and Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the communists; (2) Gamsakhurdia's cabinet was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, and (3) Mikhail Saakashvili removed Shevardnadze from his post. Each of them changed the fortunes of the country and the nation, but only the last event was tagged as a "revolution." It is obviously viewed as the most important among the three and prompts us to ask whether it is absolutely correct to describe Saakashvili's coming to power as a revolution. Is it not a ploy designed to boost the importance of the regime change in the eyes of the world community and the local population? To answer these questions we should answer another, broader, question: Did the regime change that removed Eduard Shevardnadze and became known as the Rose Revolution have the characteristics of a revolution? By revolution we mean the very specific and profound impact a regime exerts on social order-it is much more than a conflict that replaces the government. A revolution brings about changes in the political, economic, spiritual, and social spheres of the nation's life, which take some time to become obvious and are never immediately manifest the very day after forces come to power which choose to call themselves "revolutionary." The events of November 2003 in Georgia were called a revolution immediately after the coup was completed. During the three years that separate us from that time enough material has been accumulated to assess the nature of the changes that have taken place and were brought about by Mikhail Saakashvili's coming to power. The Rose Revolution is a term prompted by the immediate impressions of the non-constitutional power change in Georgia. A revolution is not merely a particular method of regime change-it is an event of profound importance for the country's economic, social, and political life. Those Western authors who have devoted much time to the theory of revolution and who have written extensively on the subject 1 interpret it as a particular method of regime change that brings more radical results than other seemingly similar actions. A revolution means replacement of the top leaders accomplished by a mass illegitimate movement that results in deep-cutting changes.
BASE
The United National Movement declared the development of small and medium businesses as one of its main aims and promised to remove the taxation issue, the main irritant, from the agenda. Under Eduard Shevardnadze tax evasion was easy: businessmen and bureaucrats established unofficial relations regarded at the top as a natural development pattern of capitalism and primary accumulation. Businessmen were free to break the law, while bureaucrats seized the moment to grow rich by using their official positions to raise their personal prosperity. Even though the country's leaders alleviated state economic pressure on business, they increased their political and bureaucratic pressure by the same token, making the business community a hostage of the state and its bureaucracy. The latter was not only growing rich on bribes, it wanted large chunks of the businesses as well. Corrupt politicians and top bureaucrats protected the lawbreakers. In other words, while economic coercion was alleviated, pressure from the country's political leaders and corrupt bureaucrats was doubled. Businessmen were naturally displeased: they wanted to wriggle out of the double pressure. At one time, Eduard Shevardnadze used this to tighten his control over the business community and strengthen the social base of his power. After coming to power through a coup that toppled the regime of legitimately elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, he badly needed all the support he could master. The deposed president's allies stood opposed to him, while most of the population badly hit by the economic devastation and sliding standard of living posed a serious threat to his political system. To strengthen the regime's economic and social basis, President Shevardnadze assembled a business community out of his friends and political allies and enlisted new allies from among the businessmen connected with his regime. This explains how the National Bank of Georgia squandered credits and damaged the state's interests: advised by highly placed and influential people, its chairman was issuing credits in hard currency to be repaid in depreciated Georgian coupons. Huge capital formed in this way. Being aware that sooner or later he would be called to account, the chairman kept a list of all those who recommended the credit seekers. He shot himself under dubious circumstances during the interrogations. Naturally enough, society refused to accept the official version as true. The members of the top crust were not the only ones to exploit the permissiveness of Shevardnadze's regime: ordinary people who lost their jobs when the Soviet Union fell apart found themselves at the very bottom. Some became petty merchants, others took to smuggling; still others tried to set up small and medium businesses by violating the laws. Permissiveness relieved the state's pressure and let them live.
BASE
In: Journal of intervention and statebuilding, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 179-204
ISSN: 1750-2985
In: Vereinte Nationen: Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen, Band 56, Heft 6, S. 251-256
ISSN: 0042-384X
World Affairs Online
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 51, Heft 4, S. 87-100
ISSN: 0039-6338
Georgia and the United States have had strong relations since the mid 1990s when Presidents Clinton and Shevardnadze forged an alliance. In recent years that relationship has become closer due to a narrative presenting Georgia as a democratic beacon and key strategic country in the region. However, this narrative is beginning to give way to an alternate narrative which suggests that Georgia is governed by an impulsive leader with authoritarian tendencies who was far too close to the Bush administration. While both of these narratives draw on elements of truth, they also lack any nuance or shades of grey. Accordingly they both lead to policy decisions that are bad for Georgia and for the United States. US policy towards Georgia needs to be viewed more soberly drawing on evidence and actions rather than competing narratives. (Survival / SWP)
World Affairs Online
In: The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Band 25, Heft 2-3, S. 199-226
The regime changes in Georgia (2003) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) that resulted in the overthrow of Presidents Shevardnadze and Akaev are widely considered to be part of a common phenomenon of 'coloured revolution' in the post-Soviet space. A key factor was the rise of successful opposition movements that dislodged the ruling regimes. However, in contrast with the widespread notion that opposition unity was a prerequisite for the overthrow of the presidents, opposition parties found it too difficult to coordinate their actions and their leaders could not agree how best to challenge the election results. Neither was it the case that the Rose and Tulip revolutions were orchestrated by Western agencies seeking to induce a change of government so as to further US interests in the region. Such analyses exaggerate the influence of foreign actors in the Rose and Tulip revolutions, and over-estimate the unity of purpose among the main opposition parties. Adapted from the source document.
In: Journal of international relations and development, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 3-25
ISSN: 1581-1980
In: Cambridge review of international affairs, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 33-48
ISSN: 1474-449X