Social choice
In: Routledge revivals
In: Routledge revivals
In: Political studies, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 301-310
ISSN: 0032-3217
A review of books by John Bonner, Politics, Economics and Welfare (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986); Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland [Eds], Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge U Press, 1986); & Michale Laver, Social Choice and Public Policy (Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986 [see listings in IRPS No. 43]). Bonner's work introduces the main elements of social choice theory to undergraduates, & presents the concepts of social welfare, utility, rationality, interpersonal comparisons, &, especially, the issue of deriving aggregate or collective welfare functions. Laver's work is also directed toward undergraduates, but its somewhat novel approach should give it a wider audience. The problem of collective action is at the core of the text. A framework for a general comparative discussion of policy outcomes in different systems is developed. The Elster & Hylland work is a collection of essays addressing substantive issues in social choice theory. F. Rasmussen
In: Social choice and welfare 25,2/3
In: Special issue
In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 365-387
ISSN: 0048-3915
Many philosophers have regarded social choice theory as a technical discipline of limited relevance to substantive questions in moral & political philosophy. It is argued here, however, that it is concerned with questions of central philosophical importance, since it examines the consistency of various beliefs we may have about the desirable characteristics of philosophical theories about the good for society. Kenneth Arrow (Social Choice and Individual Values [see SA 13:5/64B6797]) showed that some apparently innocuous beliefs are inconsistent, & much of the subsequent literature has been concerned with finding ways out of the inconsistency. One fruitful way of doing so is to relax the requirement that theories be applicable to all conceivable combinations of individual preferences. Another is to accept the moral relevance of many aspects of society other than the welfare of individuals. Some of the literature has focused on rights, & has illuminated our understanding of the risk that the rights of different individuals may conflict. Social choice theory has been increasingly integrated into game theory. Recent developments in the field are noted, & suggestions offered regarding which topics will prove to be of philosophical significance in the future. Modified AA
In: Public choice, Band 83, Heft 1-2, S. 198-200
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Critical concepts in the social sciences
In: Political economy Vol. 1
In: American political science review, Band 77, Heft 3, S. 734
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: Public choice, Band 31, S. 79-110
ISSN: 0048-5829
The means used in an election system to evaluate alternative systems, that is, conditions on social choice functions, are examined. "A condition on a social choice function is an if-then statement which specifies that if a certain designated relationship exists then some particular alternative or alternatives are not in the social choice set." The conditions in the social choice literature are compiled & the relationships among these conditions are presented. Nearly all conditions are classified into three groups, & these are then subdivided. Among the types of conditions discussed are those referred to as ethical, aggregation, & rationality conditions, all of which are dealt with separately. Further research in the area is encouraged. 9 Figures. G. Simpson.
In: Public choice, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 33-48
ISSN: 0048-5829
Optimal economic growth deals with the problem of how societies make tradeoffs between current & future consumption, or equivalently, how societies make decisions about investment rates. Social choice theorists have thrown doubt on the concept of societal utility function. Optimal growth is suggested to be a problem in social choice theory. Assuming that citizens have preferences over the various growth plans, under what conditions will a majority rule equilibrium exist? It is shown that such an equilibrium can exist for a Ramsey-type problem (Ramsey, F., "A Mathematical Theory of Saving," Economic Journal, 1928, 38, 543-559). 1 Figure. Modified HA.
In: Public choice, Band 69, Heft 3, S. 265-277
ISSN: 0048-5829
Citation totals from the Social Science Citation Index, 1966-1988, are used to determine which of several books & articles have been cited often enough to be called "classic" in terms of their influence among "social choice" scholars. The term "social choice" is used broadly, to include not only works by K. J. Arrow & A. Sen, but also Duncan Black, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson, William Niskanen, & others from modern "public choice." Specifically researched were books by J. Rawls, R. Farguahrson, P. Fishburn, R. Luce, H. Raiffa, & important articles by Ronald Coase, A. Gibbard, Ann Kruger, Sam Peltzman, Paul Samuelson, Mark Satterthwaite, George Stigler, Charles Tiebout, & Gordon Tullock. Some have received hundreds of cites over their lives, while others have received few. In 1987, these authors' works were collectively cited 1,189 times in 450+ different journals. The citation itself was quite eclectic, including, in addition to large numbers in the economics, political science, politics, & law literature, journals from business, environmental studies, health, international relations, philosophy, planning, psychology, public administration, science, sociology, interdisciplinary social science, & urban studies. 3 Tables, 28 References. AA