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The concept "Socialism of XXIst century" was first used by German sociologist, Professor Heinz Dieterich Steffan. In his two books "El Socialismo del Siglo XXI" and "Hugo Chávez y el Socialismo del Siglo XXI" as well as in many articles and interviews he described what new socialism should look like. It is mainly consist of 4 institutions. First of all, Equivalence economy, which should be based on Marxian labor theory of value and which is democratically determined by those who directly create value, instead of marketeconomical principles. Second institution of Socialism of XXIst century is majority democracy, which makes use of plebiscites, referendums to decide upon important questions that concern the whole society. Majority democracy is also based on democratic state institutions as legitimate representatives of the common interests of the majority of citizens, with a suitable protection of minority rights. The third component of new socialism is the critical and responsible subject, the rationally, ethically and aesthetically self-determined citizen. The last part of the Socialism of XXIst century is classless society. In foreign policy it is very important regional cooperation. On January 30, 2005, in a speech to the 5th World Social Forum, Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez announced that he supported the creation of socialism of the XXIst century in Venezuela. According to Chavez, this socialism would be different from the socialism of the XXth century. While Chavez was vague about exactly how this new socialism would be different, he implied it would not be a state socialism as was practiced in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or as is practiced in Cuba today. Rather, it would be a socialism that would be more pluralistic and less state-centred.[.].

The concept "Socialism of XXIst century" was first used by German sociologist, Professor Heinz Dieterich Steffan. In his two books "El Socialismo del Siglo XXI" and "Hugo Chávez y el Socialismo del Siglo XXI" as well as in many articles and interviews he described what new socialism should look like. It is mainly consist of 4 institutions. First of all, Equivalence economy, which should be based on Marxian labor theory of value and which is democratically determined by those who directly create value, instead of marketeconomical principles. Second institution of Socialism of XXIst century is majority democracy, which makes use of plebiscites, referendums to decide upon important questions that concern the whole society. Majority democracy is also based on democratic state institutions as legitimate representatives of the common interests of the majority of citizens, with a suitable protection of minority rights. The third component of new socialism is the critical and responsible subject, the rationally, ethically and aesthetically self-determined citizen. The last part of the Socialism of XXIst century is classless society. In foreign policy it is very important regional cooperation. On January 30, 2005, in a speech to the 5th World Social Forum, Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez announced that he supported the creation of socialism of the XXIst century in Venezuela. According to Chavez, this socialism would be different from the socialism of the XXth century. While Chavez was vague about exactly how this new socialism would be different, he implied it would not be a state socialism as was practiced in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or as is practiced in Cuba today. Rather, it would be a socialism that would be more pluralistic and less state-centred.[.].

The concept "Socialism of XXIst century" was first used by German sociologist, Professor Heinz Dieterich Steffan. In his two books "El Socialismo del Siglo XXI" and "Hugo Chávez y el Socialismo del Siglo XXI" as well as in many articles and interviews he described what new socialism should look like. It is mainly consist of 4 institutions. First of all, Equivalence economy, which should be based on Marxian labor theory of value and which is democratically determined by those who directly create value, instead of marketeconomical principles. Second institution of Socialism of XXIst century is majority democracy, which makes use of plebiscites, referendums to decide upon important questions that concern the whole society. Majority democracy is also based on democratic state institutions as legitimate representatives of the common interests of the majority of citizens, with a suitable protection of minority rights. The third component of new socialism is the critical and responsible subject, the rationally, ethically and aesthetically self-determined citizen. The last part of the Socialism of XXIst century is classless society. In foreign policy it is very important regional cooperation. On January 30, 2005, in a speech to the 5th World Social Forum, Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez announced that he supported the creation of socialism of the XXIst century in Venezuela. According to Chavez, this socialism would be different from the socialism of the XXth century. While Chavez was vague about exactly how this new socialism would be different, he implied it would not be a state socialism as was practiced in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or as is practiced in Cuba today. Rather, it would be a socialism that would be more pluralistic and less state-centred.[.].

This paper presents the comparative analysis of the family policy of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of Lithuania. It analyses such fields as the changes in the conception of family and family policy, discusses what changes the national economic and political framework underwent. Morcover, the paper determines what major demographic problems existed in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and what demographic problems are current in the Republic of Lithuania and, in addition, how value-related attitudes changed in respect of family. The analysis of the family policy itself covers other spheres, such as family assistance instruments (benefits, allowances, pensions, privileges for housing acquisition and occupational privileges, vacations), education of the young generation (sefeguarding the chlidren's rights, education at the pre-school establishments and schools), and overviews the changes in the family policy (regulation of marriage, divorse, property and personal relations betwee the parents and children or other close relatives).

This paper presents the comparative analysis of the family policy of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of Lithuania. It analyses such fields as the changes in the conception of family and family policy, discusses what changes the national economic and political framework underwent. Morcover, the paper determines what major demographic problems existed in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and what demographic problems are current in the Republic of Lithuania and, in addition, how value-related attitudes changed in respect of family. The analysis of the family policy itself covers other spheres, such as family assistance instruments (benefits, allowances, pensions, privileges for housing acquisition and occupational privileges, vacations), education of the young generation (sefeguarding the chlidren's rights, education at the pre-school establishments and schools), and overviews the changes in the family policy (regulation of marriage, divorse, property and personal relations betwee the parents and children or other close relatives).

Much academic writing about socialism & post-socialism in Eastern Europe is grounded on assumptions that socialism was "immoral," "imposed," "oppressive," etc., & was experienced as such by people subjected to socialist governments (c.f. Yurchak, 2003). The memories of Soviet times recorded in three village communities in present-day Lithuania constitute a paradox to such conceptualizations of socialism. Furthermore, memories comprise a contradiction to the rhetoric of the revolutions of 1989-1991 founded in the strong criticism of socialism. People in the village communities studied invoke the past as a space & time of security, social welfare, prosperity, a sensible way of life, as well as a moral & just order. Conversely, the present is narrated in terms of decline & regression. The memories are comments on the post-socialist changes & personal experiences of post-socialism. Dialectically, the past & the present are reproduced in all narratives. These narratives constitute subjectivities of the villagers significant in understanding some recent processes such as nostalgia of socialism & resentment towards the present. These processes increasingly define the post-1989 history of Eastern European countries (Minkenberg, 2002; Ramet, 1999). The rise of radical & populist politics in Eastern Europe gives reason to think that communication between politicians & people is carried out in a language incompletely understood in post-socialist studies. The inquiry into memories of Soviet times is a way to approach articulated subjectivities & social histories which may or have become embodied in recent political discourse. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

The essence of the "Swedish socialism" created in the 20th century lies in "democratic functional socialism". During the last 30 years, even after having refused part of its elements, it remains the foundation of the Swedish welfare state, and historically the name of the "Swedish socialism" is mostly related to the famous Swedish and global figure of the smart political powers, social democrat Olof Palme. The article reviews the features of the biography of Olof Palme and his both theoretical and practical activity opting for social justice and by creating a welfare state in Sweden by the means of "democratic functional socialism". Olof Palme was also an advocate of human rights and freedoms, neutrality of small countries, an international mediator, an advocate of nuclear disarmament policy and a severe critic of neo-liberal ideas.

The essence of the "Swedish socialism" created in the 20th century lies in "democratic functional socialism". During the last 30 years, even after having refused part of its elements, it remains the foundation of the Swedish welfare state, and historically the name of the "Swedish socialism" is mostly related to the famous Swedish and global figure of the smart political powers, social democrat Olof Palme. The article reviews the features of the biography of Olof Palme and his both theoretical and practical activity opting for social justice and by creating a welfare state in Sweden by the means of "democratic functional socialism". Olof Palme was also an advocate of human rights and freedoms, neutrality of small countries, an international mediator, an advocate of nuclear disarmament policy and a severe critic of neo-liberal ideas.

Straipsnyje nagrinejama, koki gyvenimo prasmes supratima isskleidzia moderni politikos samprata. Klasikineje graiku ir krikscioniu filosofijoje politine tvarka atspindejo zmoniu gyvenimo tikslus. Ikimoderni Vakaru civilizacija remesi finalistiniu kosmoso modeliu, nurodziusiu kiekvieno daikto bei zmogaus vieta ir paskirti. Todel politiniai sprendimai bent konceptualiai atspindejo zmogisku protu suvokiamus metafizikos ar dieviskojo istatymo postulatus. Nuo Renesanso ir Naujuju amziu finalistine mokslo samprata keicia kauzalistine, o gyvenimo prasmes problema dingsta is politines teorijos nagrinejamu klausimu saraso. Darbe teigiama, kad, nepaisant isorines modernybes sekuliarizacijos, kiekvienos politines teorijos branduoli sudaro teologiniu problemu sprendimas, todel gyvenimo prasmes klausimas niekada negali buti eliminuojamas is politines minties darbotvarkes. Modernybeje ivykusi slinktis nuo finalistinio prie kauzalistinio pasaulio supratimo zmonijai suteike iki tol neturetu priemoniu perdirbti bet kuria gamtine ir socialine tvarka. O Dievo mirtis prasmingo gyvenimo zenklu verte ieskoti siapus. Siu dvieju modernios minties elementu sujungimas igalino gyvenimo prasmes deficita pasalinti igyvendinant eschatono imanentizacija, t. y. perkeliant galutinius zmonijos tikslus i si pasauli. Straipsnyje konstatuojama, kad tokiu tikslu realizacija yra neatsiejama nuo politinio totalitarizmo. Del atviros modernybes laiko sampratos neimanoma nustatyti, kada galutiniu zmonijos tikslu realizavimas bus pasiektas. Sio sprendimo prerogatyva atiteko suverenui The study examines the place of meaning of life in the modern concept of politics. This can be done only by proving that political thought reflects the purpose of human life which actually is meaning of life. If a political body or political philosophy cannot prove this, it will always be possible to reject their arguments by stating that they are meaningless to humans. This created conditions for the idea that society should be permanently improved and the ultimate goal of such improvement is the salvation of every individual in this world. Although supporters of liberalism and socialism have a different understanding of this final stage of human development, both of them aim not at preparing individual for the salvation in another reality but they think that ideas of the heaven should be established in this world. Adapted from the source document.

The article describes social and economic views of Prof. V. Čepinskis, focuses on his social aspirations and discusses his views on the methology of scientific cognition. It is stated that V. Čepinskis' views represent the democratic socialism trend.

The article describes social and economic views of Prof. V. Čepinskis, focuses on his social aspirations and discusses his views on the methology of scientific cognition. It is stated that V. Čepinskis' views represent the democratic socialism trend.

The article describes social and economic views of Prof. V. Čepinskis, focuses on his social aspirations and discusses his views on the methology of scientific cognition. It is stated that V. Čepinskis' views represent the democratic socialism trend.

The article describes social and economic views of Prof. V. Čepinskis, focuses on his social aspirations and discusses his views on the methology of scientific cognition. It is stated that V. Čepinskis' views represent the democratic socialism trend.

The purpose of the cultural elite members during soviet period was designated for the implementation of soviet indoctrination and legitimization of the regime. This task provided for those cultural elites not only the authority, symbolic capital and prestige among other societal groups, but also the strict mechanisms of control, censorship and public behavior. Even this model was valid for soviet Lithuania, the analysis of their relationship with the system in the late socialism reveals that local intellectuals and other cultural elite's members who were part of soviet cultural establishment transferred to the multi-edge relationship with the system. By taking the case of soviet writers, several intellectuals circles could be identified and this deployment could be sustained as a reflection of the rest of cultural elite. These groups not maintained constructed different relationship with the system or national ideology, but also experienced the intensive struggle for the power in local cultural establishments. The group of ideologists gradually lost their influence to the group of conservatist, who in the 70-80 occupied main chairs in cultural institutions and who were more enthusiastic towards ethnic issues, but being a part of cultural nomenclatura they also found consensus with local party apparatchiks. Another part of cultural nomenclatura -- ideologists could not also gained the public recognition as conservatists or the famous intellectuals from local intelligentsia circles (moderate writers), who have increased their authority for their talent and deep attachment to local and ethnic issues. Adapted from the source document.

The paper compares the political economic systems under German (1915–1918) and Soviet (1940–1941, 1944–1990 m.) occupations in Lithuania. During the World War I, Lithuania was part of the German occupation zone Ober Ost, ruled by the higher commando of the German Eastern front (Oberbefehlshaber Ost). The German military command of Eastern front under Paul Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff used Lithuania as a laboratory for large scale social experiment, creating the first planned command administrative economy in the world. After they were promoted to the higher commando of all German armed forced and established in 1917–1918 de facto military dictatorship over Germany, they made the attempt to establish the Ober Ost system in the metropole. Although the realization of the complete "Hindenburg programme" did fail, by 1917 Germany lived under military socialism (Kriegssozialismus) and coercive economy, which became the example and source of inspiration for Bolsheviks constructing Soviet model of state socialism. In 1940, this model came back to Lithuania, history making the full circle. This means that the market transition in 1990–1992 was second restoration of capitalism in Lithuania, because in 1918–1922 the capitalist economic system also was restored here jointly with the establishment of national state. Contemporary Lithuania demands from Russia to pay for damage inflicted on Lithuanian economy by Soviet occupation, and interwar Lithuania did demand the same form Weimar Germany in 1922–1923. However, while interwar Lithuania did ask to pay only direct occupation damage, contemporary Lithuania demands to compensate also the indirect damage. The main part of this damage is the loss of the national income which Lithuania did not receive in 1940–1990 because the efficient capitalist economic system was replaced by the less productive state socialist system during this time. However, the calculations of the indirect damage incorrectly assume that all varieties of capitalism are more efficient in the developing countries in comparison with command administrative system. The assumption that the variety of capitalism which existed in Lithuania by 1940 (state cooperative capitalism) was not less efficient than Stalinist Soviet socialism is politically correct one, as much as the expectation that under this system independent Lithuania would become advanced technological frontier country ("second Finland") by 1990. Nevertheless, the counterfactual development path of the independent capitalist Lithuania in 1940–1990 would include critical conjunctures and crossroads, which could end with Lithuania entering "low road" development path. Tellingly, Latin American capitalist country Uruguay (similar to Lithuania and other Baltic culture by its size and economc structure) had higher GDP per capita level than Lithuania in 1940, but by 1990 this level was lower than in Soviet Lithuania. Importantly, Uruguay never was under Soviet Russian occupation, did not construct socialism or suffered war damage.