Traditional agroforestry methods in Somalia and attempts to introduce new practices are described. Physical, social and political constraints are discussed and recommendations for future developments are made. Nomadic pastoralism with shifting cultivation is practised over most of the country. Settled communities in these areas plant live fencing. Most agroforestry is found near the two main rivers, the Jubba and the Shabeelle. On rainfed land scattered trees, most frequently Dobera glabra, are retained. These provide limited dry season browse, fruit and poles but are mainly used as shade for the farmer and his livestock. A bush fallow is often used to maintain soil fertility. On irrigated land, agricultural crops are commonly grown alongside young fruit trees until shade becomes too great. Other practices include growing crops in mature coconut plantations and with date palms. Large banana plantations are protected by shelterbelts, predominantly of Casuarina equisetifolia.
Somalia, in the Horn of Africa, suffers violence, political instability and high mortality rates. The recent major drought in Somalia led to what was termed the worst humanitarian disaster in the world. In July 2011 it was reported that nearly 60 000 people had entered into Kenya from Somalia already that year, including 1300 new arrivals every day to the Dadaab refugee camp, described as 'the largest, most congested and one of the most remote refugee camps in the world' (see http://www.unhcr.org/4e204b1e9.html). The drought along with mass migration into such poor conditions are likely to have significant short- and long-term mental health consequences for the populations involved.
The presented paper is divided into two parts. The first part tries to elucidate the origin of political Islam and its expansion in the Muslim World. The second part discusses the development of political Islam in contemporary Somalia.
Puntland is the first of Somalia's federal units to attempt transition from clan-based representation to directly-elected government, but poor preparations and last-minute cancellation of local elections in July underline the challenges of reconciling competing clan interests with a democratic constitution. Cancellation pragmatically averted violence, but societal tensions remain unaddressed. The presidential vote by a clan-selected parliament in January 2014 will thus be fraught. Weak political and judicial institutions will struggle to mediate, risking involvement by partisan arms of the state. Direct elections are no panacea for reducing the conflict risks, but hard-won incremental progress on the constitution and local democratisation must not be abandoned. The cancelled ballot's lessons should be instructive for promised elections in the rest of Somalia. Better technical preparations matter, but Puntland's experience shows that donors and other international actors also need to be heedful of local political realities, including support of elites, robustness of institutions and viability of electoral districts.
This walks readers through the basic demographics of Somalia, a country located in the horn of Africa. After learning about the government in Somalia and the problems that the people of the country face, this focuses on the problem of Rift Valley Fever. Rift Valley Fever is a virus that year after year strikes Somalia and surrounding countries. Weather patterns seem to help predict when Rift Valley Fever will be at the highest risk for an outbreak. This outlines the steps the current government and people are trying to take to help prevent outbreaks of RVF. But the solutions currently being taken or previously tried seem to not be working good enough. Along with possible solutions, this outlines the symptoms of RVF, treatment, and warning signs.
In den Somalia-Konflikt ist Bewegung gekommen. Im September 2011 wurde unter Vermittlung der Vereinten Nationen (VN) eine »Roadmap« verabschiedet, die den Transitionsprozess unter Leitung der Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) binnen zwölf Monaten zu einem möglichst erfolgreichen Abschluss führen soll. Im Oktober startete die Armee des Nachbarlands Kenia eine militärische Intervention im Süden Somalias, um die dominierende militärische Kraft im Land, die islamistische Shabaab-Miliz, in die Defensive zu zwingen. Der Blick in die Vergangenheit legt die Schlussfolgerung nahe, dass weder der neue politische Anlauf noch eine weitere militärische Internationalisierung den Konflikt in Somalia lösen werden. Die internationale Gemeinschaft sollte über neue Handlungsoptionen nachdenken und eine neue Somalia-Politik einleiten
El pasado 1 de junio el presidente del Gobierno Transicional de Somalia, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, sufrió dos atentados contra su vida. Los mismos reflejan la situación de tensión que sufre el país desde el derrocamiento del antiguo dictador Siad Barer, en 1992, y las dificultades políticas consescuentes. A partir de entonces el país ingresó en un proceso de división en varias regiones cada vez mas autónomas, promovido por las distintas tribus que las ocupan. Es el caso de Galmudug, Maakhir y Jubalandia. El proceso avanzó mucho mas en provincias como Somaliland y Puntland, que se destacan como las más estables y perdurables y que, en los hechos, ya se han declarado estados independientes.Como si estas tendencias centrífugas no fuesen suficientemente problemáticas, en el año 2006 el Sur y el Centro del país quedaron bajo el control de las "Cortes Islámicas". El vecino gobierno de Etiopía -(al sentirse amenazado por dicha situación)- le "declaró la guerra" a la milicia de las "Cortes Islámicas", a las cuales consideró, no sin ciertos argumentos, "fuerzas terroristas". Así hace un tiempo nos encontramos con la peculiar situación de que el ejército etíope, con la ayuda del gobierno interino de Somalia y el apoyo de los Estados Unidos, decidieron enfrentar una fuerza política interna somalí. En la actualidad, esta peculiar alianza logró derrocar, efectivamente, a los islamistas.El Gobierno Transicional de Somalia, que fuese instalado en 2004, se ha encontrado con enormes dificultades para establecer y mantener un gobierno centralizado. Amén de otros problemas mas coyunturales, el fuerte fraccionamiento de la sociedad somalí, tanto en tribus, clane,s como en grupos religiosos diversos, se constituye hoy como el principal obstáculo para la unificación estatal y la existencia de una razonable centrali¡dad gubernamental. Y debemos tomar en cuenta que, en el Norte, ya Somaliland y Puntland se consideran territorios autónomos e insisten en una cerrada negativa a plegarse a dicho gobierno Transicional.La complejidad del escenario somalí dificulta la formación de una opinión y de una conclusión categórica desde un lugar tan remoto como Amética Latina. A pesar de ello podríamos señalar que la actual situación en Somalia es producto de un conjunto de sucesivas decisiones políticas radicalmente ilegitimas que se fueron tomado a lo largo de su historia reciente.El gobierno de Barer (el ex – dictador) no basó su poder, ni en el mandato popular, ni en el reconocimiento de la población: la dictadura se basó en su propia fuerza militar que utilizó para hacerse con el gobierno y que lo mantuvo mientras ocupó ese lugar. Sin embargo, la lucha desencadenada por los movimientos opositores al gobierno de Barer, tampoco pueden ser considerados como fuerzas de resistencia legitima al despotismo. Estos movimientos políticos se levantaron en armas para derrocar a un gobierno que atendía a la población en base a la satisfacción exclusiva de los intereses de determinados clanes (Barer, por ejemplo, no reconocía en su aAministración a determinados grupos étnicos). Sin embargo, cuando los movimientos opositores se hicieron con el poder utilizaron los mismos métodos: incurrieron, infelizmente, en el mismo estilo político y orientaron sus decisiones a favor de otros clanes otrora desfavorecidos. Otra vez el gobierno cayó en la ilegitimidad.La formación de ls Estados "independientes" de Somaliland y Puntland responde, también, a la lógica de la única búsqueda de la legitimación del poder por parte de determinadas trubs, clanes o poblaciones regionales. Evidentemente, cuando no hay una organización política institucionalizada, mínimamente universal, encargada del orden y de instrumentar la legalidad "para todos", toda empresa política está condenada al particularismo clánico o tribal. Operar de otro modo condena a cualquier régimen a la derrota. Esto es algo que tienen muy en claro los distintos movimientos en pugna.En este contexto, quizás un paso adelante sea que la religión se constituya como un elemento mas universal y compartido por diversos grupos que, rápidamente, puede generar algún tipo de legitimidad política que permita avanzar hacia la conformaciòn del Estado aun inexistente. De esta manera, la religión vendría a suplir los vacíos de legitimidad politica que dejaron las autoridades (¿gobiernos?) anteriores.Los gobiernos somalíes, desde la unión de los territorios coloniales italianos y británicos que dieron origen al país, no han logrado generar una verdadera unidad política constituida en torno a un acuerdo general de una mayorìa significativa de los grupos integrantes de este país "potencial". Somalia se encuentra en la encrucijada y ante el desafío de una Nación que permita integrar a los diferentes clanes, expresiones culturales, religiones y que, además, pueda sortear las diferencias idiomáticas (en Somalia se habla somalí, árabe, italiano e inglés). De esa Nación debería surgir una autoridad (producto del reconocimiento de todos) estable y duradera. La dificultad de esta hazaña no sólo radica en el fraccionamiento y dispersión del poder, sino también en la inexistencia que se observa en Somalia de siquiera un germen de administración efectivamente "pública". Aunque el Gobierno Transicional ha estado dando algunos pasos hacia la construcción de un bosquejo de autoridad central -(como, por ejemplo, la autorización de la participación de políticos de Jubalandia, así como de Galmudug, en el gobierno), todavía queda un larguísimo trecho por andar.Organizar politicamente la gran pluralidad social y cultural imperante en Somalia, generando una solución política democrática legítimar es un desafío que parece un sueño. * Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales. Depto de Estudios Internacionales. FACS - ORT Uruguay.
Somalia currently faces large-scale food insecurity, arising from the drought and poor rainfall conditions prevailing across much of the country. Following four consecutive seasons of poor rainfall and low river water levels in large swaths of the country, a severe food crisis has hit in 2017. The drought has led to near total crop failures and reduced rural employment opportunities, widespread shortage of water and pasture, and consequent increases in livestock deaths, which have in turn stretched the country's coping mechanisms to the brink. Food access diminished rapidly among poor households as staple food prices rose sharply and livestock prices dropped significantly as people engaged in forced sales to cope with the effects of the drought. According to a preliminary Rapid Drought Needs Assessment (RDNA) by World Bank staff, which is based on a triangulation of secondary data1 through remote-sensing techniques, the drought has led to: livestock-related losses of between US$1.3 billion and US$1.7 billion for the period of the drought; crop production losses of up to US$60 million during the period of the drought; and depletion of nominally functional water resources, over 50 percent of which are located within highly drought stressed areas. The new Somali leadership has highlighted drought relief as a top priority. The peaceful and smooth transfer of power has allowed the government to focus quickly on drought and the difficult fiscal situation, highlighting the combined humanitarian and development challenges facing the country. The Humanitarian Response Plan presented at the London Conference in May 2017 increased the appeal to US$1.5 billion to reach 5.5 million people with urgent lifesaving humanitarian assistance. Still, per the UN (2017), the humanitarian situation remained grim for millions as of mid-2017 with a significant risk of famine in many parts of the country.
Executive Council Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session 7 – 8 February 2019 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ; As a result of protracted armed conflict, Somalia remains as one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most underdeveloped county. Following the collapse of the central government in 1991, the country has been plagued with violent conflict and insurgency, extreme and widespread poverty, acute food shortage, and political instability, economic underdevelopment, and recurring natural disasters such as droughts and floods. Somalis to date lack: essential healthcare, education, food security, safe drinking water, hygiene and adequate sanitation, and have very limited employment and livelihood opportunities. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and sub national tiers of government have meagre resources to meet the country's pressing needs.
In this report, Rafaela Catena looks at the 133 ceasefires in Somalia between 1989 and 2018. Key insights include 1) the majority (29 out of 32) of government ceasefires were related to the peace process, while six were also humanitarian, 2) 29 of the NSA ceasefires were related to the peace process, six were (also) humanitarian and 53 due to "other" reasons, 3) 10 ceasefires have been declared unilaterally, 11 multilaterally and 112 bilaterally, and 4) 89 ceasefires involved mediation. ; In diesem Bericht geht Rafaela Catena auf die 133 Waffenstillstände in Somalia zwischen 1989 und 2018 ein. Zu den wichtigsten Erkenntnissen gehören, dass 1) die Mehrheit der Waffenstillstände der Regierung in Zusammenhang mit dem Friedensprozessen standen (29 von 32) und dass sechs davon auch humanitärer Natur waren, 2) 29 der Waffenstillstände der NSA in Zusammenhang mit dem Friedensprozess standen und dass sechs davon (auch) humanitär waren und dass 53 aus "anderen" Gründen geschlossen wurden, 3) 10 Waffenstillstände unilateral, 11 multilateral und 112 bilateral erklärt wurden, und 4) 89 Waffenstillstände durch Vermittlung geschlossen wurden.
"From January 1991 through March 1995, the United States conducted numerous incursions into Somalia, undertaking a variety of missions and objectives. All of the actions had humanitarian elements, yet the operations that made up this mosaic of American involvement ranged from benign to aggressive, from purely humanitarian to clearly combative. Somalia . . . From the Sea is an account that attempts to explain and analyze these actions and place them within the overarching strategic and operational concepts developing in the first years following the end of the Cold War."--Introduction ; "July 2009"--T.p. verso. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Introduction -- 1. Operational and strategic context -- 2. Operation Eastern Exit -- 3. Operation Provide Relief -- 4. Operation Restore Hope : prelude and lodgment -- 5. Operation Restore Hope : operations and transition -- 6. Operation Continue Hope : operations and conflict -- 7. Operation Continue Hope : reinforcement and withdrawal -- 8. Operation United Shield -- 9. Operational and strategic observations -- Appendix A. The Weinberger doctrine -- Appendix B. The Powell doctrine -- Appendix C. UNITAF component commanders -- Appendix D. UN Security Council resolutions -- Appendix E. Seven-point agreement -- Appendix F. Somali clans and political factions -- Appendix G. Participating nations -- Appendix H. General Zinni's considerations for humanitarian and peace operations -- Appendix I. Major events chronology -- Appendix J. Acronyms and abbreviations. ; "From January 1991 through March 1995, the United States conducted numerous incursions into Somalia, undertaking a variety of missions and objectives. All of the actions had humanitarian elements, yet the operations that made up this mosaic of American involvement ranged from benign to aggressive, from purely humanitarian to clearly combative. Somalia . . . From the Sea is an account that attempts to explain and analyze these actions and place them within the overarching strategic and operational concepts developing in the first years following the end of the Cold War."--Introduction ; Mode of access: Internet.
Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as 'extraversion'. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support. ; Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as 'extraversion'. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support.
Il protrarsi del conflitto in Somalia ha causato un fenomeno migratorio di notevole complessità. La diaspora che ne è risultata si inserisce in una dinamica transnazionale straordinariamente attiva che contribuisce sia alla sopravvivenza economica che al caos nel paese; nello stesso tempo, gli avvenimenti nel paese, attraverso clan transnazionali e obblighi famigliari, influiscono sulle vite dei somali all'estero. Inoltre, le condizioni dei paesi ospitanti tendono a intensificare, attraverso l'isolamento culturale, quegli aspetti della società somala che contribuiscono ad intensificare la spirale della violenza in Somalia.
Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and the end of NATO-led Operation Unified Protector, the security situation in Libya has deteriorated significantly. Lacking comprehensive post-conflict stabilisation and state-building, the country has become a de facto failed state which made the rise of different Jihadists groups possible. In comparison with the history of al-Shabaab on the Horn of Africa, it seems that the country is on a good way to become a new Somalia. This analysis examines which similarities can be discovered in the two crises. It will not explore the conflict in Somalia and Libya in details, but the paper will focus on the main parallel aspects of them. These will be the lack of strong basics, namely functioning central government and national identity, which easily led to the collapse of the state; the missed post-conflict stabilisation, which is the historical responsibility of both local and international actors; the deepening and atomized conflict which covered the interests of only a tight elite; and the rise of radical Islamists, who offered universal solutions for the woe of the neglected citizens
Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime and the end of NATO-led Operation Unified Protector, the security situation in Libya has deteriorated significantly. Lacking comprehensive post-conflict stabilisation and state-building, the country has become a de facto failed state which made the rise of different Jihadists groups possible. In comparison with the history of al-Shabaab on the Horn of Africa, it seems that the country is on a good way to become a new Somalia. This analysis examines which similarities can be discovered in the two crises. It will not explore the conflict in Somalia and Libya in details, but the paper will focus on the main parallel aspects of them. These will be the lack of strong basics, namely functioning central government and national identity, which easily led to the collapse of the state; the missed post-conflict stabilisation, which is the historical responsibility of both local and international actors; the deepening and atomized conflict which covered the interests of only a tight elite; and the rise of radical Islamists, who offered universal solutions for the woe of the neglected citizens
