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In both general humanitarian studies, as well as political studies, the concept of language has a large importance. However, considering any language could be stripped down to a (seemingly more basic) notion of code, actual studies of code as an important aspect of international political communication are scarce, despite it is rather obvious that they have much potential in terms of both practical use and theoretical dwelling. In specific case of this article (and, in wider sense, preceding research by authors) the problem to dwell upon is how such codes could be translated.Translations developed to a quite high level over thousands of years and now appear quickly and conveniently, of certain texts and in needed languages. Level of knowledge of the foreign languages among world's population is also progressing, as well. And yet, even in such conditions language barrier, whether it gets thicker or thinner at some places, diverse in its shapes and forms, remains. But there is an idea of a language which is understandable anywhere in the world: analogue of a text, in which at least some key elements would be understood by anyone, won't be lost in translation, no matter which language was it written in. As we mentioned, operating at a level of sub-text, it could be really more adequately referred to as a universal code, but within the practice of audiovisual media it is indeed often called a language.Audiovisual media, fixation of images on film or videotape and digital images as well is what we mostly talk about in this scientific work, because with civilization evolving we become more and more dependent on what was said in that language, spend more time not only searching for new ways, but developing old, as well. Audiovisual media, in that regard, is produced in almost every possible language, including fictional ones. Internet Movie Database (IMDb) divides languages which are specified as used in different listed audio-visual works into common languages and less-common languages, effectively avoiding the notion of non-common and emphasizing that regardless of how common language is, importance of it in the audiovisual media is entirely a decision of creators.Political studies are, to some point, is a glue, that bonds together different aspects of developing and classifies them accordingly to some wide-spread political doctrines. Knowing how such doctrines inspire certain concepts in the everyday life of the state, how they transform in society's conscience and eventually inspire nation-wide processes is what political studies should concentrate upon and that also might include inspiring the needed and very welcome change in what is known as technology-enhanced language learning (TELL). Studying universal code of audio-visual media in the contexts of International political communication should be taken into consideration in TELL and research thereof, as nowadays people tend to be much more politically involved with the use of Internet and social networks as instruments of political influence, discussion and education – wider then ever and yet also much more restricted then before. Correlation between audio-visual media and new media social platforms, such as Reddit seem to be overlooked and under-researched. Present-day learners are represented mostly by the members of the Facebook/YouTube generation which is more visually developed than whichever of the previous generations. For this generation, online communication via exchanging static and moving images is just as important as face-to-face interaction, often offering knowledge-exchange opportunities. Their expectations strongly influence the modern teaching style by demanding more and more visual aids (first of all films) especially in teaching foreign languages.For political studies in the international relations, audiovisual media, while not exactly being terra incognita, is a place of only a certain level familiarity, which could and should be enriched by further research, as security of the situation pretty much depends on intricate processes of international communication witnessed in a conglomerate of social media and audiovisual media. Already, a situation of hybrid war forming within our own country dictates the need of closer filtration of information provided to us through the social networks, which nowadays, primarily, tend to use audiovisual format to stay fast and relevant. Relevancy of audiovisual media, its whole survival through the years and even decades (centuries are certainly out of question as audiovisual media is much younger then printed one) depended on being fluid, adaptive and developing a very transformative and unique system of approaching the unsuspecting audience from every corner. That resulted in supposed simple entertainment becoming not just one, but several multibillion industries, which intervene in unexpected way when it comes to presenting actual events and then distorting the accounts in latter, fictionalized attempts. ; У статті розглянуто окремий випадок аудіовізуального медіа у зростаючому сегменті політичної науки, який вивчає міжнародну політичну комунікацію. Спеціальна увага приділяється такому інструменту комунікації, як коди та їх універсальність, включно з вивченням інтерпретацій аудіовізуального медіа в контексті політичної комунікації.

Civil wars have a tendency to spread across borders. In several instances of conflict diffusion, however, conflicts spread well after their cessation at home. Whereas existing diffusion research has not attached much importance to this observation, I argue that these conflicts are instances of a broader pattern of postconflict diffusion. Wars are particularly prone to spread after termination because the end of fighting generates a surplus of weapons, combatants, and rebel leaders whose fortunes are tied to the continuation of violence. Some of these resources circulate throughout the region via the small arms trade and through transnational rebel networks, making this a time at which it should be easier for nonstate groups in the neighborhood to build a capable rebel army. The results from two complementary statistical tests on global conflict data provide strong support for such a postconflict diffusion effect.

Civil wars have a tendency to spread across borders. In several instances of conflict diffusion, however, conflicts spread well after their cessation at home. Whereas existing diffusion research has not attached much importance to this observation, I argue that these conflicts are instances of a broader pattern of postconflict diffusion. Wars are particularly prone to spread after termination because the end of fighting generates a surplus of weapons, combatants, and rebel leaders whose fortunes are tied to the continuation of violence. Some of these resources circulate throughout the region via the small arms trade and through transnational rebel networks, making this a time at which it should be easier for nonstate groups in the neighborhood to build a capable rebel army. The results from two complementary statistical tests on global conflict data provide strong support for such a postconflict diffusion effect.

Debates about the legitimacy of different kinds of civil society action have increasingly come to be framed in the language of 'culture wars', and this is contributing to the closing down of space for civil society in the UK. The focus of the article is on restrictions being experienced
by the charity sector, while drawing out the implications for other parts of civil society. A recent example is the National Trust, which in 2020 faced censure for publishing a report on the historical links between its properties and slavery and colonialism. In this case, as in others, although
the culture–wars framing was novel, there were continuities with long– standing debates over the legitimate space for civil society action, often discussed in terms of the obligations on charities to avoid being 'political'. Specific modes of discipline across a range of legal
frameworks are described, with a more detailed account of how these dynamics have affected Muslim civil society since the launch of the War on Terror, especially through Prevent. The article contributes to academic and activist debates about the best ways to organise to achieve progressive
ends in an increasingly hostile and authoritarian political context.

A neoclassical growth model is used to empirically test for the influences of a civil war on steady-state income per capita both at home and in neighboring countries. This model provides the basis for measuring long-run and short-run effects of civil wars on income per capita growth in the host country and its neighbors. Evidence of significant collateral damage on economic growth in neighboring nations is uncovered. In addition, this damage is attributed to country-specific influences rather than to migration, human capital, or investment factors. As the intensity of the measure used to proxy the conflict increases, there are enhanced neighbor spillovers. Moreover, collateral damage from civil wars to growth is more pronounced in the short run.

A neoclassical growth model is used to empirically test for the influences of a civil war on steady-state income per capita both at home & in neighboring countries. This model provides the basis for measuring long-run & short-run effects of civil wars on income per capita growth in the host country & its neighbors. Evidence of significant collateral damage on economic growth in neighboring nations is uncovered. In addition, this damage is attributed to country-specific influences rather than to migration, human capital, or investment factors. As the intensity of the measure used to proxy the conflict increases, there are enhanced neighbor spillovers. Moreover, collateral damage from civil wars to growth is more pronounced in the short run. 4 Tables, 1 Appendix, 29 References. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications, Inc.]

Across nineteenth-century Europe, the emergence of constitutional and democratic nation-states was accompanied by intense conflict between Catholics and anticlerical forces. At its peak, this conflict touched virtually every sphere of social life: schools, universities, the press, marriage and gender relations, burial rites, associational culture, the control of public space, folk memory and the symbols of nationhood. In short, these conflicts were 'culture wars', in which the values and collective practices of modern life were at stake. These 'culture wars' have generally been seen as a chapter in the history of specific nation-states. Yet it has recently become increasingly clear that the Europe of the mid- and later nineteenth century should also be seen as a common politico-cultural space. This book breaks with the conventional approach by setting developments in specific states within an all-European and comparative context, offering a fresh and revealing perspective on one of modernity's formative conflicts.

The constructions of deafness and social representations of a deaf child are very complicated and
deeply contested. This paper examines the constructions of deafness and how it has been sociohistorically
framed and re-framed within the parameters of normalcy and deviance. Such analysis may
offer insight on the potential impact of shaping ideology, politics, and what it means to be deaf. This
level of analysis is conducted via an examination of the socio-history of deaf education including discussions
of the ongoing "paradigm wars" between certain social control institutions, mainly American
Sign Language-based (or called English-based) and the oral-based educational institutions and its
implications of language. Examining these two social control institutions will seek to uncover certain
constructions within specific social representations and societal dynamics that may shape the deaf
child's identity, its version of "natural" gifts, social inequality, and ultimately the types of ideologies
constructed toward deaf students. A possible alternative view of reapproprating of the corporeal differences
of deafness is discussed including positive strategies to minimize reproduced social stratification,
oppression, social inequality, and divisions when dealing with deafness.

Democratic governments who need public opinion on their side to make decisions use different strategies to win popular support for their wars. This book chronicles that process in specific how popular support for the Iraq Wars were won by the two Bush Presidents, and how the leaders can often twist the truth. There is a tacit assumption that the public wants to trust the President, and that there are things the leaders know that the general public is not privy to. In certain cases, like wars of retaliation, little marketing is necessary. The use of polling data can also aide the government in.

In this paper we analyze the relationship between ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars. Several recent papers have argued that the uncertainty about the relative power of the contenders in a war will tend to increase its duration. In these models, uncertainty is directly related to the relative size of the contenders. We argue that the duration of civil wars increases the more polarized a society is. Uncertainty is not necessarily linked to the structure of the population but it could be traced back to the measurement of the size of the different groups in the society. Given a specific level of measurement error or uncertainty, more polarization implies lengthier wars. Our empirical results show that ethnically polarized countries have to endure longer civil wars than ethnically less polarized societies.

Do state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state capitalism create unfair competition in international markets? Empirical evidence surveyed in this brief suggests that from the turn of the century, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) indeed started competing increasingly with private firms, trading across borders and establishing themselves abroad through foreign direct investment. Some SOEs benefited from government-granted advantages unavailable to their private peers. International legal disputes involving SOEs have multiplied, and discussions of new trade and investment policy initiatives aiming to discipline SOEs have emerged. However, opinions differ as to what are the best policy approaches. The OECD Guidelines on SOEs would go a long way towards maintaining an international level playing field, but these are not mandatory and therefore unevenly implemented. WTO law gives countries freedom in managing their SOEs and focuses instead on disciplining government actions which may distort competition in international markets, irrespective of their ownership status. Some recent preferential trading agreements (PTAs) have included new SOE-specific disciplines that may influence future policy developments. On-going concerns about the allegedly unfair trade practices in emerging market economies with large state sectors, most notably China, are likely to strengthen the pressure for a closer scrutiny of SOEs and a development of new national and international disciplines. Improved transparency and disclosure are likely to be a common denominator of these new initiatives. ; State-owned Enterprises and the Trade Wars ; publishedVersion

We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-location setup. In order to contrast the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when the player are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the three situations in which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose where to harvest; (b) establishes a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c) assigns to each player a specific exclusive location to hunt. We show that when preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the policies cannot mitigate the overexploitation and in addition they worsen the utilities of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing the extinction and also improving the welfare of both players.

We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-locations setup. In order to contrast the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when the player are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the three situations in which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose where to harvest; (b) establishes a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c) assigns to each player a specific exclusive location to hunt. We show that when preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the policies cannot mitigate the overexploitation and in addition they worsen the utilities of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing the extinction and also improving the welfare of both players.

We develop a spatial resource model in continuous time in which two agents strategically exploit a mobile resource in a two-locations setup. In order to contrast the overexploitation of the resource (the tragedy of commons) that occurs when the player are free to choose where to fish/hunt/extract/harvest, the regulator can establish a series of spatially structured policies. We compare the three situations in which the regulator: (a) leaves the player free to choose where to harvest; (b) establishes a natural reserve where nobody is allowed to harvest; (c) assigns to each player a specific exclusive location to hunt. We show that when preference parameters dictate a low harvesting intensity, the policies cannot mitigate the overexploitation and in addition they worsen the utilities of the players. Conversely, in a context of harsher harvesting intensity, the intervention can help to safeguard the resource, preventing the extinction and also improving the welfare of both players.