Suchergebnisse

This article introduces the special issue '« Islamogauchisme » ? Moral Panics, Culture Wars and the Threat to Academic Freedom'. It begins by outlining the polemic in 2020, whereby the government accused universities of being overrun by so-called 'Islamogauchistes', placing this moral panic within the wider French context of ideological redefinitions of laïcité and debates on the compatibility of Islam with the universalism of a secular republic, as well as of neoliberal reforms and authoritarian crackdowns on public protest. The article then explores the history and fallacy of the concept and associated government claims, arguing that the term is best understood as an empty signifier, an umbrella term under which almost anything vaguely Muslim or left-wing could be covered, before moving on to critique the function of this kind of discourse, arguing that as well as continuing the Islamophobic scapegoating of minorities, it serves to 'other' the left-wing opposition and normalise the far-right while the neoliberal centre itself becomes increasingly illiberal and authoritarian. Finally, the text will place this very French polemic in the wider global context, considering it in terms of the wider culture wars that we are witnessing around the world while also focusing on what is specific to the French case – namely, a particularly republican form of racism that supplements the neoilliberalisation of the state. The introduction concludes with a summary of the contributions to the issue from Philippe Marlière, Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, Michel Wieviorka, Caroline Ibos & Eric Fassin, Houria Bouteldja & Anna Younes, Farid Hafez, and Aurélien Mondon & Simon Dawes.

Times of crisis expose how we experience social, physical, and emotional forms of distance. Alone with Others explores how these experiences overlap, shaping our coexistence. Departing from conventional debates that associate intimacy with affection and distance with alienation, Haustein introduces tact as a particular mode of feeling one's way and making space in the sphere of human interaction. Reconstructing tact's conceptual history from the late eighteenth century to the present, she then focuses on three specific periods of socio-political upheaval: the two World Wars, and 1968. In five reading encounters with Marcel Proust, Helmuth Plessner, Theodor Adorno, François Truffaut, and Roland Barthes, Haustein invites us to reconsider our own ways of engaging with other people, images, and texts, and to gauge the significance of tact today. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.

"Slovakia has a rich and complex history, but until now there has not been a comprehensive analysis of the nation's economic thought. This volume expertly fills this gap and traces the development of Slovak economic thought from the 16th Century to the present day. Identifying key themes, moments and thinkers, the chapters in this work consider the evolution of Slovak economic ideas and explores the nation's place alongside other schools of thought. Significant coverage is given to the economists Gregorius Berzeviczy and Imrich Karvaš, as well as landmark periods such as the creation of Czechoslovakia, the World Wars, the Socialist regime, and post-Communist Slovakia. This book is of interest to advanced students and researchers of the history of economic thought, economic history and political economy, as well as those with a specific interest in the history of Slovakia. Julius Horváth is Professor at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, and Vienna, Austria."

Can heroes legitimize strongly-proscribed and repugnant political behaviors? We exploit the purposefully arbitrary rotation of French regiments to measure the legitimizing effects of heroic credentials. 53% of French line regiments happened to rotate under a specific general, Philippe Pétain, during the pivotal WWI battle of Verdun (1916). Using recently declassified intelligence data on 95,314 individuals, we find the home municipalities of regiments serving under Pétain at Verdun raised 7% more Nazi collaborators during the Pétain led Vichy regime (1940-44). The effects are similar across joining Fascist parties, German forces, paramilitaries that hunted Jews and the Resistance, and collaborating economically. These municipalities also increasingly vote for right-wing parties between the wars. The voting effects persist after WWII, becoming particularly salient during social crises. We argue these results reflect the complementary role of the heroes of Verdun in legitimizing and diffusing the authoritarian values of their former leader.

Can heroes legitimize strongly-proscribed and repugnant political behaviors? We exploit the purposefully arbitrary rotation of French regiments to measure the legitimizing effects of heroic credentials. 53% of French line regiments happened to rotate under a specific general, Philippe Pétain, during the pivotal WWI battle of Verdun (1916). Using recently declassified intelligence data on 95,314 individuals, we find the home municipalities of regiments serving under Pétain at Verdun raised 7% more Nazi collaborators during the Pétain led Vichy regime (1940-44). The effects are similar across joining Fascist parties, German forces, paramilitaries that hunted Jews and the Resistance, and collaborating economically. These municipalities also increasingly vote for right-wing parties between the wars. The voting effects persist after WWII, becoming particularly salient during social crises. We argue these results reflect the complementary role of the heroes of Verdun in legitimizing and diffusing the authoritarian values of their former leader.

Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is "effective." Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels' constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is in uenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels' need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels' terrorist attacks during con icts (1989-2009) and of ISIS tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument.

The impact of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping on conflict has received a sustained amount of attention in the empirical literature. The advent of new data on UN peacekeeping and new temporal units of analysis have enabled researchers to expand the frontiers of peacekeeping research and undertake a more nuanced examination of peacekeeping effectiveness. In this special section, a series of articles examine how UN peacekeeping affects different types of violence within conflicts and leads to different types of peaceful outcomes. Factors such as the cultural affinity between peacekeepers and local communities, the size of peacekeeping operations and the specific composition of UN forces are shown to be important variables associated with lower levels of casualties and violence and also a higher likelihood of mediation and timely peaceful settlements in civil wars. In the aggregate, these articles suggest that robust peacekeeping is associated with better outcomes in many stages of conflict.

AbstractHow do we measure religious violence? This study is focused on utilizing new methodological approaches and data sources to measure religiously motivated violence. Previous attempts to measure religious violence concentrated on coding U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom reports or utilizing existing datasets on armed conflict/civil wars. These previous attempts provided state-level data of the levels of religiously motivated violence, but due to data limitations cannot provide more fine-grained measures of specific acts of violence tied to religious motivation. In particular, accounting for varying levels of intensity especially in regards to non-lethal acts of religiously motivated violence is missing. This study builds upon previous attempts focusing on the creation of more fine-grained measures and accounting for its variation at the sub-national level utilizing natural language processing. The data generated are used to examine incidences of reported religious violence in India from 2000 to 2015.

AABB Standards specify that ABO group-specific whole blood is the only acceptable choice for whole blood transfusions. Although universal donor group O stored whole blood (SWB) was used extensively by the military during the wars of the mid-twentieth century, its use has fallen out of favor and has never been used to great extent in the civilian trauma population. Interest in the use of whole blood has been renewed, particularly in light of its potential value in far-forward military and other austere environments. Evidence of preserved platelet function in SWB has heightened enthusiasm for a "one stop shop" resuscitation product providing volume, oxygen carrying capacity, and hemostatic effects. Experience with universal donor group O SWB is required to ascertain whether its use will be an advance in trauma care. Described here is the process of establishing a universal donor group O SWB at a civilian trauma center in the United States.

Humanitarian aid has rapidly emerged as a core component of modern peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. However, some practitioners and policymakers claim that humanitarian assistance may actually prolong conflict. The current debate about the effect of humanitarian aid on conflict underspecifies causal mechanisms and takes place largely through case studies. I use a bargaining framework to argue that aid can inadvertently increase each combatant's uncertainty about the other side's relative strength, thereby prolonging civil war. I test my argument using panel data on cross-national humanitarian aid expenditures. From 1989 to 2008, increased levels of humanitarian assistance lengthen civil wars, particularly those involving rebels on the outskirts of a state. This result suggests that policymakers need to carefully consider whether the specific benefits provided by humanitarian aid outweigh the risk of prolonging civil conflicts, and to look for methods of disbursement that reduce that risk. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article analyses the establishment of a network of hostels for unemployed workers in Yugoslavia between the two world wars. The analysis investigates the legal, political, and institutional background to these hostels, and how they were conceived and financed. By looking at the development of a new public social policy from the perspective of the jobless, the article aims to examine the nature, goals, and especially the boundaries of a modern provision for Yugoslav workers, namely its strategies and practices of social inclusion and exclusion. The article reveals how a modern concept of unemployment gradually emerged. These hostels were not part of a traditional policy on poverty; they were the expression of a new and more modern form of social policy. The article further shows how new social differences and distances between "non-working" people were created, and what specific impact those differences and distances had on the functioning of these institutions.

Previous research has uncovered only ambiguous evidence of the mechanisms that support or inhibit democratic trajectories in the aftermath of civil war. Here I suggest that one specific form of transnational aid during a civil war may have reverberating consequences after the fighting stops. Specifically, when a state emerges to control the executive after a conflict with the help of a previous interstate enemy, the leadership is vulnerable to political attacks on their patriotism and judgment. As such, open democracy becomes a less attractive option for these executives. I investigate this proposition using difference-in-difference matching estimation, as well as several alternative specifications. The findings strongly suggest the presence of disincentives to democratize for those executives that received help from external rivals. This research provides a new set of tools for identifying the causes and potential remedies to deficient democracy after civil wars.

Drawing on a critical engagement with the claims made by (and interpretations of) the 2006 US army and marine corps field manual on "Counterinsurgency," this article engages some of its underlying concerns with the problematic relation between violence, legitimacy, and political order. Since this manual draws heavily on many commonplaces of contemporary political science, the analysis explores their problematic presuppositions and the ways in which they play out in contemporary warfare. The primary conclusion is that while the encounter of legitimacy and violence is claimed by the doctrine to produce and maintain political order, its framing of this encounter is deeply rooted in a specific political order, that of the modern state, which severely constrains the conditions under which this encounter can take place. These constraints cast serious doubts on many of the doctrine's assertions, especially as they have shaped recent wars in Afghanistan and, until recently, in Iraq.