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A review essay on books by (1) F. Ankersmit & L. Klinkers [Eds], De tien plagen van de staat. De bedrijfs-matige overheid gewogen ([The Ten Plagues of the State. Weighted Operational Government] Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2008); (20 T. Schillemans, Verantwoording in de schaduw van de macht ([Accountability in the Shadow of Power] (Utrecht: Lemma, 2007); & (3) F. Leeuw & R. Elte [Eds], Turven, tellen, toetsen. Over toezicht, inspectie, handhaving en evaluatie en hun maatschappelijke betekenis in Nederland ([Turven, Count, Keys. Supervision, Inspection Enforcement and Evaluatiuon and Their Social Significance in the Netherlands] Den Haag: Boom, 2007).

In Europe and especially in the euro existed between mid 2007 to late 2009 preserve vote on how the institutions of a sometimes fragile EU and the single currency managed to the global financial crisis defy. The crisis hit over from the United States, where the dangers of applied liberal and deregulated model of financial markets and inadequate governance were insufficiently recognized. European banks, but a few, behaved more than their American peers. Also banking supervision was generally effective, especially in countries like Italy, Spain and the small Cyprus. Through an innovative and fast answer to the European Central Bank had a leading role in tackling the crisis: the European legal framework for emergency loans was modified and cross-border coordination was performed. Crucial factor was that, in countries such as Belgium, Greece and Italy after, most EU and eurozone countries thanks to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Treaty of Maastricht had their debt under control. The result was that most European countries have not been hit as hard by the recession and the United States. The Anglo-American capitalism performed moderately, while the European system had shown its resilience (for the first time). Adapted from the source document.

Introduction:The foregoing chapters of this book have demonstrated the extent to which national civil servants are involved in EU-related activities, and the dynamics of national administrative activities in the context of the EU. This chapter shifts the focus from national civil servants working on the European Union to national civil servants working for the European Union. This is a class of national civil servants for whom finding a balance between national and European interests in their work is a permanent, although sometimes implicit feature of their daily professional activities. The duality of national and European roles is perhaps the most exacerbated for the seconded national experts (SNEs), i.e. national civil servants who are temporarily working for EU institutions, in particular those seconded to the European Commission.2 On the one hand, Commission SNEs have to be loyal to the Commission and represent European interests in this supranational organ of the EU. On the other hand, their employer is still the member-state government, and they are expected to return to their home organization after their secondment term ends. The SNEs are thus practically torn between two employers: their daily employer under whose supervision they work (the Commission) and the national employer who sent them on the secondment and continues to pay their salaries (the member-state).

The legislation and regulations which seek to guarantee good governance in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom are similar to the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the administrative performance in the West is significantly inferior to that of the latter. To explain this difference, this thesis highlights the fact that the legislation in the West codifies norms of conduct that are dominant in modern Western societies. However, due to the small-scale, the poverty and the stratification of the insular societies other norms of conduct are dominant in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom. To maintain their position politicians depend on electoral support. Therefore they should act according to the norms of conduct that are generally accepted within society. As a result an incentive for politicians is manifest to act contrary to the appropriate line. In the practice of the Caribbean overseas territories this incentive results especially in political patronage. Yet, the examples of Barbados and Anguilla learn that despite the fact that small-scale, poverty and social stratification are unalterable good governance is still possible. Where, however, the high quality of governance in Barbados should especially be ascribed to the de-politicization of the distribution power of public goods of the executive branch, the high quality of governance in Anguilla is mainly due to the supervision of London. Because it should not to be expected that the administrative elite in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom will adjust their state system on their own initiative, good governance will in the first place depend on the willingness of the Netherlands to play an active role in the local administrative affairs of the islands in the West.