This article explores a significant scientific problem and an actual issue of real politics, understanding the process and the specifics of the state identity politics. State identity politics is connected with symbolic politics and, in particular, the politics of historical memory. While much has been written on this topic, the lack of a reasonable unambiguous interpretation of such concepts as "state identity", "national and state identity", "civic identity" suggests that more can be said. This article provides information on the development of the theory of identity politics, describes the developmental directions of the concept of state identity politics, identifies the problems of constructing the basic matrix of state identity, identifies the problem areas for the formation of the political elite model of state identity, and discusses the hidden conflicting characteristics of state identity politics. The author focuses on developments on these issues of Russian political scientists. A separate point of discussion is the formation of state identity politics in the so-called "new" states, which have to use technologies including "post-truths" to prove the uniqueness and authenticity of the history of their states. The author believes that at present the financial, organizational and technical resources that a state uses to implement the identity politics are becoming the object of competition between various political forces and public opinion leaders from among civil activists. Attempts to create a unified model of state identity, which different layers of citizens would accept, is actually doomed to failure. This study was funded by RFBR and EISR; the research project № 19-011-31616 "State policy in the field of identity formation: conceptual foundations, technologies and prospects".
This article explores a significant scientific problem and an actual issue of real politics, understanding the process and the specifics of the state identity politics. State identity politics is connected with symbolic politics and, in particular, the politics of historical memory. While much has been written on this topic, the lack of a reasonable unambiguous interpretation of such concepts as "state identity", "national and state identity", "civic identity" suggests that more can be said. This article provides information on the development of the theory of identity politics, describes the developmental directions of the concept of state identity politics, identifies the problems of constructing the basic matrix of state identity, identifies the problem areas for the formation of the political elite model of state identity, and discusses the hidden conflicting characteristics of state identity politics. The author focuses on developments on these issues of Russian political scientists. A separate point of discussion is the formation of state identity politics in the so-called "new" states, which have to use technologies including "post-truths" to prove the uniqueness and authenticity of the history of their states. The author believes that at present the financial, organizational and technical resources that a state uses to implement the identity politics are becoming the object of competition between various political forces and public opinion leaders from among civil activists. Attempts to create a unified model of state identity, which different layers of citizens would accept, is actually doomed to failure. This study was funded by RFBR and EISR; the research project № 19-011-31616 "State policy in the field of identity formation: conceptual foundations, technologies and prospects".
Drawing on democratic theory, this dissertation explores a thesis that the experience of ethnic restructuring significantly effects the ability of a democratizing state to successfully consolidate its emerging democracy. Ethnically restructured states, it is hypothesized, have an especially hard time creating inclusive democratic political communities, which is a necessary prerequisite for a consolidated democracy. To test the thesis, the comparative case study method is applied to the ethnically restructured states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The goal of the case studies is to examine the approaches that the Baltic states used to reduce polarization. The historical background to the case studies includes an analysis of recently released archival documents and historical studies conducted in the Baltic states that deal with the demographic history of the Baltic states. One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic differences in the Baltic states were conditioned by the historical memory of deportations and planned migration. Consequently, successful approaches to community building should be responsive to both the historical sensitivities of autochthonous ethnic groups and the need of the immigrants to have a say in community building and everyday affairs. Such approaches are likely to be implemented at the local (sub-state) level. They are likely to be process-oriented and capable of incorporating flexible forms of political organization. International actors interested in helping states to reduce ethnic polarization should focus their efforts at the local level. Using political conditionality from "above" for this purpose is likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as an endangered ethnic identity.
It is estimated that around one billion people worldwide rely on electricity generated from nuclear materials. Whether Australia should join the list of countries already producing nuclear power - including, among others, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, and lndia - is a topic currently the subject of fierce debate in Australia. In 2006 Prime Minister Howard convened a Taskforce to consider the opportunities for Australia in uranium mining, processing and nuclear energy. The final report released by the Taskforce was generally supportive of nuclear power, and considered it to be an important part of the solution to Australia's greenhouse gas emissions. The Prime Minister has indicated his support for nuclear energy, however the State Premiers are adamant that nuclear power will not be allowed in their State. Whether Australia should generate nuclear power, and where a nuclear power plant would be sited are highly contentious issues. A study done by the Australia Institute has suggested 19 different sites, the most preferable being in South Australia. If the Commonwealth wishes to establish a nuclear power industry, and wishes to do so in an Australian State (as the Australia Institute study suggests they would), and the State remains strongly opposed, then there is a very live question about whether the Constitution makes provision for the establishment of a nuclear power industry in an Australian State by the Commonwealth. There are considerable obstacles for the Commonwealth to overcome if it were to establish a nuclear power industry. Firstly, State governments own the minerals, and many of them are opposed to uranium mining. Those that aren't are opposed to its mining are certainly opposed to its enrichment, conversion and fuel fabrication for use in a nuclear reactor. The States have traditionally had responsibility for the management of water resources (until recently, when they referred power over the Murray-Darling Basin to the Commonwealth), and nuclear power plants require a lot of water for their operation in both the generation of electricity, and the cooling of radioactive waste. The State governments own the infrastructure through which electricity is presently transmitted, distributed and retailed, and for nuclear power to be viable it is essential that the generator be linked into that network. In addition to all of this, the Commonwealth must establish a comprehensive national regulatory scheme, with appropriate administrative bodies, for the regulation of the industry. However, the Constitution, despite being written in 1900 when nuclear technology did not exist, enables the Commonwealth to establish a nuclear power industry in an Australian State, notwithstanding these issues. The Constitution gives certain legislative and executive powers to the Commonwealth, and the activities necessary to establish a nuclear power industry fall within the scope of those powers. There are no powers (particular functions), reserved to the States, and therefore the States are limited to arguing that a particular activity does not come within the scope of the powers given to the Commonwealth under the Constitution. A recent High Court decision has made this task considerably more difficult. In New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) ('Work Choices'), the High Court held that the Commonwealth power to legislate with respect to foreign corporations and trading and financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth extended to any activity undertaken by that corporation. This, in combination with the broad definition of what a constitutional corporation is, enables the Commonwealth to legislate in areas previously the domain of the State governments. Because State governments use the legal entity of a corporation to undertake so many of their functions (including the provision of electricity), and because corporations in the private sector would undertake most of the activities required to establish a nuclear power industry, the corporations power provides the justification (constitutionally) for much of what the Commonwealth would need to do in establishing a nuclear power industry. Other important constitutional provisions include the power given to the Commonwealth to legislate with respect to trade and commerce among the States; the Territories; external affairs; the compulsory acquisition of property; places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes; and the executive power to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth. just as notable as the powers given to the Commonwealth is the lack of redress given to the States. Any State law that is inconsistent with a valid Commonwealth law will cease to operate to the extent of the consistency, and there are very few constraints on the Commonwealth's ability to legislate so as to affect the State government itself. The end result is that the Constitution provides the necessary legislative and executive basis for the Commonwealth Government of Australia to establish a nuclear power industry in an Australian State against the strong wishes of that State.
In: Agarin , T 2018 , ' Nation-States into Nationalising States: The Impact of Transformation on Minority Participation in the Baltic States ' , Intersection: East European Journal of Society and Politics , vol. 4 , no. 3 , pp. 41-65 . https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v3i4.393
The widely shared perception in the Baltic societies about these countries being national homelands of respective ethno-nations is indispensable for understanding recent political developments in the region. Arguably, the outcomes of the transition from Soviet to European Union member-states have been by far and large positive,forging functioning state institutions and creating polities that are on the forefront of upholding European standards in a range of areas.Much of the debate on the region, my own past contributions included, has emphasised the importance of nation-state-building agendas that have facilitated the transformation of the Russian speaking population of the region from a formerly dominant nationality of the Soviet Union (SU) into a group that is today a minority in nation-states of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.Although there are plenty of assessments of how the change inminority members' opportunities has impacted their social, economic and political mobilisation strategies over the decades since the Soviet demise, this article looks at the framework for these groups'participation in public life.
The comparative welfare state research regularly highlights 'federalism' as a factor that has delayed welfare state development and sets clear 'limits to welfare state growth'. Yet, apparently German federalism goes together with one of the most generous welfare states of the world. This paper argues that federalism in Germany not only has not hindered strong welfare state expansion, but actually has contributed to it. The special variant of 'cooperative federalism' has blurred political and fiscal responsibilities, and the contribution financed Bismarckian welfare state has allowed the central government and the states to come to terms at the expense of a third party. A steady process of externalizing costs out of the public budgets and into the parafiscal budgets of the welfare state has been the result. ; In der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung wird der Föderalismus regelmäßig als Faktor identifiziert, der die sozialstaatliche Entwicklung verzögert und dem Wohlfahrtsstaatswachstum Grenzen gesetzt hat. In Deutschland scheint jedoch der Föderalismus vereinbar mit einem der großzügigsten Sozialstaaten der Welt. Der Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, ob die deutsche Ausnahme die besonderen Bedingungen erhellen kann, unter denen der Föderalismus den ihm zugeschriebenen hemmenden Einfluss auf die Sozialstaatsentwicklung besitzt. Zentrale These des Aufsatzes ist, dass in Deutschland die föderalen Staatsstrukturen nicht nur nicht hemmend, sondern sogar ausgabenexpansiv wirkten. Die besondere Spielart des kooperativen Föderalismus begünstigte 'fiskalische Unverantwortlichkeit' der verschiedenen Staatsebenen und die Beitragsfinanzierung des Bismarckschen Wohlfahrtsstaats ermöglichte es Bund und Ländern, ihre Einigungsprobleme zu Lasten Dritter zu lösen.
The United States of America is well-known (and occasionally well-liked or loathed) as the world's largest free-market capitalist nation. Indeed, many assume that since the United States for more than two centuries has had an economic system based on liberal principles, Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of capitalism must have been embedded in the United States Constitution from the beginning of the American republic. Yet government at all levels in the United States has historically exercised significant regulation of economic and commercial activity-regulation inconsistent with laissez-faire capitalism. The purpose of this article is to consider several questions: (1) what are the constitutional sources of governmental authority in the United States to regulate economic activity?; (2) what are the differences in regulatory powers between the federal and state levels of government?; and (3) what are the limits on the regulatory powers of government in the United States? I should emphasize that in this article I do not intend to advocate for or against government regulation as the proper policy in any specific area; instead, I intend to explore the circumstances under which regulatory policies chosen by policymakers are consistent with the Constitution.
The area of corporate taxation has stimulated a great deal of debate in both academic and political circles. On the political side, there have been those who argue that a corporation is only a legalistic creation and should not be regarded as a 'flesh-and-blood' person. This paper shall be concerned only with Federal taxes on corporations, although it is recognized that the system of dual sovereignity has raised questions of constitutionality in taxation areas between the Federal and state governments. A result of this has been the developing importance of the judicial branch of government in the taxation field, along with the legislative branch, as an interpretive body of no small significance.
We study the political effects of mass emigration to the United States in the 19th century using data from Sweden. To instrument for total emigration over several decades, we exploit severe local frost shocks that sparked an initial wave of emigration, interacted with within-country travel costs. Our estimates show that emigration substantially increased the local demand for political change, as measured by labor movement membership, strike participation and voting. Emigration also led to de facto political change, increasing welfare expenditures as well as the likelihood of adopting more inclusive political institutions.
The restructuring of SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) in China produced a great deal of labor contentions. How to manage the workers and control the labor conflicts after the collapsing of the work unit system became a big challenge to the state's stability and legitimacy during the transition to the market economy. This dissertation attempts to explore the structure and functioning of this state in transition from the particular perspective of the interaction between the state and its workers. It offered a comparative case study of two groups of workers (the state workers vs. the temporary workers) in central China, especially the concrete processes of their struggles, including street protests, office petitions and court litigations. The radical protesters on the streets would be directed into the petition offices, which would further refer or push the workers to the courts to seek clear judge. When the conflict could not reach a conclusion at the local level, the workers would petition to the center, which would certainly refer them back to the local. The process of the workers' struggles displayed a circular state composing of four intersecting circles: the circle between petition offices, the circle between courts, the circle between petition offices and courts, and the circle between the center and the local. This circular state only circulated the cases of the labor conflicts, instead of resolving them, but it turned the material requests from the workers into discursive struggles about justifications, and thus transformed the radical confrontation between the labor and the capital into peaceful communications. This containment of the labor conflicts was not an oppressive process simply to quench down the workers' resistance, but instead a productive process to promote the statist capitals, such as the state policies and state laws, and produce the imagination of the state. During the active engagement with the state agents, the challenging workers gradually learned to use the dominant and official languages to frame their requests, interpret their positions and realign their relations to the state. This symbolic domination was the crucial mechanism for the state to manage and control the contentious workers during the period of transition.
In the early 2000s, the cooperative movement in Ontario came together in order to lobby its provincial government for active cooperative development support programs. Momentum was building for these types of programs. Already, many provincial governments had implemented active support programs in their jurisdiction. Despite having one of the largest cooperative sectors in Canada, Ontario was lagging behind. This article assesses the progress of the efforts of the Ontario cooperative movement to date. It details how the Ontario cooperative movement developed a sectoral identity for itself and framed its objectives in an effort to strengthen its relationship with the Ontario government.RÉSUMÉLe mouvement coopératif en Ontario s'est rassemblé au début des années 2000 afin de faire pression sur le gouvernement provincial pour qu'il développe des programmes de soutient actif pour coopératives. Déjà plusieurs gouvernements provinciaux avaient mis en place de telles politiques. L'Ontario tardait malgré le fait qu'il avait un des plus grands secteurs coopératifs au Canada. Cet article examine le progrès qu'a connu le mouvement coopératif en Ontario dans ses efforts. Il décrit comment le mouvement coopératif a construit une identité sectorielle autour de laquelle il a pu ancrer ses demandes auprès du gouvernement ontarien.
To save Americaindeed, the global economy as a wholethe private/public sector balance has to shift, and the neoliberal economic model on which the country has been based for the past 25 years has to be modified. The role of the state needs to be reemphasized. The abandonment of a mixed economy and corresponding diminution of the role of government was hailed as the "rebirth of individualism," yet it caused rising inequality and the decline of median wages, and led to the widespread neglect of public goods vital to its citizens' welfare. Meanwhile, the country ran through the public investment it had made from the 1930s to the 1970s, with few serious challenges from policymakers or mainstream economists. The neoliberal model was also aggressively exported: the optimal growth strategy for all emerging economies was supposedly one that emphasized limited government, corporate governance, rule of law, and higher levels of state-owned and -influenced enterprisein spite of significant historical evidence to the contrary. Not even the economic wreckage in Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, and Russia seemed sufficient to challenge, let alone overturn, the prevailing paradigm. That is, until now: in reaction to the financial crisis, many governmentsled by the United Statesare enacting massive economic stimulus packages and taking a central role in promoting economic growth strategies. This reemergence of state-driven capitalism constitutes a back to the future investment paradigm, one that is consistent with a long and successful pattern of economic development. But once we get beyond the pothole patching and school repairing, what industries can be pushed forward using public seed capital or through Sematechlike consortiums? What must be brought to the fore is the need for a new growth path for the United States, one in which the state has a significant role. There are already indications that the private sector is beginning to adapt to this new, collaborative paradigm.