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THIS ARTICLE, ONE IN AN OCCASIONAL SERIES REVIEWING STATE DEPARTMENT ARCHIVES OF THE 1940S AND 1950S, EXAMINES THE ROLE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE RUN-UP TO AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE SUEZ CRISIS. IT ALSO EXAMINES THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE OF 1955 AND 1956.

Im Kalten Krieg spielte das 1951 souverän gewordenen prowestliche Königreich Libyen für Großbritannien eine wichtige Rolle in seiner globalen Militärstrategie und der Neutralisierung des arabischen Nationalismus. Die Suez-Krise offenbarte indes die Schwäche des libyschen Regimes - eine Entwicklung, die in die Revolution von 1969 mündete - und wirkte sich entscheidend auf die britisch-libyschen Beziehungen aus. Der Autor stützt sich auf Dokumente des Public Records Office in Kew, Presseberichte und Interviews mit Mitarbeitern des Foreign Office, die zur Zeit der Suez-Krise in Libyen stationiert waren. (DÜI-Cls)

Often as foreign policy may be the subject of partisan discussion in modern democracies, important international commitments are usually made only with support, or the expectation of support, from the great bulk of the political community. This has surely been the ordinary American and British pattern, labeled bi-partisan, non-partisan, or extra-partisan. We assume that political support extending well beyond the ranks of the party in office is essential for a successful foreign policy, and especially for a substantial military venture. Even the American decision to defend South Korea, while it was necessarily made by the Democratic administration before any apparent political consensus and while it eventually involved the United States in an unpopular war, was never in itself a partisan policy which Republicans as a group refused to support. The one outstanding recent instance of a truly partisan foreign policy is Britain's Suez action of 1956. As the significant deviant case, it provides useful insights into the process by which an alternative to the usual bi-partisan arrangement is developed and conducted. Specific questions concern the making of the Suez intervention decision, the nature of parliamentary support for this decision, the role of party loyalty in maintaining such support, and the significance of partisan opposition.