The Suez crisis (1956) was a decisive event for the expansion of Arab nationalism and its fight against the British empire. This study makes an assessment of the role played by radio in that crisis and its influence on both the Egyptian and Arab public opinion. The conclusions demonstrate that it was an instrument of paramount importance to preserve the unity of the Egyptian people in support of President Nasser and the strengthening of Pan-Arab solidarity. This factor contributed to the failure of the Franco-British intervention, demonstrating the relevance of soft power and political communication in modern military conflicts. ; La crisis de Suez (1956) constituye un momento decisivo en la expansión del nacionalismo árabe y su lucha contra el Imperio británico. Este estudio evalúa el papel de la radio en esa crisis y su influencia sobre la opinión pública egipcia y árabe. Las conclusiones indican que fue un instrumento de enorme importancia a la hora de mantener unida a la población egipcia en apoyo del Presidente Nasser y en el fortalecimiento de la solidaridad panárabe. Este factor contribuyó al fracaso de la intervención franco-británica, demostrando la importancia del poder blando y de la comunicación política en los modernos conflictos bélicos.
International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.
International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.
International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.
The Suez crisis of 1956 opened a new chapter in the global political history of the post second world war period. It was for the first time that the fire of the hardly a decade old world war would take a shape of new turmoil of sourness and distrust among the victorious great powers of the second world war over the Suez crisis 1956. The Suez Crisis turned the entire region of the Middle East into an area of vital interest for both super powers of the Cold war. The Suez Crisis intensified struggle among the super powers to maintain influence over geostrategic locations of the Middle East region. The crisis also surfaced the differences between the leaders of United States and Great Britain. The Suez crisis set the trends of global diplomacy in the initial phases of cold war in the region. Its diverse impact invited scholars to research the issue from different dimensions. There are so many important aspects attached with the Suez crisis that sparked our interests to review the literature published on this issue. For example it was the very first issue since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, when the two trusted friends United States and Great Britain diverged in their opinions. The second reason is that the Suez crisis remained neglected in historical research work on Eisenhower's era. Historians' studies on president Eisenhower mostly focused Vietnam. However the Eisenhower period is discussed with considerable length. Thirdly, this issue provides best case study of the pattern of pursuing national interests among the members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United States, Great Britain and France. Fourthly, it was the first issue on which the main adversaries of the Cold war, America and USSR had identical views. This paper presents a critical review of the published material on the Suez crisis in the decade of 1990s. This study also offers a survey of archival sources that could help the students as a source of inspiration for further research and will help to understand the current complexities of Middle Eastern politics.
The Cold War and global politics brought upheaval to the Middle East in the 1950s. The conflict between the United States and Soviet Union shaped the history of the region at the same time it brought war to Korea. Britain's relationship with the U.S., especially in the Middle Eastern theater, was shaped by the Cold War. British intelligence, political, and press members and agents used the tensions to bring the United States in to help them in the various crises that swept the Middle East in the 1950s. This strategy served to bring the two countries closer together in the Middle East in the short term, yet drove long term wedges in the Anglo-American relationship which would erupt in the second half of the 1950s. The 1953 coup of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and the 1956 Suez Crisis are used in this thesis as the lenses examine the changing Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East. These two events serve exceptionally well considering both are crises stemming from nationalization of a resource and both featured very similar actors in key roles such as Anthony Eden, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the Dulles brothers. Ultimately, it is shown that the post-1956 fracturing of the Anglo-American relationship stemmed from the actions of both countries in 1953. The questions raised by American politicians, diplomats, and intelligence agents resonated throughout the decade and the pursuit by British actors of similar goals and the use of similar stratagems proved disastrous for Britain's long-term position in the Middle East.
The aim of this paper is to examine the way James Graham and Ian M Ewan present their protagonists in a world ruled by political manipulation in their respective works, namely Eden's Empire (2006) :.-;d The Ploughman's Lunch (19R3). Graham's protagonist is an Aristotelean anti hero whose flaw is hubris, whereas McEwan's main character is a typical anti-hero who succumbs to his own web of deceit.
This article examines an important stage in the prehistory of the formation of the Israeli lobby in the United States associated with the Suez Crisis of 1956–1957. This crisis demonstrated that the Jewish community in the United States was not a coherent and well-organized group capable to defend Israel's interests and to dictate them to the American government. The Jewish diaspora was unable to help David Ben-Gurion's government to achieve several important goals. First, Dwight Eisenhower's administration flatly refused to provide strong guarantees of Israel's security. Second, the United States refused to guarantee prevention of Israeli territory from raids of Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) from the Gaza Strip. The possibilities of the Jewish community to somehow influence the policy of the Eisenhower's government were extremely limited by weak organizational forms of the community, by lack of real leverage over the policy of the Republican administration, and by the specific features in the policy of the 34th US President administration. At the same time, the leaders of the Jewish diaspora did not allow their disagreements between themselves and the State of Israel to become apparent publicly. The Suez crisis contributed to the establishment of mechanisms for interaction between the Jewish community and the US government. Later, this experience will form the basis for the formation of the Israeli lobby in the United States. ; В данной статье исследуется важный этап предыстории формирования израильского лобби в Соединенных Штатах, связанный с Суэцким кризисом 1956–1957 гг. Этот кризис продемонстрировал, что еврейская община в США вовсе не была сплоченной и хорошо организованной группой, способной отстаивать интересы Израиля и тем более диктовать их американскому правительству. Еврейская диаспора не смогла помочь правительству Д. Бен-Гуриона добиться нескольких важных целей. Во-первых, администрация Д. Эйзенхауэра наотрез отказалась предоставлять твердые гарантии безопасности Израиля. Во-вторых, Соединенные Штаты отказались брать на себя гарантии недопущения набегов палестинских партизан (федайинов) на израильскую территорию из сектора Газа. Возможности самой общины как-то повлиять на политику правительства Д. Эйзенхауэра были крайне ограничены и слабыми организационными формами общины, и отсутствием реальных рычагов воздействия на политику республиканской администрации, и особенностью политики администрации 34‑го президента США. В то же время лидеры еврейской диаспоры не позволили, чтобы их внутренние разногласия и разногласия с Государством Израиль проявились публично. Суэцкий кризис способствовал налаживанию механизмов взаимодействия еврейской общины с властными структурами США. Этот опыт ляжет в основу формирования израильского лобби в Соединенных Штатах.
In his February article ''Military Theory and Education," Rear Admiral Eccles discussed the nature of and the need for a comprehensive military theory. In this paper he critically examines the Suez crisis within the context of his previous work.
The article, based on British documents, shows the mechanism for building the British colonial policy after the Suez crisis of 1956 during the first Cabinet of Harold Macmillan. In this period (1957-1959), the new Prime Minister made a special emphasis on strengthening the Anglo-American partnership in the colonial sphere and promoting integration initiatives for the colonies and the territories that are gaining independence. These questions have been poorly studied in Russian historiography, but their detailed analysis helps to understand how the degree of prioritization within the well-known concept of Winston Churchill "three majestic circles" of British foreign policy has changed and the process of ousting the imperial sphere from second to third place after Anglo-American relations and European affairs has occurred. The author shows that the new Conservative government, having comprehended the results of the Suez operation that was disappointing for Great Britain, recognized decolonization as a fait accompli, but tried not to force events in the colonial sphere. By 1957 the imperial possessions of Britain continued to be impressive. The chain reaction of the decolonization processes that began in Asia in the 1950s covered the African territories, and H. Macmillan saw as his prime task a preventing the acceleration of the collapse of the colonial system in this part of the globe. Conservatives, continuing to comprehend the profound consequences of the Suez crisis and the colonial experience of other countries, especially France with its failure in Indochina and the ongoing war in Algeria, tried not to delay the granting of independence to the colonies and to keep pace with the times. This understanding of colonial affairs in the UK did not mean a weakening of control; rather, on the contrary, it was necessary to closely monitor the processes taking place in order to preserve the liberated territories in the British and in the whole western orbit of influence during the cold war. Particularly attentive attitude of H. Macmillan personally to these issues showed that the Prime Minister was sensitive to the course of time and rapid changes in the role of the newly free Afro-Asian states in world affairs. ; На материале британских документов в статье показан механизм выстраивания колониального курса Великобритании после Суэцкого кризиса 1956 г. в период первого кабинета Г. Макмиллана. В этот период (1957–1959 гг.) новый премьер-министр сделал особый упор на укрепление англо-американского партнерства в колониальной сфере и выдвижение интеграционных инициатив в отношении колоний и обретающих независимость территорий. Эти вопросы слабо изучены в отечественной историографии, однако их детальный анализ помогает понять, каким образом менялась степень приоритетности внутри известной концепции У. Черчилля о трех окружностях внешней политики Великобритании и как происходил процесс вытеснения имперской сферы со второго на третье место после англо-американских отношений и европейских дел. Автор показывает, что новое правительство консерваторов, осмыслив неутешительные для Великобритании итоги Суэцкой операции, признало деколонизацию свершившимся фактом, но стремилось не форсировать события в колониальной сфере. К 1957 г. имперские владения Британии продолжали оставаться внушительными. Цепная реакция начавшихся процессов деколонизации в Азии в 1950-е гг. охватила африканские территории, и свою главную задачу Г. Макмиллан видел в том, чтобы предотвратить ускорение темпов распада колониальной системы в этой части земного шара. Консерваторы, продолжая осмыслять глубокие последствия Суэцкого кризиса и колониального опыта других стран, прежде всего Франции с ее провалом в Индокитае и продолжающейся войной в Алжире, старались не затягивать сроки предоставления независимости колониям и идти в ногу со временем. Такое понимание колониальных дел в Великобритании не означало ослабление контроля, скорее наоборот, следовало максимально пристально отслеживать происходящие в процессы с тем, чтобы сохранить освобождающиеся территории в британской и в целом западной орбите влияния в условиях холодной войны. Особо внимательное отношение лично Г. Макмиллана к этим вопросам показывало, что премьер-министр чутко реагировал на ход времени и стремительные изменения роли освободившихся афро-азиатских государств в мировых делах.
The control and transportation of Middle East oil to the West was of vital importance for the Western powers during the Cold War. The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the Israeli attack on Egypt, which was supported by the UK and France, impeded the secure transportation of Middle East oil. The crisis was overcome, and the secure transfer of oil continued at the end. However, the Western powers were in search of additional ways to protect the flow of oil, and oil pipeline projects through Turkey were formulated and discussed, which reflected the policies of Western powers and other related actors toward Turkey and other Middle East states and oil companies regarding the oil issue, although these projects were not realized. This study analyzes the developments regarding these oil pipeline projects, and argues that the changing interests and perceptions of these actors, regardless of alliances or hostilities among them, shaped the pipeline project negotiations and the ultimate results. ; Soğuk Savaş döneminde Orta Doğu petrolünün kontrolü ve Batıya taşınması Batılı güçler için hayati bir önemdeydi. 1956 yılında Süez Kanalı'nın millileştirilmesi sonucu İngiltere ve Fransa'nın desteği ile İsrail'in Mısır'a saldırması Orta Doğu petrolünün güvenli bir şekilde taşınmasını engellese de nihayetinde kriz son buldu ve petrolün güvenli bir şekilde akışı sağlandı. Kriz sırasında Batılı güçler petrolün akışını korumak için farklı yollar aradılar ve bu yollardan birisi olarak da Türkiye'den petrol boru hattı geçirilmesi düşüncesin değerlendirildiler. Her ne kadar bu değerlendirmeler uygulamaya konulmamış olsa da Batılı güçlerin petrol konusunda Türkiye ve Orta Doğu'nun diğer ülkeleri ve petrol şirketlerine yönelik politikalarını yansıtmaktadır. Bu çalışma petrol boru hatları ile ilgili gelişmeleri analiz ederek petrolün akışında söz sahibi olan aktörlerin dostluk veya düşmanlık ayırımı yapmadan değişen çıkarları ve bakış açılarının petrol boru hatları projelerinin pazarlıklarını ve sonucunu belirlediği tezini sunmaktadır. ; No sponsor
Суэцкий кризис 1956 г. до сих пор вызывает пристальный интерес отечественных и зарубежных историков. Автор, обращаясь к истории англо-франко-израильской интервенции, выстраивает материал статьи вокруг поиска ответа на вопрос о том, можно ли считать события осени 1956 г. поворотным моментом британской внешней политики. Такая постановка проблемы обусловлена появлением так называемого ревизионистского направления в британской историографии, в рамках которого был представлен новый взгляд на события, связанные с Суэцким кризисом 1956 г. ; The Suez Crisis of 1956 still attracts a keen interest of domestic and foreign, especially British, historians. The first decade of the 21st century noted a surge of monographs and articles devoted to a comprehensive and thorough study of the events of the autumn of 1956. This situation, first of all, refers to Western historiography; however, Russian historical science, responding to the opening of the archives of the United Kingdom and other countries, had new fundamental publications related to the history of the triple Anglo-French-Israeli intervention in 1956. In describing the events of the autumn of 1956, the author also touches upon the Hungarian Crisis that coincided with the triple Anglo-French-Israel intervention and had a significant impact on the discussion of the events in the area of the Suez Canal in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Particular attention is paid to the reaction of the USA and the USSR on the Suez and Hungarian Crises. For the first time during the Cold War, Moscow and Washington were on the same side against the colonial powers and strongly condemned the military action against Egypt. At the same time, the White House could not use unrest in Hungary for propaganda purposes. The author, referring to the history of the events of the summer and autumn of 1956, builds material of the article around a search for an answer to the question of whether it is possible to consider the events of the autumn of 1956 a turning point of the British foreign policy. This formulation of the problem is due to the advent of the so-called revisionist trend in British historiography which presented a new view of events related to the implementation and consequences of the Suez operation against Egypt in 1956. Revisionists deny the Suez Crisis as a line after which the British policy in the Near and Middle East changed dramatically. However, questions remain about the impact of the events of the autumn of 1956 on the colonial policy and other areas of foreign policy of Britain. For the UK, the crisis highlighted the need to rethink the chosen strategy not only in the Middle East, but also in the matters of decolonization, which at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s acquired a prompt character in connection with the strengthening of the so-called "non-aligned movement" and the growth of the Asian and African countries in the UN. The Suez crisis had a clear impact on the political crisis in the country and had an important psychological impact on the perception of the country by the population and by the political elite. In the early 1957, Prime Minister Anthony Eden resigned and H. Macmillan became a new head of government. He put forward new initiatives in the field of colonial and European policy. A new chapter began in British history.
The Suez crisis is generally considered to be a decisive turning-point in Canada's relations with Great Britain. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson refused to support Britain's military action in Egypt, choosing instead to work through the United Nations for a resolution of the conflict. It seemed that Canada was repudiating a subservient role and declaring its final independence from the mother country. However, the documentary record shows that Canadian politicians and diplomats were in fact eager to work for what they believed to be Britain's good. In their view, Britain had temporarily lost sight of its own, and the western world's, best interests. During the years immediately after Suez, support for British policies was a priority of Canadian diplomats, most notably Arnold Smith, Canada's ambassador to Egypt from 1958 to 1960. Smith played an important role in the resumption of diplomatic relations between Britain and Egypt. Drawing on previously unused documents in the files of the Department of External Affairs, this paper outlines Canadian views of, and Canada's relationship to, British policy in the Middle East during and after Suez. It demonstrates that a "colony to nation" framework is inadequate for the study of the Anglo-Canadian relationship in the years following World War II. Instead, the broader context of Cold War politics must be taken into consideration. The paper also shows that despite the surface differences between Liberal and Conservative foreign policy, there were strong elements of continuity between the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments.
Desde la Crisis de Suez de 1956 hasta la Crisis Cubana de 1962, las tensiones entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética no dejaron de crecer, hasta el punto de que la guerra era una posibilidad cotidiana. Aunque el gobierno estadounidense y algunos expertos ofrecieron un discurso tranquilizador y diseñaron ejercicios de Defensa Civil para calmar a la población, varios novelistas reflejaron los miedos a una guerra nuclear y a sus consecuencias. A través de un análisis cultural de cuatro novelas escritas por cinco autores angloamericanos entre 1957 y 1962 podemos seguir el rastro de dichos miedos, comprenderlos mejor y entender de qué modo influyeron a su época. ; From the Suez Crisis of 1956 to the Cuban Crisis of 1962 the tension between the Western and Eastern Blocs rose continuously, and war was a constant possibility. The American Government and some experts offered reassuring explanations and Civil Defense exercises in order to calm the population, however some fiction authors gave voice to the fears of a Nuclear War and its consequences. Through a Cultural analysis of four novels wrote by five Anglo Americans between 1957 and 1962 we can track those fears, understand it, and realize how they influenced their own time.
From the Suez Crisis of 1956 to the Cuban Crisis of 1962 the tension between the Western and Eastern Blocs rose continuously, and war was a constant possibility. The American Government and some experts offered reassuring explanations and Civil Defense exercises in order to calm the population, however some fiction authors gave voice to the fears of a Nuclear War and its consequences. Through a Cultural analysis of four novels wrote by five Anglo Americans between 1957 and 1962 we can track those fears, understand it, and realize how they influenced their own time. ; Desde la Crisis de Suez de 1956 hasta la Crisis Cubana de 1962, las tensiones entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética no dejaron de crecer, hasta el punto de que la guerra era una posibilidad cotidiana. Aunque el gobierno estadounidense y algunos expertos ofrecieron un discurso tranquilizador y diseñaron ejercicios de Defensa Civil para calmar a la población, varios novelistas reflejaron los miedos a una guerra nuclear y a sus consecuencias. A través de un análisis cultural de cuatro novelas escritas por cinco autores angloamericanos entre 1957 y 1962 podemos seguir el rastro de dichos miedos, comprenderlos mejor y entender de qué modo influyeron a su época.