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Based on the original unpublished documents of the Italian ambassador in Ankara, the article refers to the difficult situation in which Turkey found itself as a consequence of the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. Since its entry into NATO in 1952, the Turkish government had been active in completing the Western defensive system in the Middle East. After the disappointing Middle East Command & the Medo, which had to see Egypt as a main pillar, the US Secretary of State saw in the Northern Tier line as the real base for building the Baghdad Pact. GB, of course, had to be the "glue" of the structure. Pakistan would be a new element; an Arab country; Iraq, was most welcome; & Iran joined too. Turkey tried from the beginning to get Washington into the Pact. It had to measure itself against the irresistible rise of Nasserism & the strong dissuasive action it exerted on Hussein of Jordan & Nuri Said of Iraq. When Nasser's ascendancy gained ground in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, & Iraq, Turkey tried in vain to connect the Baghdad Pact to NATO; Cairo & Damascus, the two main centers of Arab nationalism, succeeding in isolating Iraq, would strengthen those links with the USSR that would suddenly threaten Turkey both from communism in the North & Arabism from South. The bilateral treaty of 11 March 1959 with Washington, together with strong economic aid, would in the end guarantee Turkey would open its territory to the intermediate range ballistic missile base. Adapted from the source document.

The reign of big oil -- Signs of trouble -- Intrigue on the Riviera -- Onassis in the dock -- The shot heard 'round the world of oil -- Oil and the Cold War -- The CIA is on the case -- A two-tier strategy -- The world versus Onassis -- Too many moving parts -- Onassis "in the doghouse" -- Power struggle in the kingdom -- Don't embarrass the king -- The revenge of Spiridon Catapodis -- The power of the press -- Impasse -- Dark days for Onassis -- New issues emerge -- New crisis, old cases -- The Suez crisis -- The end of the affair -- Notes -- Select bibliography -- Index -- About the author.

This article is a study on dignity and the politics of dignity in postcolonial Egypt, and focuses on the historicity and socioeconomic background of two events: the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis during the rise of post-independence nationalism and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution during the Arab Spring. This study reviews the importance of the concept of dignity in philosophy and the social sciences, specifically pertaining to the development and postcolonial need for dignity and recognition, which the author terms 'dignition.' The central question here is how the conception of dignity has evolved between the two events and what the implications are for the consequent understanding of dignity.

Introduction -- Approaches and Problems -- Dimensions of the conflict -- Jewish National Home -- Balfour Declaration -- Mandate Palestine -- Partition of Palestine -- War of 1948 -- The Suez Crisis of 1956 -- June 1967 War -- UNSC Resolution 242 -- October War of 1973 -- The Palestinian Resistance -- Arab Boycott of Israel -- Non-conventional Challenges -- Madrid Conference of 1991 -- The Oslo Process -- Changing Palestinian Strategies -- Occupied Territories -- Jerusalem -- The Refugee Problem -- Other Contentious issues -- Peace-making Efforts -- Role External Players -- India and Arab-Israeli Conflict -- Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Preliminary Material -- Chapter One. The Relationship between International Law and State Behaviour in International Crises Involving the Threat or Use of Force -- Chapter Two. An Alternative Theoretical Approach for Understanding the Relationship between International Law and State Behaviour During International Crises: International Law as Ideology -- Chapter Three. The Place of International Law in State Behaviour During the Korean War -- Chapter Four. The Place of International Law in British and American Foreign Policy Behaviour During the Suez Crisis -- Chapter Five. The Place of International Law in State Behaviour During the Cuban Missile Crisis -- Chapter Six. The Place of International Law in State Behaviour During the Dominican Republic Crisis -- Chapter Seven. Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index.

В статье анализируется проблема кризиса НАТО в ходе Суэцкого кризиса 1956 г. (военные действия Великобритании, Франции и Израиля против усиления роли Египта в зоне Суэцкого канала и угрозы контроля со стороны Египта над поставками нефти в Западную Европу). Автор рассматривает позицию в конфликте ведущих стран НАТО Великобритании, Франции и США, обстоятельства вовлечения в войну Израиля, а также влияние позиции Советского Союза, Варшавского пакта и возможности применения атомного оружия. Особое внимание обращено на дезинтеграционную опасность внутри НАТО. Автор выявляет причины негативного отношения США к военной операции на Ближнем Востоке и их отказа от вступления в региональный альянс под британским руководством («Багдатский пакт»). Позиция США в Суэцком кризисе определялась боязнью, что в результате войны Ближний Восток будет охвачен антизападными протестами, дестабилизируется и окажется в руках Советского Союза. Вашингтон предлагал мирное разрешение конфликта, а Лондон и Париж стремились вовлечь США в интервенцию. Соединённым Штатам удалось добиться, чтобы НАТО как институт вплоть до высшей точки кризиса не играл какой-либо значимой роли. «Диалог глухонемых» во время кризиса вылился во время войны в тяжёлую размолвку между Соединёнными Штатами, с одной стороны, и Великобританией и Францией с другой стороны. Президент Эйзенхауэр невольно поставил НАТО на грань распада. Однако всё это проходило за кулисами, и общественность не заметила, что во время Суэцкого кризиса НАТО пережила один из тяжелейших кризисов времён холодной войны. ; The problem of NATO''s crisis during the Suez crisis in 1956 (military intervention of Britain, France and Israel to prevent the strengthening of Egypt in the Suez Canal zone) is analyzed in the paper. The author examines the position of the leading NATO countries Britain, France and the USA in the conflict, circumstances of involvement of Israel in the war, influence of the Soviet Union's position and the Warsaw pact, and the possibility of using of nuclear weapons. Special attention is paid to the danger of disintegration within NATO. The author ascertains reasons for the negative attitude of the USA to the military operation in the Middle East and their refusal to join the regional alliance under British leadership («the Baghdad Pact»). The USA position in the Suez crisis was conditioned by fear that as a result of the war the Middle East will be engulfed by anti-Western protests and it'll be in the hands of the Soviet Union. Washington offered a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and London and Paris sought to involve the USA in this intervention. The United States were able to ensure that NATO had not played any significant role up to the highest point of the crisis. «Dialogue of deaf-mutes» during the crisis escalated in heavy quarrel between the United States, Britain and France during the war. President Eisenhower had unwittingly set NATO on the brink of collapse. However, all this was passing behind the scenes, and the public did not notice that during the Suez crisis, NATO experienced one of the worst crises of the Cold War.

Letters to Australia is a collection of Julius Stone's radio talks, originally broadcast by the ABC between 1942 and 1972 which were recently discovered in the nation's archives. Volume 4 : "In the Pacific, Australia entered the multi-lateral ANZUS treaty, consolidating the nation's independence of Britain; Communist China pressed its claims to replace Taiwan on the Security Council; Queen Elizabeth II began her long reign; and adventurism by Egypt set the stage for the Suez crisis. Despite Stalin's death, the Soviet grip on eastern Europe grew." --External website

Letters to Australia is a collection of Julius Stone's radio talks, originally broadcast by the ABC between 1942 and 1972 which were recently discovered in the nation's archives. Volume 4 : "In the Pacific, Australia entered the multi-lateral ANZUS treaty, consolidating the nation's independence of Britain; Communist China pressed its claims to replace Taiwan on the Security Council; Queen Elizabeth II began her long reign; and adventurism by Egypt set the stage for the Suez crisis. Despite Stalin's death, the Soviet grip on eastern Europe grew." --External website.

The creation of the Baghdad Pact, a regional defence organization linking Britain to Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, in 1955, has been surrounded by historiographical confusion. Much of this is explicable in terms of the impact of rapid international changes on long-term strategy, the importance of which has tended to be neglected by historians of the pact. So, one school of thought focuses on the American promotion of the 'Northern Tier' concept during the period 1953–4, and on the British preference for an organization based on her Suez Canal Zone Base in Egypt.1 Applyingthis concept to the year 1955, the Baghdad Pact can become 'the United States' final victory over Great Britain during the Cold War, a victory which the Suez Crisis of 1956 served to confirm.

This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo-American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain's economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain's maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources.

This Seminar Studies title is a succinct study of modern British foreign policy, focusing on the period from 1945 to the present day. Since the end of the Second World War, Britain has been engaged in international conflicts from the Suez Crisis to the Gulf War and has actively sought involvement in transnational and global affairs. Starting with a brief overview of the rise and fall of the British Empire and continuing chronologically with detailed chapters covering the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, Alasdair Blair discusses the hi.

AbstractMultifunctional peace operations have become an integral part of international society to the extent that they are now one of the major regulating institutions of international relations. The United Nations (UN) is the main player in setting up such operations. The UN has seen a major but gradual evolution of its role in maintaining and establishing peace. Having developed peacekeeping as a form of impartial interposition between belligerents during the Suez Crisis in 1956, the UN has continually broadened its sphere of action. These cumbersome and complex operations are demanding and present the UN with a number of challenges.

"In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, British policy-makers engaged in a long-running debate about the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining Britain's special role in the Gulf. Although British officials in the Gulf extolled the virtues of a continued presence, other voices, not least from the cost-conscious treasury, questioned the need for maintaining Britain's military commitments. What appears to have swung the argument in favour of those who backed relinquishment was the related decision to withdraw from Aden which struck a severe blow against the long-term viability of Britain's presence in the Gulf." (author's abstract)

Introduction -- Conflict and its management -- China, Algeria and Egypt : the War of Independence and the Suez Crisis to Camp David -- China and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation : from people's war to the Algiers Declaration, 1967-1988 -- China, the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula : from militancy to diplomacy during the Cold War -- China and the Iran-Iraq War -- China and Iraq : the Gulf Wars and the war against ISIS -- China and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since Oslo -- China and the Darfur Crisis in Sudan -- China and Libya : from Gaddafi to the uprising and after -- China and the Syrian Civil War -- China and contemporary conflict in Yemen and the Horn of Africa -- China and the Iran nuclear deal -- China and the Gulf crisis -- Conclusion.

THE ADOPTION OF COGNITIVE VARIABLES AT THE INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP LEVEL HELP TO ACCOUNT FOR BRITISH DEICION MAKING DURING THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS, CONTRADICTING EXPLANATIONS THAT ARE FRAMED IN TERMS OF RATIONAL ACTOR MODELS. AN ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF COGNITIVE VARIABLES, HOWEVER, REQUIRES THE FORMULATION OF A RELEVANT EMPIRICAL PUZZLE THAT SETS RATIONAL EXPLANATIONS AGAINST COGNITIVE ONES. THE SO-CALLED "PROCESS TRACING" METHOD IS USEFUL IN IDENTIFYING THE ROLE OF SUCH VARIABLES. "THE OPERATIONAL CODE" CONSTRUCT AND "GROUP-THINK" THESIS IMPROVE THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE BRITISH DECISION MAKING PROCESS AND HELP TO SOLVE THE EMPIRICAL PUZZLE OF WHY BRITISH DECISION MAKERS DECIDED TO RESORT TO FORCE DESPITE THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF AMERICAN SUPPORT, WHICH WAS DEEMED ESSENTIAL.