Suchergebnisse

Since 1947 the major foreign policy of the United States government has been containment. This policy of creating situations of strength which would prevent the extension of Communist power and influence in the world was first proclaimed in the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947). The policy had been anticipated in 1946 when the battleship Missouri visited Turkey and some forty Mediterranean ports. In the course of this display the Missouri was joined by two aircraft carriers, seven cruisers, and eighteen destroyers. The early sensitivity to Soviet threats to the Middle East and its approaches, revealed in the Doctrine and that naval demonstration, was not consistently maintained at this time or later. Perhaps, indeed, American foreign policy only operates with fullest energy, when directly confronted with a serious Soviet threat. At any rate, it may be argued that for the period 1946–1955, when the Soviet Union was neither conspicuously active nor influential in the Middle East, United States policy contributed little to the solution or easing of the area's all but intractable problems. So to describe the problems is to propose a good excuse, but they were the problems, and, unfortunately, they did not wither from neglect or incantations.

"The 1956 Suez Crisis as a Perfect Case for Crisis Research" published on by Oxford University Press.

International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.

International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.

International audience ; In 1954, Pierre Mendès France, head of the French government, sought to redefine France's policy in the Middle East in order to reinforce the country's international position. Israel, Syria and Egypt were thought to be the key countries. France and Egypt already held close economic and cultural ties but their opposition to the Baghdad Pact (Middle East Treaty Organization, later Central Treaty Organization), founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, United Kingdom, Iran and Pakistan, gave common ground for further rapproachment and even development of military relations. However, what determined the French-Egyptian relations in the short term was the escalation of the Algerian war of independence. Indeed, Egypt's relations with the Algerian nationalists and the sharp divisions that arose within the French government over the question of whether to preserve military relations with Egypt and Israel at once, in combination with total disagreement between diplomats and the French defence establishment over general foreign policy goals, eventually undermined the French-Egyptian relations. By the time Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Company in the summer 1956, relations between France and Egypt had already collapsed after the Guy Mollet government silenced its opposition to the Baghdad Pact for the sake of French-British relations and intensified military relations with Israel through the secret Vermars agreement.

The Suez crisis (1956) was a decisive event for the expansion of Arab nationalism and its fight against the British empire. This study makes an assessment of the role played by radio in that crisis and its influence on both the Egyptian and Arab public opinion. The conclusions demonstrate that it was an instrument of paramount importance to preserve the unity of the Egyptian people in support of President Nasser and the strengthening of Pan-Arab solidarity. This factor contributed to the failure of the Franco-British intervention, demonstrating the relevance of soft power and political communication in modern military conflicts. ; La crisis de Suez (1956) constituye un momento decisivo en la expansión del nacionalismo árabe y su lucha contra el Imperio británico. Este estudio evalúa el papel de la radio en esa crisis y su influencia sobre la opinión pública egipcia y árabe. Las conclusiones indican que fue un instrumento de enorme importancia a la hora de mantener unida a la población egipcia en apoyo del Presidente Nasser y en el fortalecimiento de la solidaridad panárabe. Este factor contribuyó al fracaso de la intervención franco-británica, demostrando la importancia del poder blando y de la comunicación política en los modernos conflictos bélicos.