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Summitry, conducted at the highest level, has become an established part of diplomacy in the 20th and 21st centuries. Summit diplomacy means the regular meetings of heads of state or government, who acts in double legal status: on the one hand they are creators of state's foreign policy and are responsible for political decision-making; on the other hand they become diplomats responsible for execution of these decisions. The main features of contemporary summitry are: the frequency with which these meetings take place, the degree of their institutionalization and medialization. The articles identifies four different kinds of diplomatic summits: (1) regular summits held in the frame of international organizations, which could be meetings of their organs (European Council summits); (2) institutionalized regular summits which are not backed by any formal organization and are political-economic for a on their own (G7/8 summits); (3) ad hoc summits concerning specific international problems, organized by international organizations or states; (4) ceremonial summits. The article also analyzes advantages and disadvantages of summit diplomacy. ; Współcześnie nastąpił wzrost znaczenia tzw. dyplomacji na szczycie, prowadzonej przez głowy państw czy szefów rządów. Dyplomacja na szczycie to spotkanie głów państw lub szefów rządów, którzy posiadają podwójny status prawny: z jednej strony, są kreatorami polityki zagranicznej państwa i są odpowiedzialni za podejmowanie decyzji politycznych, z drugiej zaś strony, stają się zarazem wykonawcami tych decyzji, wchodząc w interakcje dyplomatyczne. Cechami charakterystycznymi współczesnej dyplomacji na szczycie są jej wzrastająca intensywność, coraz większa instytucjonalizacja oraz ogromna medializacja. W artykule podjęto próbę klasyfikacji szczytów dyplomatycznych: (1) regularne szczyty odbywające się w ramach organizacji międzynarodowych, czasami będące posiedzeniami ich organów; (2) zinstytucjonalizowane regularne szczyty stanowiące samoistne fora polityczno-gospodarcze; (3) szczyty organizowane ad hoc przez organizacje międzynarodowe lub państwa, dotyczące konkretnych spraw z zakresu stosunków międzynarodowych; (4) szczyty ceremonialne. Poddano również ocenie ich zalety oraz wady.

The objective of the paper is to shed light on the perspective of some new member states (NMS) of the European Union (EU) – in this case Poland – on the ambitious climate-energy endeavours undertaken at the supranational level. The economic consequences of implementing the most advanced plans would be to generate unproportionally high costs for the economy, energy production sector and, as a result, for the households' budgets. From the Polish perspective it would be counterproductive in terms of the energy security concept agreed in the strategic documents defining climate and energy policies in the 2030 time horizon. Despite the justification and rationale of the European climate crusade, the political and economic costs for some member states are high enough that they do not hesitate to threaten to veto in the EU Council meeting. This paper answers the question as to why the Polish veto on the climate-energy package was a real threat during the EU energy summit in December 2008.

States can, in principle, communicate with each other only through their representatives. Such communication takes place primarily through the diplomatic system – a global network of embassies and allied agreements. However, in order to establish (or re-establish) communication between any two states, they must agree to establish "diplomatic relations". Therefore, the concept of diplomatic relations is the key that opens the way to normal communication between states. As such, it is a fundamental element of the entire international system. The practice of political leadership meetings dates back to antiquity, but until the 19th century it was rare for rulers to meet in person. The situation changed only in the 21st century, when such "summit" meetings were often organized and replaced many traditional forms and methods of diplomacy. Such summits are often institutionalized, for example, G8, i.e. meetings of the most developed countries in the world. Their organization and course largely depend on the results of previous preparations and diplomatic talks, but ultimately they are led by experts who support the leaders of the state. ; Państwa w zasadzie mogą komunikować się ze sobą jedynie poprzez swoich przedstawicieli. Komunikacja taka odbywa się przede wszystkim za pośrednictwem systemu dyplomatycznego – światowej sieci ambasad i porozumień sojuszniczych. Aby jednak nawiązać (lub wznowić) komunikację między dwoma dowolnymi państwami, muszą one zgodzić się na nawiązanie "stosunków dyplomatycznych". Dlatego też pojęcie stosunków dyplomatycznych jest kluczem otwierającym drogę do normalnej komunikacji między państwami. Jako takie jest ono podstawowym elementem całego układu międzynarodowego. Praktyka spotkań przywódców politycznych sięga starożytności, ale do XIX wieku rzadko zdarzało się, by władcy spotykali się osobiście. Sytuacja zmieniła się dopiero w XXI wieku, wówczas bowiem takie spotkania "na szczycie" były często organizowane i wyparły wiele tradycyjnych form czy metod dyplomacji. Szczyty takie często są już zinstytucjonalizowane, jak np. coroczne szczyty Grupy G-7, czyli spotkania najbardziej rozwiniętych państw świata. Zarówno ich zorganizowanie, jak i ich przebieg w dużym stopniu zależy od wyników wcześniejszych przygotowań i rozmów dyplomatycznych, ale ostatecznie kierowane są przez ekspertów, którzy wspomagają przywódców państw.

The article deals with the image of the Eastern Partnership in the Polish opinion-forming press in the years 2009–2019. The aim of the Partnership was to strengthen the stability of the states to the east of the borders of the European Union, and thus to reduce the threats appearing in this region, which was equivalent to increasing the security of the EU itself. The article presents the results of a qualitative analysis of research material in the form of press texts published in two national daily newspapers (Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita) and two opinion weeklies (Newsweek Polska and Polityka). The main criterion for constructing the image of the Eastern Partnership in the opinion-forming press were the most important players participating in the Partnership's programme, i.e. the European Union and Ukraine. The third separate entity was Russia, as an opponent of the European initiative. Another criterion of analysis was to indicate the assumptions of the programme, their implementation and results in the context of each of the parties mentioned. The analysed articles often presented opinions and assessments of representatives of non-governmental organisations, experts from analytical centres and politicians connected with the Partnership. The assumptions and activities of the European Union were generally positively evaluated in the articles, while the opinions were definitely negative concerning Russia's activities. Concerning the opinions on the activities of state entities invited to the Eastern Partnership programme, these were partly positive, depending on the country and the period evaluated. Particularly much attention was paid to Ukraine in the articles. It should be stressed that, most often, the opinion-forming press wrote about the Eastern Partnership on the occasion of successive summit meetings of representatives of European Union institutions, Member States and the Eastern Partnership.

The Polish presidency in the Council of the EU has been determined by a financial crisis. However the question could be solved only by the Member States which belong to the Eurogroup led by its own President Jean-Claude Juncker and at the highest level by the Heads of States or Governments in the framework of the European Council. In addition a form of an international agreement was chosen as an instrument to introduce new solutions in the economic and monetary policy of the EU. Such a form is not foreseen in the Treaty on the European Union, in particular Article 48 TEU. In a doctrine it is called a "Schengen modus", then a way to reform the Union without a long process of ratification of an amending treaty by all the Member States. At the same time the Schengen modus may lead to a creation of different integration centers. All the above mentioned circumstances on the one hand have reduced a spectrum of the Polish activity and on the other hand indicated on a domination of an intergovernmental method, called by the Chancellor Angela Merkel a "Unions method", in the European governance. In this context provisions of the Article 12.3 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance which allows the Contracting Parties, other than those whose currency is the euro to participate in discussions of Euro Summit meetings concerning competitiveness for the Contracting Parties, the modification of the global architecture of the euro area and the fundamental rules that will apply to it in the future, as well as, when appropriate and at least once a year, in discussions on specific issues of implementation of the Treaty, may be regarded as a certain success of the Polish presidency.

The idea of involvement of the European Union in cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours has been promoted by Poland since 1998. The strongest manifestation of this effort was the Polish-Swedish initiative under the name of "The Eastern Partnership". In 2008 the European Council confirmed this project and thus it became the eastern dimension of European Neighbourhood Policy. Obtaining the EU acceptance for the Eastern Partnership was to an important extent a success of the Polish diplomacy. It proved that Poland was a strong partner in the EU, whose initiative and determination led to constructive action. A review and assessment of the activities and development of the Eastern Partnership was one of three priorities of the Polish UE presidency. The most important event during the Polish presidency was the summit meeting of the Eastern Partnership, that took place on 29 and 30 October 2011 in Warsaw. Despite the fact that it was not a full success, some important decisions for development of the Eastern Partnership were taken. For an assessment of the Polish presidency, a few factors should be taken into consideration. First of these is the role of the Council Presidency in the EU institutional and decisional system. Second is appraisal of political situation both in the EU Member States and the partner states. The authentic will of all parties to take constructive action is a condition sine quo non for the success of the Eastern Partnership. One of the important rule is more for more. It is means that the EU applies a set of conditionalities to the Eastern Partnership Member States, requiring the continuation of democratic reforms. The main objective of this article is to demonstrate the essence of the Eastern Partnership and to formulate an opinion, based upon the analysis of the activities and results of the programme. The article is divided in three parts: I. The essence of the Eastern Partnership; II. The Eastern Partnership as a Polish priority of the Polish presidency; III. The assessment of the Polish presidency.

Among many conflicts between United States and Soviet Union during the cold war era, one of the longest were Namibia's independence war and civil war in Angola. In the historiography, especially South Africa's literature, both of them are linkaged and known as Border War. However, Namibians had begun their struggle in 1966, twenty years later there was no perspective to finisz the war. The major breakthrough appeared in 1987–1988 thanks to series of meetings between president of the US, Ronald Reagan and general secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. The key role played the year 1988. One year later United Nations has implemented Resolution 435 of Security Council from 1978. From that day, South Africa Defence Forces were beginning withdrawal from Namibia's territory. This article refers about the most characteristic and important aspects of United States' and Soviet Union' negotiations in 1987–1988, especially before and during Moscow summit in May and June 1988. ; Spośród wielu sporów istniejących między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Związkiem Sowieckim w czasie zimnej wojny jednymi z trwających najdłużej była wojna o niepodległość Namibii i wojna domowa w Angoli, w literaturze traktowane niekiedy jako jeden konflikt, nazywany południowoafrykańską wojną o granice. Walka Namibijczyków o wolność trwała od 1966 r., jednak 20 lat później wciąż nie było widać perspektyw szybkiego zakończenia konfliktu. Przełom nastąpił w latach 1987–1988 dzięki seriom spotkań i negocjacji, jakie odbyły się między administracją prezydenta USA Ronalda Reagana i sekretarza generalnego KPZS Michaiła Gorbaczowa. Dla rozwiązania kwestii Namibii kluczowym rokiem był 1988 dzięki podpisaniu w Nowym Jorku grudniowych porozumień między władzami Angoli, Kuby i RPA. Rok później rozpoczęto realizację Rezolucji Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nr 435, a wojska południowoafrykańskie zaczęły stopniowo opuszczać terytorium Namibii. Artykuł ma na celu wskazać najważniejsze aspekty negocjacji między USA i ZSRS w sprawie Namibii w latach 1987–1988, głównie przed szczytem i w czasie jego trwania (Moskwa, przełom maja i czerwca 1988 r.).

At the end of the second decade of the 21st century the European Union (EU) – presenting a new strategy of enlargement policy, organising an official summit of the state leaders and devoting to potential accessions the meeting of the Council of the EU – recalled that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. Therefore, there is a reasonable question: whether the intensification of the EU's enlargement policy will affect favourably Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state considered as a potential candidate for the membership since 2003? Basing on (inter alia) official documents issued by the EU institutions, macroeconomic data and in relation to the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans region, it is worthwhile to suppose, that – despite numerous (political, economic, social) deficits and weaknesses – Bosnia and Herzegovina, which applied for membership in the EU in 2016, will receive the status of an official candidate country soon (in the thir d decade of the 21st c entury).

At the end of the second decade of the 21st century the European Union (EU) – presenting a new strategy of enlargement policy, organising an official summit of the state leaders and devoting to potential accessions the meeting of the Council of the EU – recalled that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU. Therefore, there is a reasonable question: whether the intensification of the EU's enlargement policy will affect favourably Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state considered as a potential candidate for the membership since 2003? Basing on (inter alia) official documents issued by the EU institutions, macroeconomic data and in relation to the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans region, it is worthwhile to suppose, that – despite numerous (political, economic, social) deficits and weaknesses – Bosnia and Herzegovina, which applied for membership in the EU in 2016, will receive the status of an official candidate country soon (in the thir d decade of the 21st c entury).

To play a key role in international arena, the European Union promotes close ties with states of different regions. The subject of the EU interests is Latin America. The strategic partnership between the two is realized in three areas, defined during EU-Latin America summits, ministerial and experts meetings. The first area is economic and technological cooperation. The second field of cooperation is devoted to education, science and culture, and the third – to social cohesion and development assistance. The responsibility for implementation of the partnership provisions lays with the European Investment Bank, working groups and with cooperation programmes such as AL-INVEST, ALFA, ALBAN/Erasmus Mundus, @LIS, EUrocLIMA, URB-AL. ; Dążąc do odgrywania kluczowej roli na arenie międzynarodowej, Unia Europejska zacieśnia więzi z państwami różnych regionów. Przedmiotem zainteresowania jest również Ameryka Łacińska, z którą ustanowiono strategiczne partnerstwo. Jest ono realizowane w trzech obszarach, wyznaczonych podczas szczytów Unia Europejska – Ameryka Łacińska, spotkań ministerialnych i spotkań grup eksperckich. Pierwszym jest współpraca gospodarcza i technologiczna. Drugi obszar dotyczy edukacji, nauki i kultury, natomiast trzeci poświęcony jest pomocy rozwojowej. Implementacja założeń partnerstwa odbywa się za pośrednictwem Europejskiego Banku Inwestycyjnego, grup roboczych oraz programów tematycznych, takich jak AL-INVEST, ALFA, ALBAN/Erasmus Mundus, @LIS, EUrocLIMA, URB-AL.