Suchergebnisse

Kriger vinnes i det kognitive domenet. Denne hypotesen er utgangspunkt for denne analysen av krigen mot terrorisme og dens tilhørende strategiske narrativer. Artikkelen gir støtte til hypotesen og understreker sammenhengen mellom krigens faktiske utvikling, og dens narrativer. Artikkelen analyserer selve narrativet om en krig mot terrorisme. Hvordan oppstod dette master-narrativet? Hvordan utviklet det seg over tid? Hva ble det erstattet av, og hvilke aktører var sentrale i å utfase frasen «krig mot terrorisme»? To nøkkelaktører i å avslutte både krigen mot terrorisme og narrativet om den er ISIL og president Barack Obama. ISIL overtok rollen som verdens mest fryktede og mektige terrorgruppe, og stilte dermed Al Qaida i skyggen. Mens Obama helt systematisk valgte å ikke benytte frasen «krig mot terror». En krig som aldri nevnes av USAs commander-in-chief er ikke lenger et operasjonelt militært konsept. Med likvideringen av bin Laden i 2011 gav Obama USA en slags «closure» for 9/11-traumet. For krigen mot terror var alltid president George W. Bush sin krig. Han etterlot seg to bakkekriger som man vanskelig kan påstå at USA kunne vinne. Men Bush sin strategi-omlegging i Irak i 2007, «The Surge», skaffet USA nok pusterom til å trekke seg ut. Men med ISILs hurtige fremvekst ble gleden kortvarig, ettersom de opprettet en pseudo-stat i Levanten.
Abstract in English:Narratives from the War on TerrorWars are decided in the cognitive domain. This hypothesis is supported by this article on the war on terrorism and its strategic narrative. The analysis emphasizes how the physical warfighting is inextricably linked to the strategic narratives of the war. Special consideration is given here to the master narrative establishing the war on terror. How was this narrative constructed? How did it develop over time? What replaced it, and what actors were crucial in retiring the phrase 'war on terror'? Two key actors in this respect were ISIL and President Barack Obama. ISIL eclipsed Al Qaida as the world's most feared and infamous terror group. Whereas Obama systematically avoided using the phrase 'war on terror' altogether. A war that is never mentioned by the USA's Commander-in-Chief is no longer an operational military concept. Equipped with the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, Obama brought closure to the national trauma of 9/11. Because the war on terrorism was always George W. Bush's war. He left behind two large scale ground wars with little prospect of success in either of them. He did provide a temporary change of fortune in Iraq with 'the Surge' of fresh troops in 2007. But these gains were soon enough erased as ISIL grew and developed into a pseudo-state in northern Iraq and Syria.

I kjølvannet av terrorangrepene 11. september utviklet det seg et partnerskap mellom USA og Putins Russland. I dag synes det selvfølgelig at partnerskapet ikke ville vare. Men hvorfor sprakk det egentlig? Russland forkaster partnerskapet fordi det ikke møter Kremls forventninger om gjensidighet. Dessuten har Russland en helt annen oppfatning av hva årsakene til internasjonal terrorisme er og hvordan krigen mot terror skal utkjempes. Russlands gjenreisning under Putin er en underliggende faktor og innebærer at terrortrusselen etter hvert underordnes den mer tradisjonelle frykten for amerikansk militærmakt og dominans. Selv om en felles kamp mot terror stadig foreslås som bindemiddel for dårlige relasjoner, kan det neppe fungere som det i dagens nye kalde krig.
Abstract in English:The Unsustainable Russia-US Partnership in the War on TerrorRussia and the USA forged a strategic partnership following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Today it seems obvious that such a partnership would not last. But why did it break? The article argues that the Kremlin leaves the partnership because its expectations of mutuality were not met. Russia also fundamentally disagreed with the USA on the sources of international terrorism and how best to conduct GWOT. Russia's revival under Putin's leadership is an underlying cause and implies that the terrorist threat is overshadowed be the traditional fear of NATO and US dominance. Albeit still figuring among the issue-areas suggested for US-Russian collaboration, the common fight against international terrorism will not function as a vehicle for rapprochement in the current cold war climate.

11. september-angrepene og USAs svar utfordret folkerettens regler. Basert på et argument om selvforsvar, lanserte Bush-administrasjonen en global krig mot terrorisme, med fangeleirer, bruk av tortur og utenomrettslige henrettelser. Essayet gir en oversikt over tre folkerettslige hovedproblemstillinger som oppsto i årene etter 2001. Folkerettens regimer om samarbeid for å motarbeide terror var for svake, FN-pakten gav lite klare regler om staters selvforsvarsrett mot ikke-statlige aktører på fremmed jord, og angrepene utfordret folkerettens todeling mellom krig og rettshåndhevelse (humanitærrett og menneskerettigheter). Essayet gjør opp status for hvordan folkeretten utviklet seg på disse områdene etter 2001, og tar stilling til om dette gir grunnlag for å betegne 11. september som et vannskille i folkeretten.
Abstract in English:International Law and 9/11 – a Watershed?The 9/11 attacks and the US global response was a challenge to international law. Based on an argument of self-defense, the Bush-administration launched a global war on terror, established prison-camps, opened up for torture and engaged in targeted killings. The essay provides an overview of the main challenges that arose after 9/11 from the perspective of international law. The international regime for prevention of terrorism was weak, it was unclear to what extent the UN Charter provided states with an independent right to self-defense against non-state actors in foreign states, and the attacks challenged the dichotomy between war and crime (humanitarian law and human rights). The essay analyses how these areas of international law have evolved after 2001 and concludes by assessing whether 9/11 can be deemed a watershed in the development of international law.

Sentralforvaltningen her til lands har de siste tiårene blitt internasjonalisert. Globale spørsmål legger beslag på stadig større ressurser i staten, men samordningen mellom departementene har ikke utviklet seg i samme takt. Norsk utenrikspolitikk ligger derfor ikke bare fast, den ligger også spredt. Komplekse globale utfordringer (terror, klimaendringer, pandemier, biodiversitet, cybertrusler, migrasjon m.v.) krever et langt tettere samarbeid for blant annet å reversere økt fragmentering – i en offentlig sektor hvor vi er satt opp med sterke fagdepartementer og svake samordningsmekanismer. Samtidig innvarsler byggingen av det nye regjeringskvartalet endringer i måten norsk (utenriks)politikk vil bli gjennomført på. Forholdet mellom fagspesialister og diplomatiske generalister blir tettere og vil utfordre den diplomatiske rollen og selvforståelsen på nye måter. Diplomatiets kjerneoppgaver vil endres. Blant annet vil langt bedre koordinering bli en hovedutfordring for utenrikspolitikken. Artikkelen trekker derfor opp noen problemstillinger og forslag som innspill til debatten,
Abstract in English:Track IV: The Future of DiplomacyOver the past decades, Norwegian ministries have become more internationalized. Global issues take up ever more of their time and resources, but cross-sectorial coordination has been lagging behind. Norwegian foreign policy is therefore fragmented. Complex global challenges (terrorism, climate change, pandemics, biodiversity, cyber threats, migration, etc.) call for much closer inter-ministerial cooperation to reverse increased fragmentation – in a public sector where sectorial responsibilities are strong and coordination mechanisms few. The new block housing most of the offices of the Government in central Oslo is a signal change for how Norwegian foreign policies will be conducted in the years ahead. Sector specialists and diplomatic generalists will move closer together, working under the same roof, and this will challenge the classic diplomatic role and the way diplomats look at themselves. Our core tasks will change. Improved coordination will move to the forefront of the work we do. The article presents an idea or two for a much-needed debate.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.