With calls for greater government regulation of tobacco culminating in the historic June 2009 passage of federal antismoking legislation, Tobacco could not be more timely. It is the most authoritative and accessible volume available on the evolution of tobacco consumption as well as efforts to protect consumers from its dangers.||Tobacco focuses on five key issues: tobacco excise taxation and health policy; the often misleading advertising of cigarettes and Òlow tar/nicotineÓ alternatives; the role of the Food and Drug Administration in regulating tobacco; education and prevention efforts aime
Offers a comprehensive introduction to historic and contemporary efforts to regulate tobacco and reduce the staggering number of people who die from using tobacco products.
The Tobacco Atlas is intended for anyone concerned with personal or political health, governance, politics, economics, big business, corporate behaviour, smuggling, tax, religion, internet, allocation of resources, human development and the future. It will be useful for UN agencies, governments and politicians, health officials, the media, researchers, universities, schools, and the general public. The atlas includes full-colour world maps and graphics, revealing similarities and differences between countries, on the history of tobacco, different types of tobacco use, prevalence and consumption, youth smoking, the economics of tobacco, farming and manufacturing, smuggling, the tobacco industry, promotion, profits, trade, smokers' rights, legislative action such as smoke-free areas, bans on tobacco advertising, health warnings, quitting, the effect of price and taxation, litigation and the future of the epidemic. This book illustrates, in an accessible and creative format, how tobacco is not just a simple health issue, but involves economics, big business, politics, trade, litigation, deceit and crimes such as smuggling. The atlas also shows the importance of a multifaceted approach to reducing the epidemic by WHO, other UN agencies, NGOs, the private sector and, in fact, the whole of civil society.
A large body of evidence demonstrates that tobacco companies use a wide range of tactics to interfere with tobacco control. Such strategies include direct and indirect political lobbying and campaign contributions, financing of research, attempting to affect the course of regulatory and policy machinery and engaging in social responsibility initiatives as part of public relations campaigns. Although more and more is known about tobacco industry tactics, a systematic, comprehensive guide is needed to assist regulators and policy-makers in combating those practices. Guidelines and recommendations exist for countering and monitoring industry marketing, and recommendations have been issued to refuse industry funding of certain activities, but no broad policy has been published to assist government officials, policy-makers and nongovernmental organizations in their interactions with the tobacco industry. The WHO Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI), the department in WHO with the mandate to control the global tobacco epidemic, monitors the activities of the tobacco industry in accordance with World Health Assembly resolution 54.18, which urges Member States to be aware of affiliations between the tobacco industry and members of their delegations, and urges WHO and Member States to be alert to any efforts by the tobacco industry to continue its subversive practice and to assure the integrity of health policy development in any WHO meeting and in national governments. As a continuing response to this mandate, TFI convened a group of experts to discuss tobacco industry interference in tobacco control and the public health policies and initiatives of WHO and its Member States. The meeting took place at the offices of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in Washington DC, United States of America, on 29–30 October 2007. Before the meeting, participants received a background paper commissioned by TFI, which served as the basis for discussions. The experts were asked to draw up a list of topics and concepts that should be included in policies to counter attempts by the tobacco industry to interfere with tobacco control. The list facilitated discussions on gaps in scientific evidence and the challenge of finding means for countering the wide range of types of interference (e.g. political, economic and scientific). This list also provided examples of proactive ways of eliminating tobacco companies' influence, including: policies refusing partnerships with tobacco companies; policies refusing tobacco company funding of research and programmes; rejecting self-regulatory or voluntary policies in tobacco control; encouraging divestment from tobacco investments; and promoting social indexing that excludes tobacco and businesses models that can be used to counter industry philanthropy. The meeting participants agreed that the results of the discussions should be incorporated into a document, to broaden understanding in the global public health community of the tobacco industry's influence on tobacco control. This document is therefore a synthesis of the evidencebased discussions, revisions and suggestions of the experts and is presented in a format that can readily be used by policy-makers and is based on the best available evidence on tobacco industry attempts to interfere with tobacco control and public health. The document begins by stating that effective tobacco control and the commercial success of the tobacco industry are fundamentally incompatible and that, accordingly, the tobacco industry can be expected to seek to avoid, prevent, weaken and delay effective policies and programmes, which are against its interests. Equally, tobacco control, in seeking to maximize the decline in tobacco related disease and in the tobacco use that causes such disease, must be vigilant in monitoring the wide range of tobacco industry actions to undermine effective tobacco control. Part I describes the means used by the tobacco industry and its allies to thwart effective tobacco control and summarizes the industry's history of undermining tobacco control, through direct lobbying and the use of third parties, academics and researchers. Part II describes the means used to monitor industry efforts to interfere with tobacco control. TFI aims for this document to provide the Contracting Parties to the WHO FCTC, and other WHO Member States, background and contextual information that may assist with the implementation of the WHO FCTC Article 5.3 Guidelines which were adopted at the third session of Conference of Parties (COP) in Durban, South Africa in November 2008 to counter tobacco industry interference with tobacco control.
Tobacco use is the leading preventable cause of death in South Carolina. Smoking-related medical costs amount to $1.1 billion each year, including $393 million for Medicaid. Tobacco growing in South Carolina declined by over 50 percent from 1997 to 2008. Tobacco accounted for less than 10% of the state's cash receipts from all crops in 2007. Despite the low levels of actual tobacco growing and the small role tobacco played in the state's economy in 2008, the cultural construct of being a "tobacco growing state" continued to have a disproportionately large impact on tobacco control policy making. Between 1997 and 2008, the tobacco industry lost its alliances with the Farm Bureau Federation and Commissioners of Agriculture, former staunch industry allies, because of negotiations over the Master Settlement Agreement, the buyout of the Tobacco Price Support system, and increasing purchase of foreign tobacco. Tobacco control Policy Score rankings of 2007/2008 legislators by knowledgeable tobacco control advocates revealed that legislators from the Pee Dee region, historically the stronghold of tobacco agriculture, were similar to the rest of the state's legislators in their attitudes towards tobacco control. Tobacco area legislators were formerly strong allies of the tobacco industry and historically worked with industry lobbyists to ensure defeat or manipulation of tobacco control bills. The 2007/2008 Policy Scores indicated that this was no longer the case. Tobacco control advocates should take advantage of the growing distance between tobacco companies and its former tobacco-growing allies and the decline in the actual importance of tobacco agriculture to challenge the rhetoric and resistance to tobacco control policies in the state. The tobacco industry built significant political influence in South Carolina through lobbyists, alliances with prominent trade associations, campaign contributions and other political expenditures. From 1996 to 2006, tobacco companies, trade associations and producers contributed a total of $680,541 to candidates for state office and to political parties. There is a measurable relationship between tobacco industry contributions and legislative behavior. As rated on a Policy Score scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being extremely receptive to tobacco control and 0 being extremely pro-tobacco industry, for every $1,000 received from the tobacco industry during the 2006 election cycle, a legislator's Policy Score decreased by 1.5 points. Democrats were on average 3.6 points more favorable towards tobacco control than Republicans, after controlling for campaign contributions. South Carolina was selected by the NCI in 1990 to participate in the 17-state ASSIST program. ASSIST funded tobacco control programming within the Department of Health and Environmental Control and established the state's first formal tobacco control coalition, the Alliance for a Smoke-Free South Carolina. The Alliance disbanded in 1997, leaving tobacco control advocacy disorganized and ineffective through 2003. ASSIST ended in 1999 and was replaced by a minimally-funded DHEC Tobacco Division supported primarily by about $1 million annually from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In 1998, the state signed the Master Settlement Agreement, securing approximately $70 million per year from the major cigarette companies. In 2000, the state securitized its settlement revenue, receiving a lump sum of $900 million up front in lieu of its annual payments through 2019. Refinancing in 2008 moved this date back to 2012. The 2000 General Appropriations bill set up 4 trust funds from the securitized MSA funds, with 73% ($574 million for healthcare), including tobacco control. Only $3.34 million of the MSA revenue was spent on tobacco control between 2000 and 2008. The state allocated an additional $6 million from the General Fund to the DHEC Tobacco Division between 2002 and 2008, with no state funding for the program between 2003 and 2006 and again in 2008. The Tobacco Division developed small-scale but innovative tobacco control programming, particularly community programs to promote policy change and the Rage Against the Haze youth movement. The DHEC leadership did not prioritize tobacco control between 2000 and 2008, although its support increased gradually due to efforts by the Tobacco Division, DHEC regional staff and the voluntary health groups. Funding requests remained at $2 million, significantly below the CDC recommended $62.2 million per year. Limitations by DHEC leadership on the role that DHEC staff play in local community-wide policy change efforts changed in 2007 to allow direct participation, but remained limited in scope. The voluntary health groups failed to prioritize increased funding for the DHEC Tobacco Division relative to their other lobbying focuses and continued in 2008 to act hesitantly in their lobbying of DHEC leadership to support tobacco control funding and policy change. In 2001, tobacco control advocates formed the South Carolina Tobacco Collaborative. It received 83% of its funding from the state health department, limiting its advocacy capacity. Increased funding from voluntary health groups and national partners between 2005 and 2008 allowed the Collaborative and the other prominent tobacco control advocacy groups, the South Carolina African-American Tobacco Control Network and the Smoke-Free Action Network, to increase advocacy between 2005 and 2008. These developments led to notable successes in clean indoor air policies and attempts to increase the state's tobacco tax. The cigarette tax in South Carolina remained the lowest in the nation in 2008, at 7 cents per pack. The last cigarette tax increase was in 1977, with nearly annual attempts to increase the tax defeated by coordinated efforts from the tobacco industry. Tobacco control advocates began to push for a cigarette tax increase in 2000, without success. Between 2006 and 2008, the Collaborative developed a well-funded and well-coordinated public education and lobbying campaign to support a cigarette tax increase. In 2008, the General Assembly passed a 50-cent increase, with $5 million of the annual revenue directed to the DHEC Tobacco Division, over active opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies. Governor Mark Sanford vetoed the bill for its lack of revenue neutrality, and Speaker of the House Bobby Harrell successfully prevented a veto override in the House. The 2006-2008 cigarette tax increase campaign showed that well-funded tobacco control advocacy could be successful over tobacco industry opposition in the legislature. The defeat of the increase bill demonstrated the need for stronger grasstops lobbying and relationship building with legislative leadership. Between 1977 and 1989, local policymakers passed 19 limited clean indoor air ordinances, building momentum for consideration of a state-level clean indoor air bill. In 1990, tobacco control advocates compromised with tobacco industry lobbyists to allow the passage of a weak statewide Clean Indoor Air Act, halting significant progress on clean indoor air through 2005. In 1996, the tobacco industry succeeded in using the Synar Amendment to integrate preemption into a youth access to tobacco amendment. The tobacco industry and tobacco control advocates assumed the provision also preempted local clean indoor air activity. Beginning in 1999, local policymakers in Charleston began to support local clean indoor air ordinance attempts despite assumed preemption. While Charleston did not pass an ordinance until 2006, news coverage of the city's efforts began a wave of consideration of local ordinances, eventually supported by state and local tobacco control advocates and the Municipal Association. Between May 2006 and December 2008, 21 local clean indoor air ordinances passed, 12 of which passed before the state Supreme Court rejected the argument that preemption applied to clean indoor air ordinances. Two localities were sued over their ordinances on preemption grounds, but won both cases in the Supreme Court. During the 2007/2008 legislative session, tobacco control advocates joined together to successfully defeat multiple attempts to institute express preemption through weak clean indoor air legislation supported by the tobacco industry. Given the success of local clean indoor air efforts, the strategy of tobacco control advocates developed during 2008 should be maintained: continue to promote comprehensive local smoke-free ordinances, while avoiding any action on clean indoor air in the General Assembly.
Background: The Czech Republic has one of the poorest tobacco control records in Europe. This paper examines transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs') efforts to influence policy there, paying particular attention to excise policies, as high taxes are one of the most effective means of reducing tobacco consumption, and tax structures are an important aspect of TTC competitiveness. Methods and Findings: TTC documents dating from 1989 to 2004/5 were retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website, analysed using a socio-historical approach, and triangulated with key informant interviews and secondary data. The documents demonstrate significant industry influence over tobacco control policy. Philip Morris (PM) ignored, overturned, and weakened various attempts to restrict tobacco advertising, promoting voluntary approaches as an alternative to binding legislation. PM and British American Tobacco (BAT) lobbied separately on tobacco tax structures, each seeking to implement the structure that benefitted its own brand portfolio over that of its competitors, and enjoying success in turn. On excise levels, the different companies took a far more collaborative approach, seeking to keep tobacco taxes low and specifically to prevent any large tax increases. Collective lobbying, using a variety of arguments, was successful in delaying the tax increases required via European Union accession. Contrary to industry arguments, data show that cigarettes became more affordable post-accession and that TTCs have taken advantage of low excise duties by raising prices. Interview data suggest that TTCs enjoy high-level political support and continue to actively attempt to influence policy. Conclusion: There is clear evidence of past and ongoing TTC influence over tobacco advertising and excise policy. We conclude that this helps explain the country's weak tobacco control record. The findings suggest there is significant scope for tobacco tax increases in the Czech Republic and that large (rather than small, incremental) increases are most effective in reducing smoking. Please see later in the article for the Editors' Summary.
Background: The Czech Republic has one of the poorest tobacco control records in Europe. This paper examines transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs') efforts to influence policy there, paying particular attention to excise policies, as high taxes are one of the most effective means of reducing tobacco consumption, and tax structures are an important aspect of TTC competitiveness. Methods and Findings: TTC documents dating from 1989 to 2004/5 were retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website, analysed using a socio-historical approach, and triangulated with key informant interviews and secondary data. The documents demonstrate significant industry influence over tobacco control policy. Philip Morris (PM) ignored, overturned, and weakened various attempts to restrict tobacco advertising, promoting voluntary approaches as an alternative to binding legislation. PM and British American Tobacco (BAT) lobbied separately on tobacco tax structures, each seeking to implement the structure that benefitted its own brand portfolio over that of its competitors, and enjoying success in turn. On excise levels, the different companies took a far more collaborative approach, seeking to keep tobacco taxes low and specifically to prevent any large tax increases. Collective lobbying, using a variety of arguments, was successful in delaying the tax increases required via European Union accession. Contrary to industry arguments, data show that cigarettes became more affordable post-accession and that TTCs have taken advantage of low excise duties by raising prices. Interview data suggest that TTCs enjoy high-level political support and continue to actively attempt to influence policy. Conclusion: There is clear evidence of past and ongoing TTC influence over tobacco advertising and excise policy. We conclude that this helps explain the country's weak tobacco control record. The findings suggest there is significant scope for tobacco tax increases in the Czech Republic and that large (rather than small, incremental) increases are most effective in reducing smoking.
There has been a global decline in tobacco consumption that, if continued, will negatively impact the tobacco industry's profits. This decline led the industry to invent and market new products, including heated tobacco products (HTP). HTP are an extension of the industry's strategies to undermine government's tobacco regulatory efforts as they are being promoted as part of the solution for the tobacco epidemic. Under the moniker of 'harm reduction', the tobacco companies are attempting to rehabilitate their reputation so they can more effectively influence governments to roll back existing tobacco control policies or create exemptions for their HTP. Rolling back tobacco control policies will make it easier for the companies to renormalise tobacco use to increase social acceptability for all their products. When regulations are absent or when loopholes exist in classifying HTP as a tobacco product (thus subject to all tobacco control regulations), the industry's marketing of HTP is making these products more visible to the public and more accessible. Governments need to ensure that HTP are regulated as tobacco products or drugs and reject partnerships with the tobacco companies to promote 'harm reduction'. The tobacco companies remain the vector of the tobacco-caused epidemic and cannot be part of the global tobacco control solution.
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Chapter 1: What are Tobacco and Nicotine? -- Chapter 2: The Dangers of Tobacco and Nicotine -- Chapter 3: In Their Own Words -- Chapter 4: Getting Help -- Glossary -- Find Out More -- Index -- Back Cover
Intro -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Chronology -- 1. Smoking Is Not a Constitutional Right -- 2. The Food and Drug Administration Cannot Regulate the Tobacco Industry -- 3. Raising the Minimum Age to Purchase Tobacco to Twenty-One Would Be Beneficial -- 4. Enforcing Laws Prohibiting Cigarette Sales to Minors Prevents Youth Smoking -- 5. Teens Should Be Able to Smoke -- 6. Numerous Factors Influence Teens to Smoke -- 7. A Teen Discusses Why She Thinks Her Peers Smoke -- 8. Tobacco Advertising Has Targeted Youths -- 9. Targeting Youths by Tobacco Companies Shouldm Be Banned -- 10. Banning Tobacco Ads Infringes the Freedom of Speech -- 11. Government-Mandated Bans and Ordinances Against Smoking Apply to All Public Places -- 12. Government-Mandated Bans on Smoking Are Not Justified -- 13. Banning Smoking on College Campuses Benefits Student Health -- 14. A High School Designated Smoking Area Causes Controversy -- 15. A Teen Discusses How Smoking Caused Her Brother Harm -- 16. Authorizing the Food and Drug Administration to Regulate the Tobacco Industry Is Problematic -- Organizations to Contact -- For Further Reading -- Index