The United States of America and France are states that have much in common. The USA has the greatest political, economic and military power in the world, and France held this position before the Second World War. Both, the Unites States and France, were the sources of democratic values in the eighteenth century. Currently the two countries have the same values and objectives for the world community: defence of human rights, promotion of democracy, maintenance of international stability and peace, fight against terrorism. However, France has always opposed the United States on one issue or other. It may be in the realm of international diplomacy, where one can discern a distinct distaste for America's oftproclaimed sole-superpower status, or on matters of culture, where France is always the first to denounce American "cultural imperialism." Lately, Franco – American friction has manifested itself most visibly in the UN Security Council over the Iraq war. Both countries realized the necessity to disarm Iraq yet France opposed the resolution authorizing the war against Iraq. France's antipathy to war, pessimism to crate stability in Iraq and refusal to recognize the leadership of the United States can be conceived as the reasons of the opposition. France is no longer the superpower that it was, and that leads to a strategic difference in how the two countries pursue their goals. [.].
The United States of America and France are states that have much in common. The USA has the greatest political, economic and military power in the world, and France held this position before the Second World War. Both, the Unites States and France, were the sources of democratic values in the eighteenth century. Currently the two countries have the same values and objectives for the world community: defence of human rights, promotion of democracy, maintenance of international stability and peace, fight against terrorism. However, France has always opposed the United States on one issue or other. It may be in the realm of international diplomacy, where one can discern a distinct distaste for America's oftproclaimed sole-superpower status, or on matters of culture, where France is always the first to denounce American "cultural imperialism." Lately, Franco – American friction has manifested itself most visibly in the UN Security Council over the Iraq war. Both countries realized the necessity to disarm Iraq yet France opposed the resolution authorizing the war against Iraq. France's antipathy to war, pessimism to crate stability in Iraq and refusal to recognize the leadership of the United States can be conceived as the reasons of the opposition. France is no longer the superpower that it was, and that leads to a strategic difference in how the two countries pursue their goals. [.].
The United States of America and France are states that have much in common. The USA has the greatest political, economic and military power in the world, and France held this position before the Second World War. Both, the Unites States and France, were the sources of democratic values in the eighteenth century. Currently the two countries have the same values and objectives for the world community: defence of human rights, promotion of democracy, maintenance of international stability and peace, fight against terrorism. However, France has always opposed the United States on one issue or other. It may be in the realm of international diplomacy, where one can discern a distinct distaste for America's oftproclaimed sole-superpower status, or on matters of culture, where France is always the first to denounce American "cultural imperialism." Lately, Franco – American friction has manifested itself most visibly in the UN Security Council over the Iraq war. Both countries realized the necessity to disarm Iraq yet France opposed the resolution authorizing the war against Iraq. France's antipathy to war, pessimism to crate stability in Iraq and refusal to recognize the leadership of the United States can be conceived as the reasons of the opposition. France is no longer the superpower that it was, and that leads to a strategic difference in how the two countries pursue their goals. [.].
The punk phenomenon has been both widely praised and criticized. For some, it has been the ultimate expression of youthful anger and rebellion, especially in the 1980s when the United States was once again returning to a white heteronormative value system and mass consumerism. For others, it is evidence of a postmodern condition where any rebellion is systematically appropriated and pacified through the consumer market. Punk subculture(s) have also been widely criticized both for their inability to live up to self-proclaimed ideals of egalitarianism and for their failure to break away from the social norms structuring larger society. In this paper, I take the rise of hardcore punk subcultures in the early 1980s and the diversification of punk, such as Riot Grrrl and Queercore, in the 1990s as a broad historical framework, while analyzing punk discourses throughout punk history in the US. In providing a broader overview of debates in various disciplines this paper aims to address some of the concerns over issues of the "holy family" of social sciences in the US, namely those of gender/sexuality, race, and class, while situating them within a historico-political context. It also discusses the theoretical considerations of subcultural and popular culture studies by analyzing primary and secondary materials within and about punk subcultures. It is common to assume that subculture, by its very nature, implies exclusivity: who is excluded and why may vary, but exclusions remain prevalent. However, in the neoliberal and identity politics era, these exclusions became more subtle even if more frequently addressed. [.]
The punk phenomenon has been both widely praised and criticized. For some, it has been the ultimate expression of youthful anger and rebellion, especially in the 1980s when the United States was once again returning to a white heteronormative value system and mass consumerism. For others, it is evidence of a postmodern condition where any rebellion is systematically appropriated and pacified through the consumer market. Punk subculture(s) have also been widely criticized both for their inability to live up to self-proclaimed ideals of egalitarianism and for their failure to break away from the social norms structuring larger society. In this paper, I take the rise of hardcore punk subcultures in the early 1980s and the diversification of punk, such as Riot Grrrl and Queercore, in the 1990s as a broad historical framework, while analyzing punk discourses throughout punk history in the US. In providing a broader overview of debates in various disciplines this paper aims to address some of the concerns over issues of the "holy family" of social sciences in the US, namely those of gender/sexuality, race, and class, while situating them within a historico-political context. It also discusses the theoretical considerations of subcultural and popular culture studies by analyzing primary and secondary materials within and about punk subcultures. It is common to assume that subculture, by its very nature, implies exclusivity: who is excluded and why may vary, but exclusions remain prevalent. However, in the neoliberal and identity politics era, these exclusions became more subtle even if more frequently addressed. [.]
The punk phenomenon has been both widely praised and criticized. For some, it has been the ultimate expression of youthful anger and rebellion, especially in the 1980s when the United States was once again returning to a white heteronormative value system and mass consumerism. For others, it is evidence of a postmodern condition where any rebellion is systematically appropriated and pacified through the consumer market. Punk subculture(s) have also been widely criticized both for their inability to live up to self-proclaimed ideals of egalitarianism and for their failure to break away from the social norms structuring larger society. In this paper, I take the rise of hardcore punk subcultures in the early 1980s and the diversification of punk, such as Riot Grrrl and Queercore, in the 1990s as a broad historical framework, while analyzing punk discourses throughout punk history in the US. In providing a broader overview of debates in various disciplines this paper aims to address some of the concerns over issues of the "holy family" of social sciences in the US, namely those of gender/sexuality, race, and class, while situating them within a historico-political context. It also discusses the theoretical considerations of subcultural and popular culture studies by analyzing primary and secondary materials within and about punk subcultures. It is common to assume that subculture, by its very nature, implies exclusivity: who is excluded and why may vary, but exclusions remain prevalent. However, in the neoliberal and identity politics era, these exclusions became more subtle even if more frequently addressed. [.]
The article examines the main aspects of restrictions of freedom of speech. The spread of ideas and opinions could be limited if the purpose of such limitation is information as such. Also, freedom of speech could be limited by prohibiting other acts, when the limitation of freedom of speech comes as a result of such legal regulation. Also, the object of restriction may be speech as well as actions, but the First Amendment protects only the pure speech. The main purpose in solving the issues concerning the restrictions of freedom of speech is to identify whether these restrictions fulfill the requirements of the First Amendment. The leading standard in solving these problems is the doctrine of the clear and present danger test. The First Amendment does not permit to restrict the freedom of speech except where such use of speech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The other principle to restrict the use of freedom of speech is damage, which could not be avoided in the case when even more discussions about certain question could not reduce the amount of such damage. Also, if the use of freedom of speech has no social value and does not contribute to the meaningful and free spread of ideas in the society, such use of freedom of speech is not protected by the First Amendment.
This article, based on the teleological method, could be characterised as a compressed doctrine of presidential term limits that consists of the discussions of the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention and Federalists/Anti-Federalists during the process of ratification of the draft Constitution. The analysis of the thoughts of various American statesmen on the constitutional regulation of the executive tenure during the period of 1775–1790 demonstrates the importance and objectives of the executive tenure for the future of the US constitutional system. The early doctrine of the US presidential term limits consists of three steps, which could be defined as understanding, discussion, and finding the solution to the issue. The first step relates to the constitutional conventions of the states in the period of 1775– 1780, when the problem of the term limits of the executive was raised jointly with the issue of the powers of state governors' institutions. Their relative modesty, in comparison to the terms and powers of other institutions, is explained by the fears of the American statesmen related to the dangers of monarchy and tyranny. The said feelings and the importance of the national executive were the key factors in the first sessions of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention. Most delegates were conservative on the structure of the executive, elections, and the term limits, proposing a collegial body, single term, and elections at the parliament. However, the idea that a weak executive might not be effective prompted harsh political debates between the representatives of the states. [.]
This article, based on the teleological method, could be characterised as a compressed doctrine of presidential term limits that consists of the discussions of the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention and Federalists/Anti-Federalists during the process of ratification of the draft Constitution. The analysis of the thoughts of various American statesmen on the constitutional regulation of the executive tenure during the period of 1775–1790 demonstrates the importance and objectives of the executive tenure for the future of the US constitutional system. The early doctrine of the US presidential term limits consists of three steps, which could be defined as understanding, discussion, and finding the solution to the issue. The first step relates to the constitutional conventions of the states in the period of 1775– 1780, when the problem of the term limits of the executive was raised jointly with the issue of the powers of state governors' institutions. Their relative modesty, in comparison to the terms and powers of other institutions, is explained by the fears of the American statesmen related to the dangers of monarchy and tyranny. The said feelings and the importance of the national executive were the key factors in the first sessions of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention. Most delegates were conservative on the structure of the executive, elections, and the term limits, proposing a collegial body, single term, and elections at the parliament. However, the idea that a weak executive might not be effective prompted harsh political debates between the representatives of the states. [.]
US-Russian relations have always been mutable and attracting attention of international community: US hostile foreign policy towards Russia was accompanied by periods of warming, and vice versa. When the presidency of B. Obama began, not always positive US rhetoric towards Russia (that was typical feature of G. W. Bush administration) was changed into the stressing the need to engage Russia into cooperation – ie engagement strategy. Therefore, experts of international relations started talking about a new phase in US-Russian relations. However, it would be incorrect to say that Russia's engagement strategy is the invention of B. Obama's administration. So the purpose of the article is to analyse Russia's engagement strategy in US foreign policy not only during the presidency of B. Obama and to compare its implementation during the presidency of different US presidents. In article there are given the theoretical basics of engagement strategy, there is introduced implementation of Russia's engagement strategy during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama stressing the main instruments of engagement strategy, there is compared strategy's place in US foreign policy and its instruments during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama.
US-Russian relations have always been mutable and attracting attention of international community: US hostile foreign policy towards Russia was accompanied by periods of warming, and vice versa. When the presidency of B. Obama began, not always positive US rhetoric towards Russia (that was typical feature of G. W. Bush administration) was changed into the stressing the need to engage Russia into cooperation – ie engagement strategy. Therefore, experts of international relations started talking about a new phase in US-Russian relations. However, it would be incorrect to say that Russia's engagement strategy is the invention of B. Obama's administration. So the purpose of the article is to analyse Russia's engagement strategy in US foreign policy not only during the presidency of B. Obama and to compare its implementation during the presidency of different US presidents. In article there are given the theoretical basics of engagement strategy, there is introduced implementation of Russia's engagement strategy during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama stressing the main instruments of engagement strategy, there is compared strategy's place in US foreign policy and its instruments during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama.
US-Russian relations have always been mutable and attracting attention of international community: US hostile foreign policy towards Russia was accompanied by periods of warming, and vice versa. When the presidency of B. Obama began, not always positive US rhetoric towards Russia (that was typical feature of G. W. Bush administration) was changed into the stressing the need to engage Russia into cooperation – ie engagement strategy. Therefore, experts of international relations started talking about a new phase in US-Russian relations. However, it would be incorrect to say that Russia's engagement strategy is the invention of B. Obama's administration. So the purpose of the article is to analyse Russia's engagement strategy in US foreign policy not only during the presidency of B. Obama and to compare its implementation during the presidency of different US presidents. In article there are given the theoretical basics of engagement strategy, there is introduced implementation of Russia's engagement strategy during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama stressing the main instruments of engagement strategy, there is compared strategy's place in US foreign policy and its instruments during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama.
Looking from a few hundred years of historical perspective, the Western Hemisphere is being dominated by United States of America. In the twenty-first century, however, one can say it is quite noticeable decline in the United States relative power. In addition, the September 11 events have relatively adjusted major U.S. foreign policy priorities and fostered to focus its attention on other regions of the world (particularly Middle East and Middle Asia). Along these lines, a kind of vacuum of influence that has left afterwards in the Latin America has been actively used by other states. One of the most assertive, Brazil, has lots of aspirations to fill and consolidate the regional leadership and thus become a leader of more united and integrated South America. As a rapidly emerging middle power, Brazil tries to counterbalance the U.S. influence in the region and calls for reforms of a particular international governance structures (for example, the UN Security Council). Nevertheless, the United States usually is prone to secure its own national interests by implementation of its own measures. The general subject of this work is the power dynamics of United States and Brazil and their foreign policy initiatives oriented towards keeping or increasing influence in Latin America. The aim of this thesis is to analyze Brazil as a challenge to the United States dominance in Western Hemisphere and to evaluate the U.S. response, in order to maintain their leadership. Seeking to achieve the aim of the study, the following tasks have been fulfilled during the working process. Namely with reference to the international relations theories and conceptions of power, balancing and emergent middle power discussed in the thesis, the place of the United States and Brazil in the international system has been identified. Additionally, the geopolitical context and processes of the historical U.S. leadership consolidation in Western Hemisphere has been analyzed. In the empirical part of this work, the growth of Brazil's power and the impact on regional and global level affairs have been discussed. Moreover, after the analysis of Brazil's soft balancing against the United States, it has been defined how U.S. responses to such actions and seeks to secure its own strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere. The work is carried out using descriptive, analytical and comparative methods as well as the analysis of documents and scientific literature. Brazil pursues foreign policy strategies that are common for the emergent middle powers – coalition–building and soft balancing against the dominant state, when there are a significant military and economic power asimmetry between the states. Thus, pursuit of global influence through bilateral or multilateral instruments, in order to limit or complicate U.S. freedom of action or diplomacy but also avoid direct confrontation to the United States, is quite a rational choice. Also, in order to increase autonomy in foreign policy making and to secure national interests, Brazil creates regional organizations and forums, which excludes the United States (such as the Union of South American Nations or South American Defense Council). During the terms of G.W. Bush administration (2001–2009), the area of Latin America, which U.S. seeks to control totally, was partially reduced. Thus, most of the economic, political or military initiatives and projects have been designed specifically towards the North and Central America, the Caribbean and Colombia. B. Obama (2009–2012) basically continued that foreign policy course in Latin America of former U.S. administration. In other words, the concentration on the specific territory and the militarization of the particular safety corridor remained (U.S.–Central America–Colombia). Moreover, the United States seeks to expand miscellaneous (military or economic) integration of that area. The influence in Latin America is preserved and expanded using initiatives such as Plan Colombia, Merida Initiative, also military bases in Colombia or naval fleet in the Carribean and South Pacific Ocena reactivation.
Looking from a few hundred years of historical perspective, the Western Hemisphere is being dominated by United States of America. In the twenty-first century, however, one can say it is quite noticeable decline in the United States relative power. In addition, the September 11 events have relatively adjusted major U.S. foreign policy priorities and fostered to focus its attention on other regions of the world (particularly Middle East and Middle Asia). Along these lines, a kind of vacuum of influence that has left afterwards in the Latin America has been actively used by other states. One of the most assertive, Brazil, has lots of aspirations to fill and consolidate the regional leadership and thus become a leader of more united and integrated South America. As a rapidly emerging middle power, Brazil tries to counterbalance the U.S. influence in the region and calls for reforms of a particular international governance structures (for example, the UN Security Council). Nevertheless, the United States usually is prone to secure its own national interests by implementation of its own measures. The general subject of this work is the power dynamics of United States and Brazil and their foreign policy initiatives oriented towards keeping or increasing influence in Latin America. The aim of this thesis is to analyze Brazil as a challenge to the United States dominance in Western Hemisphere and to evaluate the U.S. response, in order to maintain their leadership. Seeking to achieve the aim of the study, the following tasks have been fulfilled during the working process. Namely with reference to the international relations theories and conceptions of power, balancing and emergent middle power discussed in the thesis, the place of the United States and Brazil in the international system has been identified. Additionally, the geopolitical context and processes of the historical U.S. leadership consolidation in Western Hemisphere has been analyzed. In the empirical part of this work, the growth of Brazil's power and the impact on regional and global level affairs have been discussed. Moreover, after the analysis of Brazil's soft balancing against the United States, it has been defined how U.S. responses to such actions and seeks to secure its own strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere. The work is carried out using descriptive, analytical and comparative methods as well as the analysis of documents and scientific literature. Brazil pursues foreign policy strategies that are common for the emergent middle powers – coalition–building and soft balancing against the dominant state, when there are a significant military and economic power asimmetry between the states. Thus, pursuit of global influence through bilateral or multilateral instruments, in order to limit or complicate U.S. freedom of action or diplomacy but also avoid direct confrontation to the United States, is quite a rational choice. Also, in order to increase autonomy in foreign policy making and to secure national interests, Brazil creates regional organizations and forums, which excludes the United States (such as the Union of South American Nations or South American Defense Council). During the terms of G.W. Bush administration (2001–2009), the area of Latin America, which U.S. seeks to control totally, was partially reduced. Thus, most of the economic, political or military initiatives and projects have been designed specifically towards the North and Central America, the Caribbean and Colombia. B. Obama (2009–2012) basically continued that foreign policy course in Latin America of former U.S. administration. In other words, the concentration on the specific territory and the militarization of the particular safety corridor remained (U.S.–Central America–Colombia). Moreover, the United States seeks to expand miscellaneous (military or economic) integration of that area. The influence in Latin America is preserved and expanded using initiatives such as Plan Colombia, Merida Initiative, also military bases in Colombia or naval fleet in the Carribean and South Pacific Ocena reactivation.
Looking from a few hundred years of historical perspective, the Western Hemisphere is being dominated by United States of America. In the twenty-first century, however, one can say it is quite noticeable decline in the United States relative power. In addition, the September 11 events have relatively adjusted major U.S. foreign policy priorities and fostered to focus its attention on other regions of the world (particularly Middle East and Middle Asia). Along these lines, a kind of vacuum of influence that has left afterwards in the Latin America has been actively used by other states. One of the most assertive, Brazil, has lots of aspirations to fill and consolidate the regional leadership and thus become a leader of more united and integrated South America. As a rapidly emerging middle power, Brazil tries to counterbalance the U.S. influence in the region and calls for reforms of a particular international governance structures (for example, the UN Security Council). Nevertheless, the United States usually is prone to secure its own national interests by implementation of its own measures. The general subject of this work is the power dynamics of United States and Brazil and their foreign policy initiatives oriented towards keeping or increasing influence in Latin America. The aim of this thesis is to analyze Brazil as a challenge to the United States dominance in Western Hemisphere and to evaluate the U.S. response, in order to maintain their leadership. Seeking to achieve the aim of the study, the following tasks have been fulfilled during the working process. Namely with reference to the international relations theories and conceptions of power, balancing and emergent middle power discussed in the thesis, the place of the United States and Brazil in the international system has been identified. Additionally, the geopolitical context and processes of the historical U.S. leadership consolidation in Western Hemisphere has been analyzed. In the empirical part of this work, the growth of Brazil's power and the impact on regional and global level affairs have been discussed. Moreover, after the analysis of Brazil's soft balancing against the United States, it has been defined how U.S. responses to such actions and seeks to secure its own strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere. The work is carried out using descriptive, analytical and comparative methods as well as the analysis of documents and scientific literature. Brazil pursues foreign policy strategies that are common for the emergent middle powers – coalition–building and soft balancing against the dominant state, when there are a significant military and economic power asimmetry between the states. Thus, pursuit of global influence through bilateral or multilateral instruments, in order to limit or complicate U.S. freedom of action or diplomacy but also avoid direct confrontation to the United States, is quite a rational choice. Also, in order to increase autonomy in foreign policy making and to secure national interests, Brazil creates regional organizations and forums, which excludes the United States (such as the Union of South American Nations or South American Defense Council). During the terms of G.W. Bush administration (2001–2009), the area of Latin America, which U.S. seeks to control totally, was partially reduced. Thus, most of the economic, political or military initiatives and projects have been designed specifically towards the North and Central America, the Caribbean and Colombia. B. Obama (2009–2012) basically continued that foreign policy course in Latin America of former U.S. administration. In other words, the concentration on the specific territory and the militarization of the particular safety corridor remained (U.S.–Central America–Colombia). Moreover, the United States seeks to expand miscellaneous (military or economic) integration of that area. The influence in Latin America is preserved and expanded using initiatives such as Plan Colombia, Merida Initiative, also military bases in Colombia or naval fleet in the Carribean and South Pacific Ocena reactivation.
