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We propose a new type of values for cooperative TU-games, which we call pyramidal values. Assuming that the grand coalition is sequentially formed, and all orderings are equally likely, we define a pyramidal value to be any expected payoff in which the entrant player receives a salary and the right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition, whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. To be specific, we consider some parametric families of pyramidal values: the egalitarian pyramidal family, which coincides with the a-consensus value family introduced by Ju et al. in (2007), the proportional pyramidal family, and the weighted pyramidal family, which in turn includes the other two families as special cases. We also analyze the properties of these families, as well as their relationships with other previously defined values. ; This research has been supported by I+D+i research project MTM2011-27892 from the Government of Spain.

Metadata only record ; Values are often invoked in discussions of how to develop a more sustainable relationship with the environment. There is substantial literature on values that spans several disciplines. In philosophy, values are relatively stable principles that help us make decisions when our preferences are in conflict and thus convey some sense of what we consider good. In economics, the term values is usually used in discussions of social choice, where an assessment of the social value of various alternatives serves as a guide to the best choice under a utilitarian ethic (the greatest good for the greatest number). In sociology, social psychology, and political science, two major lines of research have addressed environmental values. One has focused on four value clusters: self-interest, altruism, traditionalism, and openness to change and found relatively consistent theoretical and empirical support for the relationship of values to environmentalism. The other line of research suggests that environmentalism emerges when basic material needs are met and that individuals and societies that are postmaterialist in their values are more likely to exhibit pro-environmental behaviors. The evidence in support of this argument is more equivocal. Overall, the idea that values, especially altruism, are related to environmentalism, seems well established, but little can be said about the causes of value change and of the overall effects of value change on changes in behavior.

Recognizing the prevalence of initiatives to align technology with social values through design and "by design" (such as privacy by design, security by design, and governance by design), this dissertation explores the current and potential role of design techniques in attending to values, and analyzes user experience (UX) professionals' "values work" practices—practices used to surface, advocate for, and attend to values—within large technology companies. The first part of the dissertation interrogates the relationship between values and design practices, looking at privacy as a case study. A review of human computer interaction literature about privacy and design suggests the importance of thinking about the purpose of design, who does the work of design, and on whose behalf is design work done. In order to better understand how design in the service of "values work" could be used towards purposes of exploration, critique and speculation, I create a set of speculative design fictions depicting a range of fictional products that suggest different sets of privacy harms. These designs serve as way to surface and foster reflection on values. The success of this design intervention in a laboratory setting sparked interest in understanding whether and how design approaches were used in values work within the technology industry. The second part of the dissertation seeks to understand the practices and strategies of UX professionals who already see addressing values as a part of their practice. I conducted interviews with UX professionals working at large technology companies, and field observations at meetups in the San Francisco Bay Area about technology design and values. These UX professionals report doing values work as a part of everyday configurations of UX work, such as when designing interfaces or conducting user research. More strikingly, UX professionals also report on engaging in a range of other activities aimed at shaping the organization, rather than a technical product or system. These practices are used by UX professionals to re-configure how values work is conducted at their organizations in several ways: by making more space for UX professionals' values work; by getting others in the organization to adopt human-centered perspectives on values; and by changing the politics and strategies of the organization regarding values. Moreover, UX professionals' values work practices occur within relations and systems of power. UX professionals often engage in tactics of soft resistance, seeking to subtly subvert existing practices towards more values-conscious ends while maintaining legibility as conducting business-as-usual within the organization. Together, these values work practices create social and organizational infrastructures to promote an alternative sociotechnical imaginary of large technology companies in a way that views these companies and their workers as more cognizant, proactive, and responsible for identifying and addressing social values, in particular reducing harms to users and other stakeholders.The last part of the dissertation reflects on the politics of using speculative design techniques in the service of values work. Experiences sharing speculative designs with others who interpreted the designs in ways that do not recognize their speculative, critical, and reflective nature, raises questions about how speculative design can be re-appropriated by or co-opted towards the very ends that are being critiqued and reflected upon. One approach to this dilemma might be to conduct speculative design work with and for specific groups of stakeholders, instead of for broad public discussion. Another approach might be to create organizational fictions that focus a designer's and viewer's attention more on practices and social relationships, compared to traditional speculative designs that focus attention on fictional products. Informed by the practices of UX professionals involved in values advocacy, the dissertation concludes by suggesting a new purpose for design, design for infrastructuring imaginaries, to complement the social practices of values advocacy. I reflect on the politics of choosing design as a mode of action when conducting values work, and reflect on implications that this work has for values in design researchers, practitioners, and stakeholders.

In November 2014 on the Dialogic Pedagogy Journal Facebook page, there was an interesting discussion of the issue of values in dialogic pedagogy[1]. The main issue can be characterized as the following. Should dialogic pedagogy teach values? Should it avoid teaching values? Is there some kind of a third approach? The participants of the Facebook discussions were focusing on teaching values in dialogic pedagogy and not about teaching aboutvalues. On the one hand, it seems to be impossible to avoid teaching values. However, on the other hand, shaping students in some preset molding is apparently non-dialogic and uncritical (Matusov, 2009). In the former case, successful teaching is defined by how well and deeply the students accept and commit to the taught values. In the latter case, successful dialogic teaching may be defined by students' critical examination of their own values against alternative values in a critical dialogue. Below, Eugene Matusov and Jay Lemke, active participants of this Facebook dialogue, provide their reflection on this important issue and encourage readers to join their reflective dialogue.[1] See in a public Facebook domain: https://www.facebook.com/DialogicPedagogyJournal/posts/894734337204533, https://www.facebook.com/DialogicPedagogyJournal/posts/896916850319615

This qualitative study examined the relationship between values taught and values experienced in three values-oriented high schools, i.e., high schools whose educational philosophy and objectives include an emphasis on specific values. The research questions focused on description of values taught and experienced within the schools, the perception of leaders and teachers about this relationship, and the theories of action developed by school leaders and teachers to enhance the relationship. Primary data sources included interviews with leaders and teachers, observations of classrooms and public spaces, and document reviews in each school. Data were analyzed both within each school and across the three schools to develop a multi-site case study that addresses the research questions. Findings present a description of the three schools' values systems with four major components: (a) public values; (b) acknowledged values; (c) personal values; and (d) implicit values. Within these values systems, the relationship between values taught and values experienced may be one of harmony, i.e., values taught and values experienced working together in a complimentary manner, or dissonance, i.e., values taught and values experienced perceived to be at odds with one another. Multiple examples of both harmony and dissonance were found in all of the research sites. School leaders and teachers exhibited a high degree of perception regarding the relationship between values taught and values experienced, with some exceptions when the values involved individual roles and actions. Theories of action developed by leaders and teachers to enhance the relationship include: (a) creating a distinctive culture and language around values; (b) consciously and continually aligning the school's value system with changing realities in the school; (c) using multiple types of meetings to support values; (d) making adult values education a priority; and (e) emphasizing reflection. The implications of the study are relevant to leaders and teachers who wish to improve values education in their schools.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways dissociated from prospects for success. Across the world, people believe that devotion to essential or core values – such as the welfare of their family and country, or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice – are, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Counterintuitively, understanding an opponent's sacred values, we believe, offers surprising opportunities for breakthroughs to peace. Because of the emotional unwillingness of those in conflict situations to negotiate sacred values, conventional wisdom suggests that negotiators should either leave sacred values for last in political negotiations or try to bypass them with sufficient material incentives. Our empirical findings and historical analysis suggest that conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, offering to provide material benefits in exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes settlement more difficult because people see the offering as an insult rather than a compromise. But we also found that making symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit might open the way to resolving seemingly irresolvable conflicts. We offer suggestions for how negotiators can reframe their position by demonstrating respect, and/or by apologizing for what they sincerely regret. We also offer suggestions for how to overcome sacred barriers by refining sacred values to exclude outmoded claims, exploiting the inevitable ambiguity of sacred values, shifting the context, provisionally prioritizing values, and reframing responsibility.

Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways dissociated from prospects for success. Across the world, people believe that devotion to essential or core values – such as the welfare of their family and country, or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice – are, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Counterintuitively, understanding an opponent's sacred values, we believe, offers surprising opportunities for breakthroughs to peace. Because of the emotional unwillingness of those in conflict situations to negotiate sacred values, conventional wisdom suggests that negotiators should either leave sacred values for last in political negotiations or try to bypass them with sufficient material incentives. Our empirical findings and historical analysis suggest that conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, offering to provide material benefits in exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes settlement more difficult because people see the offering as an insult rather than a compromise. But we also found that making symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit might open the way to resolving seemingly irresolvable conflicts. We offer suggestions for how negotiators can reframe their position by demonstrating respect, and/or by apologizing for what they sincerely regret. We also offer suggestions for how to overcome sacred barriers by refining sacred values to exclude outmoded claims, exploiting the inevitable ambiguity of sacred values, shifting the context, provisionally prioritizing values, and reframing responsibility.

The article highlights the issues of professional training of future educators using innovative pedagogical approaches, as well as the formation of inclusive competency as part of professional competency. The authors present the views of scholars on such terms as "inclusive education", "inclusive culture", "inclusive values", and "value-based orientations" and demonstrate the importance for teaching staff of basic knowledge and methods of working with children with special educational needs. The article highlights the effectiveness of inclusive education in the training and retraining of teachers, where the formation of inclusive values is one of the objectives. The creation of an inclusive culture in higher education institutions ensures the existence of a safe democratic society that shares the ideas of cooperation and the value of each person in common achievements. This kind of university culture creates shared inclusive values and principles that are common for all faculty and students.

Silvia Ivani Values in Science. The role of cognitive and non-cognitive values in Evolutionary Psychology Summary Should scientists value simple theories? Is fruitfulness an important criterion to assess scientific theories? What role moral, social, and political values should have in the assessment of scientific theories? In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of science in studying how cognitive and non-cognitive values influence and should influence the assessment and comparison of scientific theories. While cognitive values (such as simplicity and fruitfulness) are features of scientific theories that are indicative of the truth or empirical adequacy of theories, non-cognitive values are moral, political, social, and economic values. Understanding the roles of values in science is a particularly urgent issue. Clarifying the importance of cognitive values is important in order to be able to make accurate comparisons of scientific theories. Understanding the influence of non-cognitive values on science is crucial because moral, social, and political values are involved in many stages of research, such as decisions on methodologies and allocation of funds. Since these decisions affect all the members of the society (scientists, non-experts, and political institutions), understanding the impact of non-cognitive values on these choices is of primary importance. Although a large body of literature has investigated the roles of cognitive and non-cognitive values in theory appraisal, several questions remain to be analysed. In this dissertation, I address four questions by using two main methods, namely the analysis of case studies from evolutionary psychology and the experimental method. First, while philosophers have clarified the importance and roles in theory appraisal of some cognitive values, little or no attention has been paid to other values. In this dissertation, I have started filling this gap by formulating a clear explication and a simple strategy to be employed in theory appraisal for one of the values that have attracted little attention, namely fruitfulness. I have explicated fruitfulness as the ability of programs to extend their content and suggested considering research questions and discovery heuristics to assess this ability. Moreover, I have used my account to assess the fruitfulness of evolutionary psychology. Second, some philosophers of science argue that cognitive values are desirable and relevant to the assessment of theories because they are indicative of the truth or empirical adequacy of theories. However, why is it so? In my dissertation, I develop a context-sensitive approach to values and I argue that in order to understand the ground for the desirability of cognitive values and make an accurate appraisal of theories, we have to consider specific factors of the context in which theories are assessed, such as the availability of methodologies and the way cognitive values are interrelated to each other in that context. Third, philosophers have traditionally argued that the influence of non-cognitive values on scientific reasoning threatens the epistemic authority of science. I have challenged this view and argued that some non-cognitive values can play a cognitive role in science, i.e., they can be epistemically beneficial to the assessment of scientific theories. On the basis of a case study (the account of human mating in evolutionary psychology), I have argued that feminist values have positively contributed to theory appraisal in various ways, such as by raising sensitivity to evidence that was neglected because of gender bias. Fourth, some philosophers have argued that non-cognitive values play a legitimate role in cases of inductive risk, namely cases in which scientists may wrongly assess scientific hypotheses (e.g. accepting a hypothesis that should be rejected) because of some uncertainty due to mixed results or disagreement on the reliability of methodologies. Mistakes can have consequences that can be morally or economically undesirable and non-cognitive values, some philosophers argue, provide the standards to evaluate and compare these possible consequences. However, little is known on how - specifically - non-cognitive values influence this evaluation. To address this issue, I have conducted an experimental study clarifying how personal features, political values, and specific aspects of a risk (e.g. the chance of incurring Type I vs. Type II errors) determine people's reasoning about cases of inductive risk. On the basis of these results, I have discussed recent institutional calls for the need to align research agendas and technological development to citizens' values, needs, and expectations.

We consider a class of cooperative network games with transferable utilities in which players interact through a probabilistic network rather than a regular, deterministic network. In this class of wealth-generating situations we consider probabilistic extensions of the Myerson value and the position value. For the subclass of probabilistic network games in multilinear form, we establish characterizations of these values using an appropriate formulation of component balancedness. We show axiomatizations based on extensions of the well-accepted properties of equal bargaining power, balanced contributions, and balanced link contributions.