WTO
In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 47, Heft 3
ISSN: 1467-6346
In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 47, Heft 3
ISSN: 1467-6346
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 103, S. 124-128
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: Berichte / BIOst, Band 13-2000
'Mit dem Abschluß der bilateralen Verhandlungen zwischen den USA und der VR China ist im November 1999 der Beitritt Chinas zur Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) in greifbare Nähe gerückt worden. Obwohl noch weiterer Verhandlungsbedarf besteht, ist es möglich, daß die VR China im Laufe des Jahres 2000 in die WTO aufgenommen wird. Womit erklärt sich der plötzliche Verhandlungserfolg nach 14 Jahren Verhandlungszeit? Welche Motive und Zielsetzungen verbindet die chinesische Regierung mit dem Beitritt, und was hat die wichtigsten Verhandlungspartner der VR China, die USA und die Europäische Union bewogen, dem Beitritt zuzustimmen? Ausgehend von dieser politischen Einordnung prüft der vorliegende Bericht die Inhalte und ökonomischen Implikationen des Beitritts für die chinesische Wirtschaft.' (Textauszug)
In: Berichte / Forschungsinstitut der Internationalen Wissenschaftlichen Vereinigung Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik (IWVWW) e.V, Band 8, Heft 72, S. 18-28
ISSN: 1022-3258
World Affairs Online
Since 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members violate their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU), i.e. as being 'composed of seven persons', with vacancies being 'filled as they arise'. This contribution argues that none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates - on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates - can legally justify its disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. Also the European Union (EU) has offered no convincing justification of its failure to protect 'strict observance of international law' in it external relations, as required by Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU) and by Article IX:1 WTO Agreement ('where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting'). The 2018 'Concept Paper' prepared by the EU Commission on 'WTO modernization' indicates no strategy for the obvious problem that the EU objective of 'preserving and deepening the rules-based multilateral system', including 'more effective and transparent dispute settlement including the Appellate Body', is inconsistent with the US strategies underlying US blocking of the AB jurisdiction by preventing the appointment of AB judges, a strategy which was previously applied by the US for blocking third-party adjudication under Chapter 20 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Trade diplomats have no democratic mandate for disrupting the AB jurisdiction by illegally reducing the number of AB members to one single judge by December 2019 and, thereby, undermining the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership for using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX:1 WTO – if necessary, based on 'a majority of the votes cast' - to initiate and complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Article IX.2 could be used for authoritative interpretations 'taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members' confirming the collective duties of WTO members to fill AB vacancies in case of illegal blocking of AB nominations. WTO law foresees similar majority decisions for the appointment of the WTO Director-General; such majority decisions are necessary for preventing illegal de facto amendments of the WTO legal system, and do not set a precedent for future WTO majority voting on discretionary, political issues, which most WTO diplomats reject as a 'nuclear option'. As suggested by European ordo-liberalism, citizens and democratic institutions must hold trade politicians democratically and legally more accountable for complying with their legislative mandates to implement and modernize, but not to destroy WTO law and dispute settlement.
BASE
In: Commentaries on World Trade Law, Brill 2020.
SSRN
Tax havens and tax flight have lately received increasing attention, while interest toward multilateral trade policies has somewhat diminished. We argue that more attention needs to be paid exactly to the interrelations between trade and tax policies. Drawing from two case studies on Panama's trade disputes, we show how World Trade Organization (WTO) rules can be used both to resist attempts to sanction secrecy structures and to promote measures against tax flight. The theory of new constitutionalism can help to explain how trade treaties can 'lock in' tax policies. However, our case studies show that trade policy not only 'locks in' democratic policy-making, but also enables tax havens to use their commercialized sovereignty to resists anti-secrecy measures. What is being 'locked in' are the policy tools, not necessarily the policies. The changing relationship between trade and tax policies can also create new and unexpected tools for tackling tax evasion, underlining the importance of epistemic arbitrage inthe context of new constitutionalism. In principle, political actors with sufficient technical and juridical knowledge can shape global tax governance to various directions regardless of their formal position in the world political hierarchies. This should be taken into account when trade treaties are being negotiated or revised. ; Peer reviewed
BASE
In: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO
In: The round table: the Commonwealth journal of international affairs, Band 92, Heft 372, S. 623-635
ISSN: 1474-029X
In: Südostasien aktuell: journal of current Southeast Asian affairs, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 79-95
Becoming member of theWorld Trade Organisation was the decisive follow-up of Vietnam's reform
resolutions taken in 1986. Nevertheless the process of acceding the "club" was not a walkover but
took the SRV not less than two decades, marked by seven steps: The doi-moi-resolution (1986),
the normalization of her relationship with the international financial organisations (1993), the
formal applying for membership to the WTO (1995), the membership of the ASEAN (1995), of
the ASEM (1996) and of the APEC (1998), and the accession to the WTO (2006/07). Having
achieved this final destination, Vietnam's expectations continue to be strangely mixed. On the one
hand there are at least three great opportunities for the country: to join the global trade market, to
absorb capital, know-how and management, and to improve its status in the international economy
and politics.
On the other hand Vietnam has to meet several challenges coming up in different realms: The
SRV is partially afraid of becoming confronted with a disintegration of its economy: Whereas the
strong secondary sector is supposed to continue to grow, the service industry and particularly the
agriculture may decline at the same time. Functionally there is much concern about efficiency
and competitiveness of the economy in general and about the qualification of workers and the
flexibility of the state owned enterprises in particular. Last not least there remains a conceptional
problem to be settled which could trouble the political leadership. The more the Vietnamese
enterprises are sticking to WTO-rules, the more the authoritarian tutelage of the CPV-leadership
is becoming undermin
The WTO Analytical Index is a comprehensive guide to the interpretation and application of the WTO Agreements by the Appellate Body, dispute settlement panels and other WTO bodies. It contains extracts of key pronouncements and findings from tens of thousands of pages of WTO jurisprudence, including panel reports, Appellate Body reports, Article 21.3(c) awards and Article 22.6 decisions. This unique work will be of assistance to anyone working in the field of WTO law, including lawyers, economists, academics and students. It is produced by the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO Secretariat with contributions from other divisions of the Secretariat and the Appellate Body Secretariat. The third edition of the WTO Analytical Index covers developments in WTO law and practice over the period January 1995 to September 2011
In: (2011) 61(1) Telecommunications Journal of Australia 6.1–6.7
SSRN
In: European journal of political economy, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 327-353
ISSN: 0176-2680
This paper reviews the internal & external architecture of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The internal architecture relates to the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT) & the Uruguay Round Agreements. The external architecture relates to the relationship between the WTO & other multilateral organizations. The present architecture is incoherent. The paper proposes that the architectural design should be based on the objective of full nondiscrimination, ie, free trade & national treatment without exception. There are gaps in the internal architecture that should be filled. The main consideration in the external architecture is the scope of the WTO rules relating to the environment, competition, & investment. Some principles for the design of external architecture are proposed. These indicate that the rules of the WTO might be extended to cover foreign direct investment, but not the environment & competition. 39 References. Adapted from the source document.