Considers the nature of the Australian Labor Party and Labor governments in the course of a critique of two books on the Party. Stresses the continuity in the ALP's pursuit of the interests of Australian capital when it is in office and its 'structural constitution', that is its distinctive relationship with the working class, especially through the union movement, and with the capitalist class. Evidence to support the analysis is drawn from the experience of the Chifley government during the 1940s, the Whitlam government during the 1970s and the Hawke government during the 1980s.
This thesis focuses on the political and diplomatic history relating to Australian foreign policymaking towards the East Timor question during the Whitlam and Fraser governments, from April 1974 to January 1978. With reference to a number of published and unpublished Australian diplomatic records, a study of newspaper coverage (in particular, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Age and the Canberra Times), and also contemporary periodicals and personal memoirs, this thesis analyses the Australian foreign policymaking process towards Indonesia's integration policy towards East Timor. Although the existing literature has tended to focus on Australian policymakers, notably Prime Minister Whitlam in collaboration with Ambassador to Indonesia Woolcott – who were mostly concerned with Australian relations with Indonesia and sought to avoid the outcome of a small independent East Timor in the neighbourhood – this research also pays attention to the contribution of other foreign policy actors, including Foreign Minister Willesee of the Whitlam government in consultation with Secretary Renouf, both of whom thought it necessary to take account of domestic opinion sympathetic to self-determination. Considering that the Department of Foreign Affairs was convinced of the need for a proper act of self-determination in Portuguese Timor from the beginning and accordingly advised Foreign Ministers Willesee and Peacock to issue official statements in support of the right of self-determination against the backdrop of mounting domestic opinion – in particular during the period from October 1975 to July 1976 – this thesis argues that the Department took a substantial role in foreign policymaking in an attempt to dissociate the Australian government from Indonesia's coercive integration policy. In conclusion, despite the commonly-accepted view of the strong personal leadership of Prime Minister Whitlam who favoured Indonesia's integration of East Timor, this thesis argues that his influence was not unlimited. It is essential to consider ...
[Introduction]:.I want to concentrate on what Australian Governments have done and should do to improve Australia's system of representative government. Federal parliamentarians have the main responsibility because they and they alone can initiate constitutional referendums and enact international instruments. In all my own accounts and analyses of the matter, I contend that November 1975 was fundamentally a political crisis, fully capable of a political resolution, and, indeed, about to be so resolved, not more than 48 hours later than my government's dismissal. That is, by the fully attested switch of votes imminent on the part of at least four coalition senators. One such defection would have been enough to end the crisis. The dismissal was needless and premature. More recent accounts go to this conclusion. John Menadue's indispensable book, Things You Learn Along the Way, was published last year. Tonight, however, I propose only to touch on some aspects which point to changes in the Constitution which, if made before 1975, would have prevented the crisis or which, if made now, would prevent a repetition.
[Introduction]:.The choice of topic was, for me, an easy one. The campaign for open government was the first topic on which I developed an academic and professional interest. That was at a time, in the early 1970s, when the concept of open government did not enjoy widespread acceptance. The mood was aptly captured a little later by Sir Arnold Robinson's explanation to Sir Humphrey Appleby – "Open government is a contradiction in terms. You can be open – or you can have government". Sir Humphrey agreed: the word "secretary", he noted, is after all a derivative of "secret". The first assurance of change was a promise by the new Whitlam Government in 1972 to enact a freedom of information Act along the lines of the 1967 United States law. The realisation of that promise, ten years later, was a confirmation that government was changing, but of how difficult it was to accomplish that change. The intervening development of the legislative model told the story. An interdepartmental committee appointed by the Government to develop a legislative model took nearly two years to prepare its report of 18 pages. Sent back to the drawing board, it returned two years later with a report that had grown to 100 pages. The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs then took control of the reform agenda, conducting hearings around Australia, receiving submissions in support of a stronger law from over 125 individuals, public interest groups, unions and professional associations, and delivering finally a report of over 500 pages, heralded at the time as one of the finest products of the Senate committee system. The momentum was sustained when six government senators crossed the floor to vote with the Opposition in favour of a stronger FOI law. The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) was a part, a small but vital part, of the revolution in government and thinking that occurred in Australia. The Act thus serves as a barometer of sorts for measuring the strength of government commitment to openness. I want to return to that issue –problems with the FOI Act, and contemporary challenges to open government – but before doing so it is important to paint a fuller picture of the current structural basis for open government in Australia. I will look at three areas of structural support – legal doctrine, the framework of government, and our philosophy of government.
Senate reform has once again found its way into national conversation. A discussion paper released by the Prime Minister in early October represents the latest in a long history of national discussions on the topic of resolving deadlocks between the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate has been an the subject of considerable debate starting from the federation conferences of the 1890's. At the time of Federation in 1901 , the Senate was seen as encompassing the dual role of a 'house of review' and a 'states house'. It was believed that the Senate would aspire to these roles as it grew through history. Sadly, the Senate never became a 'states house' and has only recently played the role of 'house of review' due to the rise of a robust Senate Committee system. Alfred Deakin had predicted before federation that a strong two party system would develop in Australia, preventing the Senate from fulfilling either of its intended roles. He was right. A combination of factors, including a switch to proportional representation and an increase in the size of the Senate in 1949 to 10 Senators, and 1984 to 12 Senators per state has ted to a upper house that is not likely to be led by a governing majority. In recent times, the Senate, led by the opposition parties have obstructed and frustrated the governments legislative program.· In 1975, the refusal of the Senate to pass Supply led to a constitutional crisis and the downfall of the Whitlam Government. In the last decade, the Senate has been referred to as 'unrepresentative swill' and a 'house of obstruction'. Both of these terms represent the frustration that successive Prime Ministers from both of the major parties have had with a Senate that they do not control. This frustration has once again culminated in the prospect that the deadlock provisions under section 57 of the constitution will be changed. The Prime Minister has re-suggested two proposals, both of which provide for a joint sitting of parliament without the need for a double dissolution. Both suggestions would require a referendum to undertake the necessary constitutional changes. This paper suggests two alternative measures that do not require a referendum, but could potentially serve the same function - to eliminate the occurrence of bicameral deadlock. The first suggestion is to cut party ties in the Senate by banning ministerial positions from being held in the upper-house. An enhanced committee system would provide an alternative career structure for Senators who would be rewarded for hard legislative work. Associated electoral reforms would also help to cut party loyalty . in the Senate allowing for the easier negotiation of government legislation. The second suggestion is one revived from Billy Wentworth's maiden speech in 1950. It is simply to change back to a system of first past the post voting in the event of a double dissolution election. The resulting winner takes all effect would be a deterrent against obstruction for obstructions sake. Only a party which was sure it had the majority of voters on side would be prepared to allow a double dissolution to occur.
The Policy Agendas Project collects and organises data from official documents to trace changes in the policy agenda and outputs of national, sub-national and supranational governments. In this paper we use the policy agendas method to analyse the changing contents of those Australian Governor-General's speeches delivered on behalf of incoming governments between 1945 and 2008. We suggest that these speeches provide an important insight into how the executive wishes to portray its policy agenda as it starts a new term of government. In mapping the changing agenda in this way we address four questions: which issues have risen or fallen in importance? When and in relation to what issues have there been policy 'punctuations'? How stable is the Australian policy agenda? How fragmented is the policy agenda? We find evidence of a number of policy punctuations and one turning-point: the election of the Whitlam government.
The Policy Agendas Project collects and organises data from official documents to trace changes in the policy agenda and outputs of national, sub-national and supranational governments. In this paper we use the policy agendas method to analyse the changing contents of those Australian Governor-General's speeches delivered on behalf of incoming governments between 1945 and 2008. We suggest that these speeches provide an important insight into how the executive wishes to portray its policy agenda as it starts a new term of government. In mapping the changing agenda in this way we address four questions: which issues have risen or fallen in importance? When and in relation to what issues have there been policy 'punctuations'? How stable is the Australian policy agenda? How fragmented is the policy agenda? We find evidence of a number of policy punctuations and one turning-point: the election of the Whitlam government.
Labor governments since the early 20th Century have consistently attempted to boost business profits. The way they have done so has changed but their policies have been consistently shaped by both the shifting requirements of Australian capitalism and the ALP's nature as a capitalist workers party. From the 1940s until the early 1970s, Labor advocated a program of Keynesian and protectionist economics. As the economics profession turned against protectionism, the Whitlam Government sought to integrate Australian capitalism more closely with the global economy. The Hawke and Keating Governments went much further in opening the economy, deregulating, privatizing and corporatizing than their conservative predecessor. In most areas, with the notable exception of industrial relations, they generally acted in line with the new, neo-liberal orthodoxy in economics. The logic of the Rudd and Gillard Governments' responses to the global economic crisis, invoking a mixture of neo-liberal and Keynesian precepts, like the economic policies of its Labor predecessors, can only be grasped in terms of the ALP's distinctive material constitution.
Labor governments since the early 20th Century have consistently attempted to boost business profits. The way they have done so has changed but their policies have been consistently shaped by both the shifting requirements of Australian capitalism and the ALP's nature as a capitalist workers party. From the 1940s until the early 1970s, Labor advocated a program of Keynesian and protectionist economics. As the economics profession turned against protectionism, the Whitlam Government sought to integrate Australian capitalism more closely with the global economy. The Hawke and Keating Governments went much further in opening the economy, deregulating, privatizing and corporatizing than their conservative predecessor. In most areas, with the notable exception of industrial relations, they generally acted in line with the new, neo-liberal orthodoxy in economics. The logic of the Rudd and Gillard Governments' responses to the global economic crisis, invoking a mixture of neo-liberal and Keynesian precepts, like the economic policies of its Labor predecessors, can only be grasped in terms of the ALP's distinctive material constitution.
The Whitlam government of the 1970s introduced the principle of self-determination to Indigenous affairs. Since then it has been accepted as an important factor in attaining equality for Indigenous Australians. Self-determination can be broadly understood to mean the transference of political and economic power to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. In is understood in terms of Aboriginal people having control over the ultimate decision about a wide range of matters including political status, and economic, social and cultural development and having the resources and capacity to control the future of their own communities within the legal structure common to all Australians. Political representation is a vital aspect of Indigenous self-determination as it is the forum in which Indigenous people can express their views and opinions as well as influence policies concerning their lives and communities and interact with the government in order to achieve the best possible results for all involved. It can be argued that the present government's policies in the area of Indigenous affairs have marked a significant shift away from the policy of self-determination as evident in the dismantlement of representative structures such as ATSIC. The policies of self-determination and self-management led to what Will Sanders describes as two experiments in the creation of government-sponsored Aboriginal representative structures - the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC), and the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). Both the NACC and the NAC were elected advisory bodies to the government that were both short-lived and were replaced with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). ATSIC differed form its predecessors in that it combined two functions within one organization - representation and executive responsibilities. Upon its inception, ATSIC was described as a path breaking experiment in the field of Indigenous affairs internationally. ATSIC was an elected body with a strong regional focus with 60 (later 36) regional councils which formed the basis of ATSIC's representative structure. Each ATSIC region had a Regional Council. 8-12 people were elected to each Regional Council who then in turn elected a Regional Chairperson and a Deputy. These Regional councils are grouped into 16 ATSIC zones each of which elected a national Commissioner from among their regional councillors. In an attempt to balance representation of regions with very different populations, zones ranged from one to eight regional councils whilst there were 60 regions from 1990 to 1993. From late 1993, when there were 36 regions, zones ranged from one to four regional councils. The administrative arm was headed by a Chief Executive Officer and administrated ATSIC's various programs, including the implementation of decisions made by the elected arm about loan and grant applications and the direction of funding to particular service delivery organisations. A review of ATSIC in 2002-2003 resulted in a public discussion paper and a final report outlining problems with ATSIC's structure and operations and recommendations for reform. One of the main criticisms of ATSIC was the need to improve connections between regional representative structures and national policy formulations. Within six months of the report being published the government position did an abrupt about face - from strengthening ATSIC, which was considered a unique organisation to doing away with it. In April 2004, both the coalition government and the labour opposition announced intentions to abolish ATSIC. In May 2004, the government announced that ATSIC was to be abolished in two stages, with the national board to terminate in 2004 and the regional councils in 2005. The National Indigenous Council (NIC) was established to advise the government on Indigenous affairs and consists of appointed members and is not representative nor does it have the power to influence policy making in Indigenous affairs The abolition of the nationally elected representative Indigenous body ensures that the government will only have to deal with Indigenous peoples on its own terms and without any reference to the views and goals of Indigenous peoples. Increased Indigenous participation and control over decision making is essential to improving government service delivery. Ultimately, abolishing ATSIC will simply silence Indigenous people at the national level while the deeply entrenched crisis in Indigenous communities continues unabated. The removal of ATSIC and the lack of a replacement representative body for Indigenous Australians means that once again, Indigenous people have lost the power to influence the decisions that impact on their lives. International examples from Canada, the US and New Zealand show that there are various models for Indigenous representation which facilitate self-determination. It is vital that these models are considered as well as the models of past Australian representative structures when developing a representative body for Indigenous Australians. A representative body must be established for. Indigenous Australians so that once again, they influence policies which concern them, advocate on behalf of Indigenous Australians and negotiate with governments for positive outcomes to improve their lives.
Sir Arthur Tange was perhaps the most powerful Secretary of the Australian Defence Department and one of the most powerful of the great 'mandarins' who dominated the Commonwealth Public Service between the 1940s and the 1970s. His strong, and often decisive, influence on both administration and policy was exerted by virtue of his intellectual capacity, his administrative ability and the sheer force of his personality. Controversies from his time in Defence, including those associated with 'the Tange report' and 'the Tange reforms', echo to this day, and it is still easy to identify both staunch admirers and vitriolic critics in defence and public service circles. Tange wrote this account in his last years. It is a memoir – based largely on memory supplemented by limited reference to documentary material – that focuses upon his career after he came to Defence in 1970. It records his own account of his part in those administrative reforms and policy shifts, as well as his involvement-or non-involvement or alleged involvement-in several of the political crises of the 1970s, including the downfall of John Gorton as Prime Minister and the dismissal of the Whitlam Government.
In the 1970s the Australian Commonwealth Government and three States, Victoria (1974), New South Wales (1977) and South Australia (1978), passed legislation to protect the built heritage within their jurisdictions. The legislation was primarily a response to two factors: a large number of public protests against the demolition of historic buildings in all Australian states by the 1970s and the influence of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, which the Whitlam Government (1972-75) embraced enthusiastically. The other states, with governments that were more influenced by development interests, were slow to follow the federal lead. In this study, Sharon Mosler examines heritage issues and conflicts in Adelaide from enactment of the first South Australian Heritage Act in 1978 to its successor in 1993, and also analyses issues leading from that period into the twenty-first century. State legislation introduced by the Labor government of Premier Mike Rann (2002 – present) has affected the built environment significantly since this book began. The Rann government has given the built heritage a low priority in its strategic plan compared to population growth, while the Adelaide City Council has become more balanced in the past decade, although the council too has focussed on increasing Adelaide's population. The result has been more high-rise buildings at the expense of heritage conservation and historic precincts.
'The Ayes Have It' is a fascinating account of the Queensland Parliament during three decades of high-drama politics. It examines in detail the Queensland Parliament from the days of the 'Labor split' in the 1950s, through the conservative governments of Frank Nicklin, John Bjelke- Petersen and Mike Ahern, to the fall of the Nationals government led briefly by Russell Cooper in December 1989. The volume traces the rough and tumble of parliamentary politics in the frontier state. The authors focus on parliament as a political forum, on the representatives and personalities that made up the institution over this period, on the priorities and political agendas that were pursued, and the increasingly contentious practices used to control parliamentary proceedings. Throughout the entire history are woven other controversies that repeatedly recur – controversies over state economic development, the provision of government services, industrial disputation and government reactions, electoral zoning and disputes over malapportionment, the impost of taxation in the 'low tax state', encroachments on civil liberties and political protests, the perennial topic of censorship, as well as the emerging issues of integrity, concerns about conflicts of interest and the slide towards corruption. There are fights with the federal government – especially with the Whitlam government – and internal fights within the governing coalition which eventually leads to its collapse in 1983, after which the Nationals manage to govern alone for two very tumultuous terms. On the non-government side, the bitterness of the 1950s split was reflected in the early parliaments of this period, and while the Australian Labor Party eventually saw off its rivalrous off-shoot (the QLP-DLP) it then began to implode through waves of internal factional discord.
'The Ayes Have It' is a fascinating account of the Queensland Parliament during three decades of high-drama politics. It examines in detail the Queensland Parliament from the days of the 'Labor split' in the 1950s, through the conservative governments of Frank Nicklin, John Bjelke- Petersen and Mike Ahern, to the fall of the Nationals government led briefly by Russell Cooper in December 1989. The volume traces the rough and tumble of parliamentary politics in the frontier state. The authors focus on parliament as a political forum, on the representatives and personalities that made up the institution over this period, on the priorities and political agendas that were pursued, and the increasingly contentious practices used to control parliamentary proceedings. Throughout the entire history are woven other controversies that repeatedly recur – controversies over state economic development, the provision of government services, industrial disputation and government reactions, electoral zoning and disputes over malapportionment, the impost of taxation in the 'low tax state', encroachments on civil liberties and political protests, the perennial topic of censorship, as well as the emerging issues of integrity, concerns about conflicts of interest and the slide towards corruption. There are fights with the federal government – especially with the Whitlam government – and internal fights within the governing coalition which eventually leads to its collapse in 1983, after which the Nationals manage to govern alone for two very tumultuous terms. On the non-government side, the bitterness of the 1950s split was reflected in the early parliaments of this period, and while the Australian Labor Party eventually saw off its rivalrous off-shoot (the QLP-DLP) it then began to implode through waves of internal factional discord.
Recent responses to Asian immigration in Australia can be assessed in relation to Australia's search for a national identity. Australian nationalism has always had its racist elements, reflected in the maintenance of the White Australia Policy until it was abolished by the Whitlam government in 1973. Asian immigration has built up considerably since them, though no one source country has been dominant. Since the late 1970s, generally one third or more of settler arrivals have been from Asian countries. Migrants to Australia from Asian countries have been, on average, more highly educated and have achieved higher income levels than the rest of the population. However, some groups have had below average education levels, notably refugees from the Indo-chines region. The polls indicate majority opposition to Asian immigration, as to immigration in general, though multiple issue opinion polling does not show immigration to be an issue of major concern. Since the maiden speech in parliament by the independent member for Oxley, Pauline Hanson, in September 1996, a "race controversy" has erupted which has reflected not only the persistence of racist attitudes among a section of the Australian population, but also that there is a class and education element: anti-Asian sentiment is more prevalent among the Anglo-Australian working class than among the better educated and those of immigrant background. Avoidance of further widening of these fault lines in Australian society will require statesmanship of a high order from Australia's political leaders.
