Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1: Introduction -- References -- 2: Multiculturalism, Australian Style: Official Multiculturalism from Whitlam to Fraser -- The Beginnings of Official Multiculturalism: The Whitlam Government -- The Fraser Government: The Expansion of Multiculturalism -- The Emerging Critiques of Multiculturalism, from the Late 1970s to the Early 1980s -- References -- 3: Multiculturalism as Social Justice: The Hawke and Keating Governments -- Multiculturalism and Keating -- Conclusion: Further Critiques of Multiculturalism -- References

[Introduction]:.I want to concentrate on what Australian Governments have done and should do to improve Australia's system of representative government. Federal parliamentarians have the main responsibility because they and they alone can initiate constitutional referendums and enact international instruments. In all my own accounts and analyses of the matter, I contend that November 1975 was fundamentally a political crisis, fully capable of a political resolution, and, indeed, about to be so resolved, not more than 48 hours later than my government's dismissal. That is, by the fully attested switch of votes imminent on the part of at least four coalition senators. One such defection would have been enough to end the crisis. The dismissal was needless and premature. More recent accounts go to this conclusion. John Menadue's indispensable book, Things You Learn Along the Way, was published last year. Tonight, however, I propose only to touch on some aspects which point to changes in the Constitution which, if made before 1975, would have prevented the crisis or which, if made now, would prevent a repetition.

1. The post-war period and the Whitlam government -- 2. The Fraser government -- 3. The Hawke-Keating governments -- 4. The Howard government -- 5. The Rudd-Gillard governments -- 6. The Abbott-Turnbull governments -- 7. The national story and policy legitimacy -- 8. Professionalisation and technical legitimacy -- 9. Managing risk and administrative legitimacy.

This thesis explores the context in which the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, 1974-1977 came to be. The Whitlam Government wanted to reform the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) so as to depoliticise it and make it more effective in combating genuine threats to the state, including global terrorism. In early 1973 the government's reform was stalled as a result of the attorney-general's raid on ASIO offices. The Prime Minister announced in late 1973 that an inquiry into ASIO would arise at some point. The Australian Labor Party took the idea of a judicial inquiry into Australia's intelligence and security apparatus to the 1974 election. Within weeks of returning to office the Whitlam Government decided to launch the Royal Commission. Even by the time of the government's dismissal in 1975 the process of ASIO's reform was advanced. The decision to keep ASIO was made by Labor prior to the 1972 election. This was despite experiencing two decades of ASIO's ideological partisanship, which had consequences for Labor. But the party's decision was not inconsistent with its history, having been an anti-communist party from the 1920s and responsible for ASIO's creation in 1949. The Royal Commission's terms of reference ensured that an intelligence apparatus would continue to be available to the Commonwealth. The decision to erect the Royal Commission was also widely supported by major Australian newspapers. When the Royal Commission finished in 1977 a lasting bipartisan consensus on ASIO was emerging.

This thesis explores the context in which the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, 1974-1977 came to be. The Whitlam Government wanted to reform the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) so as to depoliticise it and make it more effective in combating genuine threats to the state, including global terrorism. In early 1973 the government's reform was stalled as a result of the attorney-general's raid on ASIO offices. The Prime Minister announced in late 1973 that an inquiry into ASIO would arise at some point. The Australian Labor Party took the idea of a judicial inquiry into Australia's intelligence and security apparatus to the 1974 election. Within weeks of returning to office the Whitlam Government decided to launch the Royal Commission. Even by the time of the government's dismissal in 1975 the process of ASIO's reform was advanced. The decision to keep ASIO was made by Labor prior to the 1972 election. This was despite experiencing two decades of ASIO's ideological partisanship, which had consequences for Labor. But the party's decision was not inconsistent with its history, having been an anti-communist party from the 1920s and responsible for ASIO's creation in 1949. The Royal Commission's terms of reference ensured that an intelligence apparatus would continue to be available to the Commonwealth. The decision to erect the Royal Commission was also widely supported by major Australian newspapers. When the Royal Commission finished in 1977 a lasting bipartisan consensus on ASIO was emerging.

During the 1970s the Whitlam government in Australia and the Kirk government in New Zealand each adopted a policy of new nationalism in an attempt to come to terms with a rapidly changing and increasingly decolonised world marked by the decline of Britain as an economic and military force in the world. In each case this new nationalism prioritised local and national identities over a larger pan‐British identity. Both governments were more inward‐looking and yet also more engaged with the Asia‐Pacific region than their predecessors. They promoted their own national distinctiveness and independence, while also forging closer relationships with each other and the wider region. Both embraced a new understanding of their geographic position and repudiated the idea that Australia and New Zealand were European nations on the edge of Asia. The nationalisms they promoted were remarkably similar, yet there are important differences that reflect their different ethnic makeup and geographic position.

An "urban" definition of public policy problems raises great difficulties for the policy maker. If we emphasize implementation as a primary factor in evaluating public policy, we have good grounds for questioning the wisdom of an urban perspective. But urban questions have been and still are major areas of concern in public policy formulation. The ALP federal platform contains a long section on urban policies, reiterating what the Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD) was striving to achieve under the Whitlam Government. At state level, urban problems have been tackled with varying degrees of success and seriousness, although at this level overall urban perspectives tend to be ignored, for reasons we shall indicate. However urban planning authorities have been tried in most capital cities, and metropolitan plans have been drawn up for all of them. They have concentrated mainly on land use and urban form. By the 1970s a common criticism of such planning was that it left aside many social and economic aspects of urban growth. For example, one (admittedly partisan) government source—the N.S.W. Department of Decentralization and Development—noted "a massive and increasing trend towards socio‐economic segregation":…the remoteness of central city facilities …the cost of commuter transport and the inadequacy of community facilities in low‐income outer suburbs are operating to perpetuate economic under‐privilege.