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The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard is the first critical examination of Australia's post-Vietnam military operations, spanning the 35 years between the election of Gough Whitlam and the defeat of John Howard. John Blaxland explores the 'casualty cringe' felt by political leaders following the war and how this impacted subsequent operations. He contends that the Australian Army's rehabilitation involved common individual and collective training and reaffirmation of the Army's regimental and corps identities. He shows how the Army regained its confidence to play leading roles in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, and to contribute to combat operations further afield. At a time when the Australian Army's future strategic role is the subject of much debate, and as the 'Asian Century' gathers pace and commitment in Afghanistan draws to an end, this work is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding the modern context of Australia's military land force.

Gough Whitlam's Labor government came to office in December 1972 with a vast and transformative reform agenda, at the heart of which was a fundamental policy shift in Aboriginal affairs away from assimilation and toward self-determination, described by Whitlam as; 'Aboriginal communities deciding the pace and nature of their future development as significant components within a diverse Australia'. Whitlam's commitment to self-determination reflected the United Nation's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which refers to the right of all peoples to 'freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'. Whitlam made it clear that Aboriginal Affairs would be a priority of his government with the establishment of the first separate Ministry for Aboriginal Affairs and his government introduced a suite of path-breaking policies for Aboriginal people. Pat Dodson, the inaugural chairperson of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, later described the change in policy and intent under Whitlam as, 'a transforming sentiment in this country for Aboriginal people'. This article explores the key features of Whitlam's Indigenous policy and argues that Whitlam's commitment to self-determination was a unique and radical policy reframing in Indigenous affairs not seen before or since. These advances were wound back by the conservative government of Malcolm Fraser and the 'transforming sentiment' soon reverted to one of 'self-management' and unarticulated assimilation.

[Introduction]:.I want to concentrate on what Australian Governments have done and should do to improve Australia's system of representative government. Federal parliamentarians have the main responsibility because they and they alone can initiate constitutional referendums and enact international instruments. In all my own accounts and analyses of the matter, I contend that November 1975 was fundamentally a political crisis, fully capable of a political resolution, and, indeed, about to be so resolved, not more than 48 hours later than my government's dismissal. That is, by the fully attested switch of votes imminent on the part of at least four coalition senators. One such defection would have been enough to end the crisis. The dismissal was needless and premature. More recent accounts go to this conclusion. John Menadue's indispensable book, Things You Learn Along the Way, was published last year. Tonight, however, I propose only to touch on some aspects which point to changes in the Constitution which, if made before 1975, would have prevented the crisis or which, if made now, would prevent a repetition.

Queensland played a significant role in Gough Whitlam's political career as a federal politician. Whitlam's electioneering in the Sunshine State during the 1960s helped secure his reputation as a forward-thinking, progressive leader with both a national and regionally focused agenda. As a leading figure within the federal Labor Opposition, he skilfully employed a specific notion of 'Queensland difference' based on local resentment of perceived 'southern' neglect to enhance his appeal to Queensland voters. However, as prime minister (1972–75), his failure to maintain a strong connection with the Queensland electorate undid much of the political capital Whitlam had accumulated in the state during the previous decade. This was compounded by his increasingly toxic relationship with a state rights–oriented Queensland premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, who, energised by his own version of 'Queensland difference', obstructed key aspects of Whitlam's national political agenda. Whitlam and Bjelke-Petersen's individual approaches to the political issue of 'Queensland difference' are compared and contrasted in this essay, and it is argued that, ultimately, both were reliant on the same emotional message to Queensland electors: the idea that Queenslanders wished to be noticed, respected outside the state and to be perceived as good as, and to have the same material advantages as, other Australians. The paper concludes with a brief reflection on the continuities and discontinuities of federalism in Australia since the period under review.

Talking about foreign policy relations of a country, it cannot be explained without adapting to the changes that occur in the growing environment or situation of both countries. Adjustments to the environment and the situation, especially the foreign policy are done in order to maintain the physical, economic, politic and social culture of the country in the midst of the real conditions of the situation occurred, like the history of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia). This is a study of the history of Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia since Whitlam government in 1972 until Hawke. The goal of the study is to explain how the foreign policy of the Australian Prime Ministers during their reigns. Although in reality in the course of its history, Australian and Indonesian diplomatic relations were full of intrigues, turmoil and conflicts, but it did not severe the relation of the two nations. Eventually, the conclusion of this study explicitly states that Australia and Indonesia still need each other in an attempt to establish political stability, economic and security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific peacefully.

The purpose of this report is to examine the extent to which the policies of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (in office December 1972-November 1975) were affected by the close personal interest he had in Italy. It provides an analysis of this interest in both domestic and foreign policy, and uses comparative examples to test the strength of any links between the personal and the political that this research has found. This report incorporates research which has involved an examination of primary evidence - namely speeches, press releases, interview transcripts and letters - and secondary evidence, including academic articles, biographies and autobiographies, and newspaper articles. The research has discovered that a link can be found between Whitlam's interest in Italy and his domestic and foreign policy, and that the former therefore influenced the latter. More broadly, this seeks to question whether Australian prime ministers in general are politically influenced by their personal lives, and the implications thereof, in accordance with the Australian Prime Ministers Centre's research guidelines.

This thesis focuses on the political and diplomatic history relating to Australian foreign policymaking towards the East Timor question during the Whitlam and Fraser governments, from April 1974 to January 1978. With reference to a number of published and unpublished Australian diplomatic records, a study of newspaper coverage (in particular, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Age and the Canberra Times), and also contemporary periodicals and personal memoirs, this thesis analyses the Australian foreign policymaking process towards Indonesia's integration policy towards East Timor. Although the existing literature has tended to focus on Australian policymakers, notably Prime Minister Whitlam in collaboration with Ambassador to Indonesia Woolcott – who were mostly concerned with Australian relations with Indonesia and sought to avoid the outcome of a small independent East Timor in the neighbourhood – this research also pays attention to the contribution of other foreign policy actors, including Foreign Minister Willesee of the Whitlam government in consultation with Secretary Renouf, both of whom thought it necessary to take account of domestic opinion sympathetic to self-determination. Considering that the Department of Foreign Affairs was convinced of the need for a proper act of self-determination in Portuguese Timor from the beginning and accordingly advised Foreign Ministers Willesee and Peacock to issue official statements in support of the right of self-determination against the backdrop of mounting domestic opinion – in particular during the period from October 1975 to July 1976 – this thesis argues that the Department took a substantial role in foreign policymaking in an attempt to dissociate the Australian government from Indonesia's coercive integration policy. In conclusion, despite the commonly-accepted view of the strong personal leadership of Prime Minister Whitlam who favoured Indonesia's integration of East Timor, this thesis argues that his influence was not unlimited. It is essential to consider ...

As an Opposition member of parliament in the 1950s and 1960s, Gough Whitlam took a keen interest in Australia's responsibilities, under the United Nations' mandate, to develop the Territory of Papua New Guinea until it became a self-determining nation. In a chapter titled 'International Affairs', Whitlam proudly recalled his government's steps towards Papua New Guinea's independence (declared and recognised on 16 September 1975). However, Australia's relationship with Papua New Guinea in the 1970s could also have been discussed by Whitlam under the heading 'Indigenous Affairs' because from 1973 Torres Strait Islanders demanded (and were accorded) a voice in designing the border between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Whitlam's framing of the border issue as 'international', to the neglect of its domestic Indigenous dimension, is an instance of history being written in what Tracey BanivanuaMar has called an 'imperial' mode. Historians, she argues, should ask to what extent decolonisation was merely an 'imperial' project: did 'decolonisation' not also enable the mobilisation of Indigenous 'peoples' to become self-determining in their relationships with other Indigenous peoples? This is what the Torres Strait Islanders did when they asserted their political interests during the negotiation of the Australia–Papua New Guinea border, though you will not learn this from Whitlam's 'imperial' account.

This thesis explores the context in which the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, 1974-1977 came to be. The Whitlam Government wanted to reform the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) so as to depoliticise it and make it more effective in combating genuine threats to the state, including global terrorism. In early 1973 the government's reform was stalled as a result of the attorney-general's raid on ASIO offices. The Prime Minister announced in late 1973 that an inquiry into ASIO would arise at some point. The Australian Labor Party took the idea of a judicial inquiry into Australia's intelligence and security apparatus to the 1974 election. Within weeks of returning to office the Whitlam Government decided to launch the Royal Commission. Even by the time of the government's dismissal in 1975 the process of ASIO's reform was advanced. The decision to keep ASIO was made by Labor prior to the 1972 election. This was despite experiencing two decades of ASIO's ideological partisanship, which had consequences for Labor. But the party's decision was not inconsistent with its history, having been an anti-communist party from the 1920s and responsible for ASIO's creation in 1949. The Royal Commission's terms of reference ensured that an intelligence apparatus would continue to be available to the Commonwealth. The decision to erect the Royal Commission was also widely supported by major Australian newspapers. When the Royal Commission finished in 1977 a lasting bipartisan consensus on ASIO was emerging.

This thesis explores the context in which the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, 1974-1977 came to be. The Whitlam Government wanted to reform the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) so as to depoliticise it and make it more effective in combating genuine threats to the state, including global terrorism. In early 1973 the government's reform was stalled as a result of the attorney-general's raid on ASIO offices. The Prime Minister announced in late 1973 that an inquiry into ASIO would arise at some point. The Australian Labor Party took the idea of a judicial inquiry into Australia's intelligence and security apparatus to the 1974 election. Within weeks of returning to office the Whitlam Government decided to launch the Royal Commission. Even by the time of the government's dismissal in 1975 the process of ASIO's reform was advanced. The decision to keep ASIO was made by Labor prior to the 1972 election. This was despite experiencing two decades of ASIO's ideological partisanship, which had consequences for Labor. But the party's decision was not inconsistent with its history, having been an anti-communist party from the 1920s and responsible for ASIO's creation in 1949. The Royal Commission's terms of reference ensured that an intelligence apparatus would continue to be available to the Commonwealth. The decision to erect the Royal Commission was also widely supported by major Australian newspapers. When the Royal Commission finished in 1977 a lasting bipartisan consensus on ASIO was emerging.

The Commonwealth's importance for Australia's overall foreign policy is often seen as relatively negligible, but its importance historically for Australia's foreign policy engagement with African states should be seen as quite central. Since the 1960s, the Commonwealth forum has provided Australia with the most extensive multilateral (and to an extent bilateral) opportunity to engage with African states and issues, and as such should be recognised as Australia's traditional 'window' into African affairs. This article for the first time brings together a discussion of all of the major episodes of Australia's foreign policy engagement with African states taking place within the Commonwealth forum and argues that, at least until the late 2000s, the Commonwealth was indeed the main vehicle for Australia's most prominent foreign policy engagement with African issues.

The Commonwealth's importance for Australia's overall foreign policy is often seen as relatively negligible, but its importance historically for Australia's foreign policy engagement with African states should be seen as quite central. Since the 1960s, the Commonwealth forum has provided Australia with the most extensive multilateral (and to an extent bilateral) opportunity to engage with African states and issues, and as such should be recognised as Australia's traditional 'window' into African affairs. This article for the first time brings together a discussion of all of the major episodes of Australia's foreign policy engagement with African states taking place within the Commonwealth forum and argues that, at least until the late 2000s, the Commonwealth was indeed the main vehicle for Australia's most prominent foreign policy engagement with African issues.

Contents: Death sentences: final appeals fail -- Buyung Nasution interviewed by Tapol -- Military Karyawan in Indonesia's top central bureaucracy -- Seven Jenggawah peasants in detention -- Did Suharto mastermind the 1965 "coup attempt"? -- Carrington's visit: a boost for business -- Workers under attack -- Achehnese prisoners tortured -- Whitlam attacks Bishop of Dili -- The general election: chosen before being elected -- A profile of Ali Murtopo (1924-) -- Protection against crime or protection racket?

Elizabeth Reid (AO, FASSA, FAIIA) was the first adviser on women's affairs to any head of government in the world, appointed by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1973. Drawing on her own life and writing, and those of other members of the Women's Liberation Movement and the Women's Electoral Lobby, Reid recreates the fire that burned in 1970s feminists. Weaving together connections between sexuality, justice, morality, and the cultural structures of sexism, Reid evokes women's experiences of personal disempowerment that fuelled their activism and political determination. In 1973 when the Prime Minister's office advertised for a Women's Adviser, feminists debated whether or not revolution could be made from within government. Reid recalls her work as Women's Adviser, and her leadership of the Australian delegation to the 1975 International Women's Year events in Mexico City. As the nation's most prominent feminist, Reid travelled around Australia and spoke to all kinds of women. She received more letters than any member of Cabinet other than the Prime Minister. In this significant retrospective, Reid summarises the achievements of the Whitlam Government in various areas, the constraints it faced, and more broadly the successes of the 1970s feminist movement and what we can learn from it now.

How wealth is distributed among households provides insight into the fundamental characters of societies and the opportunities they afford for social mobility. However, economic inequality has been hard to study in ancient societies for which we do not have written records, which adds to the challenge of placing current wealth disparities into a long-term perspective. Although various archaeological proxies for wealth, such as burial goods or exotic or expensive-to-manufacture goods in household assemblages, have been proposed, the first is not clearly connected with households, and the second is confounded by abandonment mode and other factors. As a result, numerous questions remain concerning the growth of wealth disparities, including their connection to the development of domesticated plants and animals and to increases in sociopolitical scale. Here we show that wealth disparities generally increased with the domestication of plants and animals and with increased sociopolitical scale, using Gini coefficients computed over the single consistent proxy of house-size distributions. However, unexpected differences in the responses of societies to these factors in North America and Mesoamerica, and in Eurasia, became evident after the end of the Neolithic period. We argue that the generally higher wealth disparities identified in post-Neolithic Eurasia were initially due to the greater availability of large mammals that could be domesticated, because they allowed more profitable agricultural extensification, and also eventually led to the development of a mounted warrior elite able to expand polities (political units that cohere via identity, ability to mobilize resources, or governance) to sizes that were not possible in North America and Mesoamerica before the arrival of Europeans. We anticipate that this analysis will stimulate other work to enlarge this sample to include societies in South America, Africa, South Asia and Oceania that were under-sampled or not included in this study.