Reading Kurt Wolff
In: Qualitative sociology, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 107-113
ISSN: 1573-7837
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In: Qualitative sociology, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 107-113
ISSN: 1573-7837
In: NACLA Report on the Americas, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 12-13
ISSN: 2471-2620
In: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung, Band 102, Heft 1, S. 239-246
ISSN: 2304-4861
In: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung, Band 101, Heft 1, S. 476-491
ISSN: 2304-4934
In: The American journal of sociology, Band 66, Heft 2, S. 189-190
ISSN: 1537-5390
In: The American journal of sociology, Band 81, Heft 6, S. 1516-1518
ISSN: 1537-5390
Ken Wolff discusses the work of Grounded Eagle Foundation, a non-profit in Swan Valley, Montana, devoted to the rescue and recovery of injured wild birds. He describes growing up in and around Western Montana, his ties to the landscape, and returning to Swan Valley after a number of years away. Wolff recalls serving in the U.S. military during the Vietnam War and the personal difficulties he suffered immediately following the war, such as unemployment, a divorce, and struggling with alcoholism. He talks about returning to Swan Valley in the late 1970s, where he rebuilt his life, largely by working to assist returning veterans, and later in 1983 when he became involved in bird rescue. ; https://scholarworks.umt.edu/upperswanvalley_oralhistory/1044/thumbnail.jpg
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In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 5, Heft 4, S. 553-559
ISSN: 1744-9324
It is the contention of Robert Paul Wolff that we live under governments which have no right to govern us. Most of us of course believe that our governments have legitimate authority. We believe that by far the greater part of what our governments require of us they have the authority to require. Wolff insists that it does not follow from our belief that most, or at least many, governments rightfully govern, that in fact any government rightfully governs. He is right of course; it does not follow, unless our beliefs are true. And we might be mistaken. The question is, are we?
In: International law reports, Band 22, S. 718-719
ISSN: 2633-707X
718International Organization — Specialized Agencies — International Monetary Fund — Articles of Agreement of — Regulation of Currency and International Exchange — Recognition of Such Regulation by Other States — International Recognition of Exchange Control Regulations — Effect of Membership in International Monetary Fund.
In: Slavic review: interdisciplinary quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European studies, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 336-336
ISSN: 2325-7784
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 85, Heft 2, S. 312-313
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung, Band 84, Heft 1, S. 400-404
ISSN: 2304-4934
In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Band 104, Heft 1, S. 131-163
ISSN: 1613-0650
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss Christian Wolff's conception of motivating and normative reasons. My aim is to show that in the discussion of error cases, Wolff pursues a strategy that is strikingly similar to the strategy of contemporary defenders of nicht-psychologist accounts of motivating reasons. According to many nicht-psychologist views, motivating reasons are facts. My aim is to show that Wolff's motivation in pursuing this strategy is very different. The point is that due to his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Wolff has to show that error cases are compatible with the PSR. The issue is worth discussing because it is not yet sufficiently explored what motivating reasons are, according to Wolff, and how they relate, in substance, to normative reasons. Methodologically, my approach can be characterized as one of "mutual illumination": I think it is possible to highlight some crucial ambiguities of Wolff's conception against the backdrop of the contemporary conception of motivating reasons, but also to question the importance and role of the ontological question of what motivating reasons are in contemporary discussions against the backdrop of Wolff's position.
In: The review of politics, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 16-39
ISSN: 1748-6858
A Radical who argues is an uncommon sight; even more uncommon is a radical who likes to argue with nonradicals. To participate in radical political dialogue, one usually has to be committed to a specific social cause and perhaps even to a "dialectical logic." One of the fascinating and challenging aspects of Robert Paul Wolff's recent books is that he draws his radical, anarchosocialist conclusions from premises that are quite acceptable to the average nonradical, in a style that is free from flirtations with a higher logic. In this sense Marcuse and Wolff could not be further apart.
In: American anthropologist: AA, Band 76, Heft 1, S. 165-167
ISSN: 1548-1433