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International audience ; The external expectations of organizational accountability force organizational leaders to find solutions and answers in organizational (and information) governance to assuage the feelings of doubt and unease about the behaviour of the organization and its employees that continuously seem to be expressed in the organizational environment. Organizational leaders have to align the interests of their share– and stakeholders in finding a balance between performance and accountability, individual and collective ethical approaches, and business ethics based on compliance, based on integrity, or both. They have to integrate accountability in organizational governance based on a strategy that defines boundaries for rules and routines. They need to define authority structures and find ways to control the behaviour of their employees, without being very restrictive and coercive. They have to implement accountability structures in organizational interactions that are extremely complex, nonlinear, and dynamic, in which (mostly informal) relational networks of employees traverse formal structures. Formal processes, rules, and regulations, used for control and compliance, cannot handle such environments, continuously in 'social flux', unpredictable, unstable, and (largely) unmanageable. It is a challenging task that asks exceptional management skills from organizational leaders. The external expectations of accountability cannot be neglected, even if it is not always clear what is exactly meant with that concept. Why is this (very old) concept still of importance for modern organizations?In this book, organizational governance, information governance, and accountability are the core subjects, just like the relationship between them. A framework is presented of twelve manifestations of organizational accountability the every organization had to deal with. An approach is introduced for strategically govern organizational accountability with three components: behaviour, accountability, and external ...

The external expectations of organizational accountability force organizational leaders to find solutions and answers in organizational (and information) governance to assuage the feelings of doubt and unease about the behaviour of the organization and its employees that continuously seem to be expressed in the organizational environment. Organizational leaders have to align the interests of their share– and stakeholders in finding a balance between performance and accountability, individual and collective ethical approaches, and business ethics based on compliance, based on integrity, or both. They have to integrate accountability in organizational governance based on a strategy that defines boundaries for rules and routines. They need to define authority structures and find ways to control the behaviour of their employees, without being very restrictive and coercive. They have to implement accountability structures in organizational interactions that are extremely complex, nonlinear, and dynamic, in which (mostly informal) relational networks of employees traverse formal structures. Formal processes, rules, and regulations, used for control and compliance, cannot handle such environments, continuously in 'social flux', unpredictable, unstable, and (largely) unmanageable. It is a challenging task that asks exceptional management skills from organizational leaders. The external expectations of accountability cannot be neglected, even if it is not always clear what is exactly meant with that concept. Why is this (very old) concept still of importance for modern organizations? In this book, organizational governance, information governance, and accountability are the core subjects, just like the relationship between them. A framework is presented of twelve manifestations of organizational accountability the every organization had to deal with. An approach is introduced for strategically govern organizational accountability with three components: behaviour, accountability, and external assessments. The core ...

Texto presentado en la conferencia "Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability", Viena, junio de 1997, coorganizada por el Institute for Advanced Studies de Viena y el International Forum for Democratic Studies.

This Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with the constitutional structure have become too fixated on the concern for political accountability. As a result, those efforts have overlooked an important obstacle to agency legitimacy: the concern for administrative arbitrariness. Such thinking is evident in the prevailing model of the administrative state, which seeks to legitimate agencies by placing their policy decisions firmly under the control of the one elected official responsive to the entire nation-the President. This Article contends that the "presidential control" model cannot legitimate agencies because the model rests on a mistaken assumption about the sufficiency of political accountability for that purpose. The assumption resonates with the premise, familiar in constitutional theory, that majoritarianism is the hallmark of legitimate government. This premise, brought to the fore by Alexander Bickel, now is questioned among constitutional theorists. Moreover, majoritarianism is not enough to legitimate administrative decisionmaking under our constitutional structure for the reason that it does not reliably address the concern for arbitrariness. This Article argues for a more direct focus on the concern for arbitrariness-ana pproach that has at its core a concern for good government, not simply "accountable" government in the post-Bickel, majoritarian sense of that word. The Article demonstrates how a more direct approach suggests new possibilities for resolving the time-honored problem of agency legitimacy and new ways of understanding the perennial puzzles of administrative lawar.

Identifying and implementing incentives that give rise to a strong relationship of accountability between service providers and beneficiaries is viewed by many as critical for improving service delivery. How to achieve this in practice and if it at all works, however, remain open questions. Systematic evaluation of service delivery innovations to increase accountability can show what works, what doesn't and why, a first step to scaling up success. This paper discusses one such attempt: a randomized evaluation of a Citizen Report Card project at the community level in primary health care in Uganda. The Citizen Report Card project collected quantitative information on the quality and quantity of health service provision from citizens and public health care providers. This information were then assembled in "easy access" report cards that were disseminated, together with practical information on how best to use this information, in community, staff, and interface meetings by local community organizations in order to enhance citizens' ability to monitor the health care providers. The intervention improved both the quality and quantity of health service provision in the treatment communities: One year into the program, average utilization was 16 percent higher in the treatment communities; the weight of infants higher, and the number of deaths among children under-five markedly lower. Treatment communities became more extensively involved in monitoring providers following the intervention, but we find no evidence of increased government funding. These results suggest that the improvements in the quality and quantity of health service delivery resulted from increased effort by the health unit staff to serve the community.

This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.

This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.

The importance of good governance, specifically the presence of accountability among developing countries in managing development aid from official aid agencies, has been significantly recognized. The Republic of the Philippines has been struggling to address the issue of corruption not only in aid management but also in the government as a whole. The contribution of the accountability systems of a recipient government to address corruption in aid management and to make aid more effective is analyzed here.

Charter schools involve a trading of autonomy for accountability. This accountability comes through two forces—markets through the choices of parents and students, and accountability to government through the writing of contracts that must be renewed for schools to continue to operate. Charter schools are supposed to be more accountable for educational performance than traditional public schools because authorizers have the ability to revoke charter contracts. Here, I focus on one central component of accountability to government: performance accountability or accountability for educational outcomes to charter school authorizers through the revocation or non-renewal of charter contracts. In this paper, I suggest that contract-based accountability for educational performance in charter schools may not be working as proponents argued it would. This article explores some explanations for why there are very few examples of charter schools that have been closed primarily because of failure to demonstrate educational performance or improvement. Future work will need to test if these challenges for authorizers hold in a variety of contexts. The conclusion examines the implications of these findings for the future of charter school accountability.

In contemporary public governance, leaders of public organizations are faced with multiple, and oftentimes conflictual, accountability claims. Drawing upon a survey of CEO's of agencies in seven countries, we explore whether and how conflictual accountability regimes relate to strategic behaviors by agency-CEO's and their political principals. The presence of conflictual accountability is experienced as a major challenge and is associated with important behavioral responses by those CEO's. This article demonstrates empirically how conflictual accountability is related to (a) controlling behaviors by principals, (b) constituency building behaviors by agencies, and (c) a general pattern of intensified contacts and information processing by both parties.

Although a growing number of NGOs are combining humanitarian and development activities, it was long the case that humanitarian action was isolated from discussions and practices in the world of development. The work of saving lives was deemed to be guided solely by the humanitarian principles, and discussions on accountability were rare. In the 1990s, humanitarian standards initiatives arose in recognition that humanitarian organisations were not accountable to affected populations. This article aims to take stock of accountability initiatives and practices in the sector. It builds on accountability theory in distinguishing upward, sideways, and downward accountability, and incorporates formal and informal forms of accountability. It is based on empirical research in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone. The first part of the article outlines the history of accountability in the humanitarian sector, including an accountability timeline, and discusses current trends in performances around accountability towards displaced people, minorities, and other recipients of aid. It then presents the findings from the three countries. The article concludes by calling attention to the everyday politics of accountability, the widening accountability arena, the differential accountability demands on international and national aid providers, and the crucial importance of sideways accountability to bring accountability to a next level.

South Carolina legislation calls for the Education Oversight Committee (EOC), working with the South Carolina State Board of Education, and a broad‑based group of stakeholders, to conduct a comprehensive cyclical review of the accountability system. The EOC and the South Carolina Department of Education convened the South Carolina Accountability Advisory Committee (AAC), comprised of members who represented the interests and priorities of various educational stakeholders in South Carolina. This report is a summary of the AAC's key findings and recommendations.

Title from cover. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Vols. for FY 1997-FY 1999 prepared by: U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Chief Financial Officer. ; Combines six separate HUD financial reports, mainly internal office documents issued in looseleaf form: Chief Financial Officer's annual report; Report on compliance with the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act; Secretary's semiannual report to Congress; Report on compliance with the Prompt Payment Act; Report on civil monetary penalties; and: Debt collection performance report (some are available in U.S. Government depository libraries on microfiche, under slightly variant titles). ; Latest issue consulted: FY 1997. ; UPDATED

The purpose of the Virginia Tech Center for Public Administration and Policy (CPAP) Roundtable Series for Leadership and Administration is to bring together the leading scholars, practitioners, students, and others for a stimulating conversation focusing on the exchange of ideas that will advance the knowledge and understanding of leadership in public administration through the sharing of research and experiences. For this particular session, Colleen Woodard moderated a discussion between John Rohr, professor at Virginia Techs Center for Public Administration and Policy, and Bradford Huther, President and CEO of the International Property Institute and retired member of the Senior Executive Service on the subject of Leadership and Accountability. The roundtable discussion focused primarily on defining accountability and what it means in the realm of public administration and politics.

Today, health is a human right in India, and the government is working hard for universalization of health services provision till the grassroots. Health without accountability is a challenging task in hand, and recently, state governments drafted a bill toward public health system to move in the strengthened direction of accountability mechanism. Accountability is the quality or state of being accountable, and it is an important component of the health-care reforms in India. This article provides more nuanced understanding of accountability which includes the specification of accountability, conceptual framework of accountability, and its potential approaches for how accountability is viewed today in India with reference to the Central, State, District, and other stakeholders. It examines the role of accountability in making accountable health plans, and its relationship governance/ownership structures as a key component of health-care reforms as improved accountability is a major element in improving the health system performance. The article elaborates on the definition of accountability in terms of answerability and sanctions and distinguishes the three types of accountability, namely financial, performance, and political/democratic. The article describes three accountability-enhancing strategies, namely reducing the pilferage, assuring acquiescence with procedures and standards, and improved learning from the past experience. The recent events in Indian health care put forward a serious issue on how accountability can be fixed if health mishaps happened and how we can make our health plans accountable to the needs and aspiration for the people of India. Overall, the accountability is discouraging and more needs to be done to enhance the accountability compliance in India.