Accountability Unbound
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 72, Heft 4, S. 615-622
ISSN: 1540-6210
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In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 72, Heft 4, S. 615-622
ISSN: 1540-6210
In: Library of contemporary essays in political theory and public policy
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of representative politics, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 71-83
ISSN: 0031-2290
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In: In Malcolm Langford, Wouter Vandenhole, Martin Scheinin and Willem van Genugten, eds., Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013)
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Texto presentado en la conferencia "Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability", Viena, junio de 1997, coorganizada por el Institute for Advanced Studies de Viena y el International Forum for Democratic Studies.
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In: Estudios políticos: revista de ciencia política, Heft 19
ISSN: 2448-4903
Texto presentado en la conferencia "Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability", Viena, junio de 1997, coorganizada por el Institute for Advanced Studies de Viena y el International Forum for Democratic Studies.
In: Proceedings of the Annual Pacific Northwest Conference on Higher Education 33.1971
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Blog: Verfassungsblog
In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has condemned Greece for yet another instance of human rights violations in border management. By underlining the importance of clear regulations and adequate evidence within border operations, the Court showed avenues to enhance the accountability framework for violations perpetrated at Europe's borders. Its decision contrasts favourably with the approach taken in the EU at large, where both legislators and national and supranational courts generally disregard the opacity in regulations governing border operations and the difficulty of collecting evidence for migrants.
This Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with the constitutional structure have become too fixated on the concern for political accountability. As a result, those efforts have overlooked an important obstacle to agency legitimacy: the concern for administrative arbitrariness. Such thinking is evident in the prevailing model of the administrative state, which seeks to legitimate agencies by placing their policy decisions firmly under the control of the one elected official responsive to the entire nation-the President. This Article contends that the "presidential control" model cannot legitimate agencies because the model rests on a mistaken assumption about the sufficiency of political accountability for that purpose. The assumption resonates with the premise, familiar in constitutional theory, that majoritarianism is the hallmark of legitimate government. This premise, brought to the fore by Alexander Bickel, now is questioned among constitutional theorists. Moreover, majoritarianism is not enough to legitimate administrative decisionmaking under our constitutional structure for the reason that it does not reliably address the concern for arbitrariness. This Article argues for a more direct focus on the concern for arbitrariness-ana pproach that has at its core a concern for good government, not simply "accountable" government in the post-Bickel, majoritarian sense of that word. The Article demonstrates how a more direct approach suggests new possibilities for resolving the time-honored problem of agency legitimacy and new ways of understanding the perennial puzzles of administrative lawar.
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In: The library of contemporary essays in political theory and public policy
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Working paper
In: Australian journal of political science: journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 126-142
ISSN: 1363-030X
In: Australian journal of political science, S. 1-17