Suchergebnisse

Description based on: 2008/2009; title from cover. ; Report year ends June 30. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Continues the Legislative capital plan analysis issued by the Commission.

Much theory suggests that manager–employee gender congruence (that manager and employee share the same gender) may influence employee accountability. This article empirically tests this notion by examining how manager–employee gender congruence among public service employees relates to two key aspects of bureaucratic accountability: (a) organizational goal alignment and (b) compliance with organizational rules and regulations. Using school fixed effects on teacher survey data and administrative school data, we find that male teachers with male principals are less aligned with their school's goals and less compliant with its rules and regulations than are male teachers with female principals.

How accountable are decisions about terminating parental rights to ensure an adoption from care? In this paper we examine if the proceedings in eight European jurisdictions are accountable to: a) the private parties, i.e. individuals that are concerned – such as parents, child; b) the general public that authorized the politicians and the government to make legislation; and c) the elected government, i.e. the legislators and the system that have granted the court, court-like or administrative body the authority to make these decisions. Our data material consists of national legislation, organizational guidelines (courts, child protection, or supervisory agencies), statistics and expert knowledge. The conclusions of our analysis are discouraging. There is only limited accountability for one of the most intrusive interventions by a state into the private lives of individuals. There is a lack of information about the proceedings as well as a lack of transparency. We identify systems that, with few exceptions, operate in isolation, with only a few outsiders having access or knowledge about what is going on. We cannot in this study say anything about the decision-making quality in these proceedings, they may be excellent, but the problem is that very few external actors are in a position to examine the quality of the decisions. This missing connection between the wider democratic society and this part of the legal systems in the eight democracies we studied is of huge concern, and we have indications that the situation is equally concerning in other European states.

Abstract
This contribution proposes a framework of transnational parliamentarism to study inter-parliamentary cooperation, and applies it to the interparliamentary conference on CFSP/CSDP. It asks to what extent the IPC's functioning reflects its constitutive intergovernmental logic, or whether its behaviour in practice might be guided by a transnational logic, hence becoming something more than just the parliamentary mirror of an intergovernmental cooperation framework. To this end we outline three functions that are brought forward by transnational parliamentarism: policy-making, collective accountability and cooperation, and investigate to which extent these logics can be observed in the functioning of the IPC CFSP/CSDP. Applying the framework reveals a nuanced picture of an inter-parliamentary cooperation framework which to some extent goes beyond purely intergovernmental functions of domestic accountability and representation, and also includes the performance of policy-making and parliamentary cooperation functions.

In this article we explore the idea of public accountability in the contemporary entrepreneurial governance of cities, which are influenced by market dependency and private sector involvement. We specifically focus on the fragmentation of public accountability through hybrid contractual landscapes of governance, in which the public and private sector actors interactively produce a diversity of instruments to ensure performance in service. This is in sharp contrast to the traditional vague norms and values appealed to by urban planning institutions, to safeguard the public interest. We argue that within these complex contractual governance environments public accountability is produced by public and private sector actors, through highly diverse sets of contractual relations and diverse control instruments that define responsibilities of diverse actors who are involved in a project within a market-dependent planning and policy making environment, which contains context-specific characteristics set by the specific rules of public-private collaboration. These complexities mean public accountability has become fragmented and largely reduced to performance control. Moreover, our understanding of contractual urban governance remains vague and unclear due to very limited empirical studies focusing on the actual technologies of contractual urban development. By deciphering the complex hybrid landscapes of contractual governance, with comparative empirical evidence from The Netherlands, UK and Brazil, we demonstrate how public accountability is assuming a more 'contractual' and unpredictable meaning in policy and plan implementation process.

This report by the Legislative Audit Committee contains summaries of the state's expenditures for the fifth quarter of fiscal year 1977 and summaries of other information required by the Fiscal Accountability Act of 1976 (Act 561).

This article explores the tension between autonomy and accountability of international organizations with a focus on the role of the United Nations in the context of peacekeeping operations. What triggered the interest in this particular matter was the recent failure by the UN in the Central African Republic to prevent and respond to allegations of sexual exploitation and/or abuse crimes committed by UN peacekeepers.
A more theoretical analysis of the meaning of autonomy in the law of international organizations will be followed by a practical examination of issues of accountability and existing mechanisms to address them. The assessment of the current legal and judicial framework is followed by a further exploration of the main challenges and possible alternative solutions to bridge the gap between two mutually constitutive concepts. The primary (and modest) purpose of this analysis is to attempt to plant legal seeds that can not only grow into an ethical and accountable culture within the un but also be instrumental in preventing abuses and be strong enough to remain in place when the public spotlight on crimes has been turned off.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Development in Practice on 21 January 2008, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09614520701778348. ; For the purposes of accountability and uniformity, and as a way of giving insight into their intellectual capital regarding development practices, NGOs in Southern Africa are required by donor agencies to describe their intended activities in very clear, unambiguous terms. These requirements may include the expression of theoretical approaches, the development of logical frameworks, clear objectives, indicators for success, criteria for sustainable development, and relationships to government policies. However, the interface between reality and these planning measures and tools, most often completed without the input and contributions of the communities whom they are to serve/service, produces a much more messy, dynamic, and involved picture of the development process. None the less, the NGOs are still required to be accountable on the basis of their original proposal and planning. The author presents examples of this phenomenon and discusses the challenges facing an evaluator when dealing with competing principles of accountability, autonomy, and authenticity.

This report by the Legislative Audit Committee contains summaries of the state's expenditures for the third quarter of fiscal year 1980-1981 and summaries of other information required by the Fiscal Accountability Act of 1976 (Act 561).

This report by the Legislative Audit Committee contains summaries of the state's expenditures for the second quarter of fiscal year 1980-1981 and summaries of other information required by the Fiscal Accountability Act of 1976 (Act 561).

This report by the Legislative Audit Committee contains summaries of the state's expenditures for the first quarter of fiscal year 1980-1981 and summaries of other information required by the Fiscal Accountability Act of 1976 (Act 561).

This report by the Legislative Audit Committee contains summaries of the state's expenditures for the third quarter of fiscal year 1979-1980 and summaries of other information required by the Fiscal Accountability Act of 1976 (Act 561).

This report by the Legislative Audit Committee contains summaries of the state's expenditures for the final quarter of fiscal year 1979-1980 and summaries of other information required by the Fiscal Accountability Act of 1976 (Act 561).