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Lord Pannick celebrates advocacy: that controversial legal issues are decided in court after reasoned argument in which the participants refrain (usually) from shouting, personal insults or threats, and the points on each side of the debate are tested for their relevance, their accuracy, and their strength. The book seeks to identify the central characteristics of good and bad advocacy with the aid of examples from courtrooms in the UK and abroad. Lord Pannick also examines the morality of advocacy - that the advocate sets out views to which he does not necessarily subscribe, on behalf of clients for whom she may feel admiration, indifference, or contempt. Lord Pannick seeks to answer the question he is often asked - more by friends than by judges - 'How can you act for such terrible people?'. Finally, he addresses the future of advocacy, arguing it should and will survive pressures for efficiency and technological developments

This article examines current inconsistent trends in social welfare advocacy literature. Some studies show evidence of widespread engagement in advocacy by nonprofit organisations, while other studies conversely offer evidence of limited advocacy activities. Another controversial aspect stems from the question whether governmental funding undermines the extent to which nonprofits engage in advocacy. We argue that these findings reflect the contradictory impact of neoliberal governance on social welfare advocacy. The article highlights and discusses three interrelated components of neoliberalism and their impact on current social welfare advocacy: marketisation, precariousness and commodification. Neoliberalism has propelled a model of market‐driven civil society that has remade the practice of social welfare advocacy in contradictory ways. With its complex rationales, neoliberalism has simultaneously undermined the ability of nonprofits to engage in advocacy but in a paradoxical way has also created conditions that induce these organisations to practice advocacy. Implications for practice and research on social welfare advocacy are discussed.

The collection of information necessary for decision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats, advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision have to be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of a single agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces of information cancel each other out. Using two agents, each searching for one cause yields full information collection at minimum costs. This provides a rationale for advocacy in political and judicial systems. In this paper, we provide a rationale for the sequential nature of information collection in advocacy systems. If two agents search simultaneously, the incentive to continue searching is affected by the information found by the other agent. This forces the principal to leave rents to the agents. If agents search sequentially, the reward can be made conditional on the information found in earlier stages. This reduces the cost of information collection. However, sequential advocacy implies either a more sluggish decision-making process or a less-informed decision.

The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats,advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision haveto be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of asingle agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces ofinformation cancel each other out. Using two agents, eachsearching for one cause yields full information collection atminimum costs. This provides a rationale for advocacy in politicaland judicial systems. In this paper, we provide a rationale forthe sequential nature of information collection in advocacysystems. If two agents search simultaneously, the incentive tocontinue searching is affected by the information found by theother agent. This forces the principal to leave rents to theagents. If agents search sequentially, the reward can be madeconditional on the information found in earlier stages. Thisreduces the cost of information collection. However, sequential advocacyimplies either a more sluggish decision-making processor a less-informed decision.