The emergence of eugenic discourse in Latin America in the 1920s seemed to be an inevitable scientific, political, and social phenomenon. The discourse of eugenics gained momentum in the context of global conflict and unrest, which led to the displacement of mass human groups to the Americas. While the arrival of "undesirable" immigrants disproportionately impacted Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, the fear that accompanied their arrival took hold of the entire region. The foreign "human waste" who had been ravaged by war and who endangered the racial makeup of the continent had become one of the central elements in arguments for justifying the establishment of a Pan-American eugenics project. This plan would be capable of protecting the genetic heritage of the continent faced with the menace of the arrival of individuals who had been rejected by conflict because of their "biological ineptitude". In this way, Latin America inserted itself in transnational epistemic networks devoted to eugenics a scientific and socio-political movement (maybe plan) to control the population through mechanisms concerning reproduction and the sexuality of the individual. These networks had started to form in the early 1910s with the organisation of the First Congress of Eugenics in London and with the creation of the first international eugenics organization: the Permanent International Eugenics Committee.The Pan-American eugenics project was marked by the political, economic and social challenges of the 1930s. Further, the economic crisis of 1929, the anti-American sentiment provoked by the military interventions of the United States in Latin America, the questioning of the Pan-American model, and the claim of Latin Americanism all characterized the movement and reconfigured the epistemic eugenic networks. Despite everything, the project got under way. The Primera Conferencia Panamericana de Eugenesia y Homicultura (Havana, 1927) thus marked the beginning of the will to consolidate this project, the objective of which was ...
The emergence of eugenic discourse in Latin America in the 1920s seemed to be an inevitable scientific, political, and social phenomenon. The discourse of eugenics gained momentum in the context of global conflict and unrest, which led to the displacement of mass human groups to the Americas. While the arrival of "undesirable" immigrants disproportionately impacted Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, the fear that accompanied their arrival took hold of the entire region. The foreign "human waste" who had been ravaged by war and who endangered the racial makeup of the continent had become one of the central elements in arguments for justifying the establishment of a Pan-American eugenics project. This plan would be capable of protecting the genetic heritage of the continent faced with the menace of the arrival of individuals who had been rejected by conflict because of their "biological ineptitude". In this way, Latin America inserted itself in transnational epistemic networks devoted to eugenics a scientific and socio-political movement (maybe plan) to control the population through mechanisms concerning reproduction and the sexuality of the individual. These networks had started to form in the early 1910s with the organisation of the First Congress of Eugenics in London and with the creation of the first international eugenics organization: the Permanent International Eugenics Committee.The Pan-American eugenics project was marked by the political, economic and social challenges of the 1930s. Further, the economic crisis of 1929, the anti-American sentiment provoked by the military interventions of the United States in Latin America, the questioning of the Pan-American model, and the claim of Latin Americanism all characterized the movement and reconfigured the epistemic eugenic networks. Despite everything, the project got under way. The Primera Conferencia Panamericana de Eugenesia y Homicultura (Havana, 1927) thus marked the beginning of the will to consolidate this project, the objective of which was ...
The emergence of eugenic discourse in Latin America in the 1920s seemed to be an inevitable scientific, political, and social phenomenon. The discourse of eugenics gained momentum in the context of global conflict and unrest, which led to the displacement of mass human groups to the Americas. While the arrival of "undesirable" immigrants disproportionately impacted Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, the fear that accompanied their arrival took hold of the entire region. The foreign "human waste" who had been ravaged by war and who endangered the racial makeup of the continent had become one of the central elements in arguments for justifying the establishment of a Pan-American eugenics project. This plan would be capable of protecting the genetic heritage of the continent faced with the menace of the arrival of individuals who had been rejected by conflict because of their "biological ineptitude". In this way, Latin America inserted itself in transnational epistemic networks devoted to eugenics a scientific and socio-political movement (maybe plan) to control the population through mechanisms concerning reproduction and the sexuality of the individual. These networks had started to form in the early 1910s with the organisation of the First Congress of Eugenics in London and with the creation of the first international eugenics organization: the Permanent International Eugenics Committee.The Pan-American eugenics project was marked by the political, economic and social challenges of the 1930s. Further, the economic crisis of 1929, the anti-American sentiment provoked by the military interventions of the United States in Latin America, the questioning of the Pan-American model, and the claim of Latin Americanism all characterized the movement and reconfigured the epistemic eugenic networks. Despite everything, the project got under way. The Primera Conferencia Panamericana de Eugenesia y Homicultura (Havana, 1927) thus marked the beginning of the will to consolidate this project, the objective of which was ...
Chinese footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), as in other parts of the globe, has surged in the last fifteen years. Beyond the traditional drivers of this expansion from an economic perspective (securing resources and new markets), China represents a special partner for Latin-American countries because of grey lines delimiting public and private ownership, strict industrial policy and long-term development goals. Besides, regional discrepancies have appeared between South America, which benefited from the boom of Chinese demand for raw materials, and Mexico, which found itself in direct competition with China on different segments of his secondary sector, and whose integration dynamic in North America was deeply impacted by the growing shares of Chinese companies in the US market. Combining an extensive analysis of existing databases about foreign direct investments (FDI) from China in LAC and three original case studies of Chinese companies located in the manufacturing industry in Mexico, this dissertation shows unique features in these operations such as an accelerated growth path and relative adaptive skills to foreign environments. Nevertheless, the positive or negative externalities of Chinese FDI remain dependent upon the interactions between the institutional context of the host country and the companies' strategies. ; La présence chinoise en Amérique latine et Caraïbes (ALC), tout comme dans d'autres régions du monde, a fortement augmenté depuis une quinzaine d'années. Au-delà des motifs traditionnels de cette expansion au niveau économique (la recherche de ressources et de nouveaux marchés), la Chine représente un partenaire particulier pour les pays latino-américains en raison des frontières floues entre les formes de propriété publique et privée, et des objectifs stricts de son gouvernement en matière de politique industrielle et de développement sur le long terme. En outre, des disparités régionales sont apparues entre l'Amérique du Sud, longtemps favorisée par l'augmentation de la demande chinoise en matières premières, et le Mexique, qui s'est rapidement retrouvé en situation de concurrence ouverte avec la Chine sur différents segments de son secteur secondaire, et dont la dynamique d'intégration en Amérique du Nord fut profondément impactée par l'arrivée des entreprises chinoises sur le marché des États-Unis. En combinant une analyse approfondie des bases de données disponibles sur les investissements directs à l'étranger (IDE) de la Chine en ALC et trois études de cas originales d'entreprises chinoises installées dans le domaine manufacturier au Mexique, cette thèse montre que ces opérations présentent des modalités inédites notamment en termes de rythme d'expansion et de capacités d'adaptation aux environnements locaux. Cependant, les externalités positives ou négatives des IDE chinois demeurent tributaires des interactions entre le contexte institutionnel du pays d'accueil et les stratégies des entreprises.
Chinese footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), as in other parts of the globe, has surged in the last fifteen years. Beyond the traditional drivers of this expansion from an economic perspective (securing resources and new markets), China represents a special partner for Latin-American countries because of grey lines delimiting public and private ownership, strict industrial policy and long-term development goals. Besides, regional discrepancies have appeared between South America, which benefited from the boom of Chinese demand for raw materials, and Mexico, which found itself in direct competition with China on different segments of his secondary sector, and whose integration dynamic in North America was deeply impacted by the growing shares of Chinese companies in the US market. Combining an extensive analysis of existing databases about foreign direct investments (FDI) from China in LAC and three original case studies of Chinese companies located in the manufacturing industry in Mexico, this dissertation shows unique features in these operations such as an accelerated growth path and relative adaptive skills to foreign environments. Nevertheless, the positive or negative externalities of Chinese FDI remain dependent upon the interactions between the institutional context of the host country and the companies' strategies. ; La présence chinoise en Amérique latine et Caraïbes (ALC), tout comme dans d'autres régions du monde, a fortement augmenté depuis une quinzaine d'années. Au-delà des motifs traditionnels de cette expansion au niveau économique (la recherche de ressources et de nouveaux marchés), la Chine représente un partenaire particulier pour les pays latino-américains en raison des frontières floues entre les formes de propriété publique et privée, et des objectifs stricts de son gouvernement en matière de politique industrielle et de développement sur le long terme. En outre, des disparités régionales sont apparues entre l'Amérique du Sud, longtemps favorisée par l'augmentation de la ...
This dissertation focuses on the figure of Francisco Morazán, liberal caudillo of Honduran origin and president for ten years of the Federal Republic of Central America founded in 1824, few years after the independence of the region from the Spanish crown. The process of heroization and its uses are studied mainly through historical books, newspaper articles, political speeches and various "territorial marks". A comparative perspective is developed between the five states that made up the Federation: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. This investigation offers a History of memory recorded in the current of the cultural History of politics: it is not intended to give an "objective" dimension to the figure of Morazán but to identify the symbolic and mythical aspects used to rebuild his image. The analysis aims at understanding in what way the fabric of this Central American hero has supported the legitimacy in power of various governments. The links between the heroic memory and the invention of the nation are here questioned considering that regional identity has remained a frame of reference throughout the study period despite the failure of the various unionist attempts.This work begins with the death of Morazán in 1842, a key episode for his heroization, and ends with the centenary of his death. Three commemorative contexts were defined around which the dissertation has been organized. The first part (1829-1858) tackles the lifetime of the caudillo and his execution to highlight the passage from the historic person to the hero. The first steps of his official heroization occurred at a time qualified as conservative with the repatriation of his remains from Costa Rica to El Salvador and the official burial of his body in the Salvadoran capital. The second part (1880-1892) focuses on the formalization and institutionalization of the heroic cult during the first stage of the so-called liberal era, with the inauguration of the first statues in his honor at San Salvador and Tegucigalpa, the creation of the park "Morazán" in the Costa Rican capital and the celebration of the centenary of his birth that has a major impact in Guatemala. In the third and last part (1921-1942), which takes place during the second phase of the liberal period, the organization of two centenaries is examined: that of the independence of Central America and that of the death of Morazán that results in a multiplication of political uses of his figure. ; La presente tesis trata de la figura de Francisco Morazán, caudillo liberal de origen hondureño y presidente durante diez años de la República Federal de Centro América, fundada en 1824, algunos años después de la independencia de la región ante la corona española. El proceso de heroización y sus usos son estudiados principalmente a través de obras históricas, artículos de prensa, discursos políticos y diversas "marcas territoriales". Se desarrolla una perspectiva comparativa entre los cinco Estados que conformaron la Federación: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua y Costa Rica. Esta investigación propone una Historia de la memoria inscrita en la corriente de la Historia cultural de lo político: no se trata de volver a dar una dimensión "objetiva" a Morazán sino de extraer los aspectos simbólicos y míticos que reconstruyeron su imagen. El análisis pretende entender en qué sentido la fabricación del héroe centroamericano permitió sostener la legitimidad en poder de diferentes gobiernos. Los lazos entre la memoria heroica y la invención de la nación están aquí interrogados tomando en cuenta que la escala regional siguió siendo un marco de referencia identitario a lo largo del periodo de estudio, a pesar del fracaso de los diferentes intentos unionistas.Este trabajo empieza con la muerte de Morazán en 1842, episodio clave para su heroización, y se termina con el centenario de ésta. La reflexión se organiza a través de tres contextos conmemorativos definidos para éste propósito. La primera parte (1829-1858) se refiere al periodo de vida del caudillo y a su fusilamiento, con el objetivo de evidenciar la transformación del personaje histórico en héroe. Los primeros pasos de su heroización oficial tienen lugar en una época calificada de conservadora, con la repatriación de sus restos desde Costa Rica hasta El Salvador y la inhumación oficial de su cuerpo en la capital salvadoreña. La segunda parte (1880-1892) abarca la oficialización e institucionalización del culto heroico, durante la primera etapa de la época llamada liberal, con la inauguración de las primeras estatuas en su honor en San Salvador y Tegucigalpa, la creación del parque "Morazán" en la capital costarricense y la celebración del centenario de su nacimiento, el cual tiene un impacto determinante en Guatemala. En la tercera y última parte (1921-1942), que ocurre durante la segunda fase del periodo liberal, examinamos la organización de dos centenarios: el de la independencia de América Central y el de la muerte de Morazán, eventos que dan lugar a una multiplicación de los usos políticos de su figura. ; Cette thèse porte sur la figure de Francisco Morazán, caudillo libéral d'origine hondurienne et président pendant dix ans de la République Fédérale d'Amérique Centrale fondée en 1824, quelques années après l'indépendance de la région face à la couronne espagnole. Le processus d'héroïsation et ses usages sont étudiés principalement à travers des ouvrages historiques, des articles de presse, des discours politiques et diverses « marques territoriales ». Une perspective comparative est développée entre les cinq États qui ont composé la Fédération : le Guatemala, le Salvador, le Honduras, le Nicaragua et le Costa Rica. Cette recherche propose une Histoire de la mémoire inscrite dans le courant de l'Histoire culturelle du politique : il ne s'agit pas de redonner une dimension « objective » à la figure de Morazán mais de dégager les aspects symboliques et mythiques qui ont reconstruit son image. L'analyse vise à comprendre en quel sens la fabrique du héros centraméricain a permis de soutenir la légitimité au pouvoir de différents gouvernements. Ce sont les liens entre la mémoire héroïque et l'invention de la nation qui sont ici interrogés en considérant que l'échelle régionale est restée un cadre de référence identitaire tout au long de la période d'étude, malgré l'échec des différentes tentatives unionistes. Ce travail commence avec la mort de Morazán en 1842, épisode clé pour son héroïsation, et se termine avec le centenaire de sa mort. Trois contextes commémoratifs ont été définis autour desquels la réflexion a été organisée. La première partie (1829-1858) aborde la période de vie du caudillo et son exécution pour mettre en évidence le passage du personnage historique au héros. Les premiers pas de son héroïsation officielle ont lieu durant une époque qualifiée de conservatrice avec le rapatriement de ses restes du Costa Rica au Salvador et l'inhumation officielle de son corps dans la capitale salvadorienne. La deuxième partie (1880-1892) s'intéresse à l'officialisation et l'institutionnalisation du culte héroïque durant la première étape de l'époque dite libérale, avec l'inauguration des premières statues en son honneur à San Salvador et Tegucigalpa, la création du parc « Morazán » dans la capitale costaricienne et la célébration du centenaire de sa naissance, qui a un impact déterminant au Guatemala. Dans la troisième et dernière partie (1921-1942), qui se déroule pendant la seconde phase de la période libérale, l'organisation de deux centenaires est examinée : celui de l'indépendance de l'Amérique Centrale et celui de la mort de Morazán qui donnent lieu à une multiplication des usages politiques de sa figure.
This dissertation focuses on the figure of Francisco Morazán, liberal caudillo of Honduran origin and president for ten years of the Federal Republic of Central America founded in 1824, few years after the independence of the region from the Spanish crown. The process of heroization and its uses are studied mainly through historical books, newspaper articles, political speeches and various "territorial marks". A comparative perspective is developed between the five states that made up the Federation: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. This investigation offers a History of memory recorded in the current of the cultural History of politics: it is not intended to give an "objective" dimension to the figure of Morazán but to identify the symbolic and mythical aspects used to rebuild his image. The analysis aims at understanding in what way the fabric of this Central American hero has supported the legitimacy in power of various governments. The links between the heroic memory and the invention of the nation are here questioned considering that regional identity has remained a frame of reference throughout the study period despite the failure of the various unionist attempts.This work begins with the death of Morazán in 1842, a key episode for his heroization, and ends with the centenary of his death. Three commemorative contexts were defined around which the dissertation has been organized. The first part (1829-1858) tackles the lifetime of the caudillo and his execution to highlight the passage from the historic person to the hero. The first steps of his official heroization occurred at a time qualified as conservative with the repatriation of his remains from Costa Rica to El Salvador and the official burial of his body in the Salvadoran capital. The second part (1880-1892) focuses on the formalization and institutionalization of the heroic cult during the first stage of the so-called liberal era, with the inauguration of the first statues in his honor at San Salvador and Tegucigalpa, the ...
During the fifteen years discussed here — 1998-2013 — all the countries of South America, except Colombia and Peru, have democratically established themselves through the ballot boxes of left-wing governments. This turn to the left began in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chavez by universal suffrage as President of the Republic of Venezuela. Such an impressive tidal tress raises questions about its causes but also about the distinction that is usually made on the two left: one referred to as moderate, comprising Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and the other considered to be revolutionary, including Hugo Chavez, Bolivia of Evo Morales and Equateur de Rafael Correa. Research has different objectives: understanding the origins of the turn on the left, drawing up the balance sheet after 15 years of power, defining political, economic and social achievements. Cristina Kirchner estimated the 2000s in Argentina as a gained decade. This judgment could be extended to most countries in the region. The debt problem has been resolved to the advantage of certain countries such as Argentina and Ecuador. Growth has returned throughout the subcontinent. Poverty has fallen to a very large extent, even though it is far from being eliminated. Unemployment has also decreased. The middle classes have grown. The neo-liberal model behind South American illnesses in the previous period was fought. That said, nothing is played definitively. In most countries, the right retains a resounding power. ; Au cours des quinze années ici abordées -1998-2013- tous les pays de l'Amérique du Sud, à l'exception de la Colombie et du Pérou, se sont dotés démocratiquement par les urnes de gouvernements de gauche. Ce virage a gauche a débuté en 1998 par l'élection d'Hugo Chavez au suffrage universel à la présidence de la république du Venezuela. Un raz de marée aussi impressionnant conduit à s'interroger sur ses causes mais aussi sur la distinction que l'on opère habituellement sur les deux gauche : l'une qualifiée de modérée qui regroupe le Brésil, ...
The articles Work led by Armony and Rousseau are derived, in large part, the work presented on the occasion of the international conference 'The recognition of equality and difference. Regards on transnational democratization', held in the Universite Laval in November 2009. as part of the framework of the literature dealing with sociology and political anthropology, social movements and democratization process in Latin America, the book addresses issues in terms of the link between Pindigeneite and politics, the challenges of citizen participation and the Constitutional recognition of multiple nationality. Adapted from the source document.
Official circuits of art production such as Artistic corporations and Academies, provide the art historian with a wider context by which to approach the object and link it to the creation process. Unfortunately, such formal Academies and Corporations did not exist in ail of colonial Latin America, even though the success of the Spanish political project was based upon the evangelization process and thus, the construction of temples. Not being able to rely on the traditional methods to study the artistic production of the New Granada (present country of Colombia), we propose here to study the catholic temple construction from the perspective a cultural history. To this end, we used heuristic research. This methodological approach was abandoned in the study of Colimbian colonial art since the 1980s. Nevertheless, the use of archival documents represents a rich source of information. Thus, by avoiding the historical analysis based on the study of the shape and taxinomic classification of an object, we privileged a cultural interpretation of archival documents. Using this source, we were able to study the production of religious temples, from the establishment of rules and regulations to the finalization or abandonment of projects. We were also interested in the detailed analysis of the different actors that intervened at the creation level of a project. By stressing the study of their training we were able to reconstruct how the ideas and skills were transmitted on the place and time. ; Qu'il s'agisse de corporations ou d'Académies, l'existence de circuits de production artistique officiels (ou du moins formellement constitués), fournit à l'historien de l'art une grille de lecture permettant de structurer l'approche avec l'objet à étudier et avec les processus qui ont abouti à sa création. Cela ne se vérifie pas dans toute l'Amérique coloniale même si, paradoxalement, la légitimité du projet politique espagnol se fondait sur le succès de la campagne évangélisatrice et donc sur la mise en place de temples, ce qui théoriquement, devrait se traduire par l'imposition d'un goût officiel à travers de telles institutions. Face à l'impossibilité d'étudier la production artistique de la Nouvelle Grenade (Colombie actuelle) selon une histoire qualitative articulée autour d'un jugement de valeurs (le Beau, le Vrai le Bien), ce travail propose d'aborder le bâti religieux depuis la perspective d'une histoire culturelle. Comme instrument méthodologique nous avons privilégié la recherche heuristique. Délaissée par l'histoire de l'art colonial colombien depuis les années 1980, cette approche qui implique la mise en valeur du patrimoine documentaire, représente pourtant une source très abondante d'informations. Eloignés d'une histoire basée sur l'analyse de la forme et sur sa classification taxonomique, une lecture culturaliste des documents d'archive nous a permis d'approcher la chaîne de production du bâti, depuis la mise en place d'une réglementation jusqu'à la réalisation - ou l'abandon - du projet. Nous avons également identifié les différents acteurs susceptibles d'intervenir dans l'étape de d'invention du projet, en prêtant une attention particulière à leur formation afin de restituer les voies qui ont permis la circulation des idées et du savoir-faire.
International audience ; [To deploy its scientific vocation, geopolitical aims to highlight patterns may provide reference points transposed in a world where power relations are complex. However, geopolitical study of Colombia constitutes hardly a good example because many geopolitical paradoxes, that is to say, situations or geopolitical developments composed of elements a priori contradictory. The first paradox, cognitive, adds geographical exceptional but difficult to value because the country is as a spa tial puzzle situation. In addition, Colombia is a country in Latin America where the political weight of the military, unlike the history of the sub-continent since independence, has been never historically important. Fourth paradox : Colombian democracy was consolidated despite violent conflictualities. The 2000s have seen it two successive contradictions : a Democratic president beloved inside and outside very vilified, then suddenly recognized. Two other paradoxes take the issue of displaced by internal conflicts, then, in the 2010s, to an heir President seeming to want to divert the inheritance. Finally, in parallel, the fact that South American country to join the " Yankees ", often reviled in this region remains amazing.] ; Afin de déployer sa vocation scientifique, la géopolitique vise à mettre en évidence des régularités susceptibles d'offrir des points de repère transposables dans un monde où les rapports de force sont complexes. Or, l'étude géopolitique de la Colombie ne consti-tue guère un exemple probant du fait de nombreux paradoxes géopolitiques, c'est-à-dire de situations ou d'évolutions géopolitiques composées d'éléments a priori antinomiques. Au premier paradoxe, de nature cognitive, s'ajoute une situation géographique exceptionnelle mais difficile à valoriser parce que le pays se présente comme un puzzle spa-tial. En outre, la Colombie est un pays d'Amérique latine où le poids politique des mili-taires, contrairement à l'histoire de ce sous-continent depuis les indépendances, n'a ja-mais ...
International audience ; [To deploy its scientific vocation, geopolitical aims to highlight patterns may provide reference points transposed in a world where power relations are complex. However, geopolitical study of Colombia constitutes hardly a good example because many geopolitical paradoxes, that is to say, situations or geopolitical developments composed of elements a priori contradictory. The first paradox, cognitive, adds geographical exceptional but difficult to value because the country is as a spa tial puzzle situation. In addition, Colombia is a country in Latin America where the political weight of the military, unlike the history of the sub-continent since independence, has been never historically important. Fourth paradox : Colombian democracy was consolidated despite violent conflictualities. The 2000s have seen it two successive contradictions : a Democratic president beloved inside and outside very vilified, then suddenly recognized. Two other paradoxes take the issue of displaced by internal conflicts, then, in the 2010s, to an heir President seeming to want to divert the inheritance. Finally, in parallel, the fact that South American country to join the " Yankees ", often reviled in this region remains amazing.] ; Afin de déployer sa vocation scientifique, la géopolitique vise à mettre en évidence des régularités susceptibles d'offrir des points de repère transposables dans un monde où les rapports de force sont complexes. Or, l'étude géopolitique de la Colombie ne consti-tue guère un exemple probant du fait de nombreux paradoxes géopolitiques, c'est-à-dire de situations ou d'évolutions géopolitiques composées d'éléments a priori antinomiques. Au premier paradoxe, de nature cognitive, s'ajoute une situation géographique exceptionnelle mais difficile à valoriser parce que le pays se présente comme un puzzle spa-tial. En outre, la Colombie est un pays d'Amérique latine où le poids politique des mili-taires, contrairement à l'histoire de ce sous-continent depuis les indépendances, n'a ja-mais ...
International audience ; [To deploy its scientific vocation, geopolitical aims to highlight patterns may provide reference points transposed in a world where power relations are complex. However, geopolitical study of Colombia constitutes hardly a good example because many geopolitical paradoxes, that is to say, situations or geopolitical developments composed of elements a priori contradictory. The first paradox, cognitive, adds geographical exceptional but difficult to value because the country is as a spa tial puzzle situation. In addition, Colombia is a country in Latin America where the political weight of the military, unlike the history of the sub-continent since independence, has been never historically important. Fourth paradox : Colombian democracy was consolidated despite violent conflictualities. The 2000s have seen it two successive contradictions : a Democratic president beloved inside and outside very vilified, then suddenly recognized. Two other paradoxes take the issue of displaced by internal conflicts, then, in the 2010s, to an heir President seeming to want to divert the inheritance. Finally, in parallel, the fact that South American country to join the " Yankees ", often reviled in this region remains amazing.] ; Afin de déployer sa vocation scientifique, la géopolitique vise à mettre en évidence des régularités susceptibles d'offrir des points de repère transposables dans un monde où les rapports de force sont complexes. Or, l'étude géopolitique de la Colombie ne consti-tue guère un exemple probant du fait de nombreux paradoxes géopolitiques, c'est-à-dire de situations ou d'évolutions géopolitiques composées d'éléments a priori antinomiques. Au premier paradoxe, de nature cognitive, s'ajoute une situation géographique exceptionnelle mais difficile à valoriser parce que le pays se présente comme un puzzle spa-tial. En outre, la Colombie est un pays d'Amérique latine où le poids politique des mili-taires, contrairement à l'histoire de ce sous-continent depuis les indépendances, n'a ja-mais ...
Official circuits of art production such as Artistic corporations and Academies, provide the art historian with a wider context by which to approach the object and link it to the creation process. Unfortunately, such formal Academies and Corporations did not exist in ail of colonial Latin America, even though the success of the Spanish political project was based upon the evangelization process and thus, the construction of temples. Not being able to rely on the traditional methods to study the artistic production of the New Granada (present country of Colombia), we propose here to study the catholic temple construction from the perspective a cultural history. To this end, we used heuristic research. This methodological approach was abandoned in the study of Colimbian colonial art since the 1980s. Nevertheless, the use of archival documents represents a rich source of information. Thus, by avoiding the historical analysis based on the study of the shape and taxinomic classification of an object, we privileged a cultural interpretation of archival documents. Using this source, we were able to study the production of religious temples, from the establishment of rules and regulations to the finalization or abandonment of projects. We were also interested in the detailed analysis of the different actors that intervened at the creation level of a project. By stressing the study of their training we were able to reconstruct how the ideas and skills were transmitted on the place and time. ; Qu'il s'agisse de corporations ou d'Académies, l'existence de circuits de production artistique officiels (ou du moins formellement constitués), fournit à l'historien de l'art une grille de lecture permettant de structurer l'approche avec l'objet à étudier et avec les processus qui ont abouti à sa création. Cela ne se vérifie pas dans toute l'Amérique coloniale même si, paradoxalement, la légitimité du projet politique espagnol se fondait sur le succès de la campagne évangélisatrice et donc sur la mise en place de temples, ce qui ...
Since the 60s, Latin America has been hearing the suggestions of International Economic Organizations (IEOs) on how to reach development. In the 70s, the United Nations suggested the politics of development, where the countries could define independently their own national and international politics to reach development and be equally rich. This did not work due to the increasing interdependence; therefore, in the second half of the 80s, the Washington Consensus replaced this policy. The Washington Consensus claims that globalization promotes multilateralism and does not allow countries to take unilateral decisions because they affect others and are being affected by other countries' decisions as well. Although this made a lot of sense, it would mean that the free market prevailed over the actions of the government, eliminating all barriers to trade and to foreign investments. According to the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "International production has become the central structural characteristic of the world economy". A greater freedom to trade, plus the opening of capital flows, could lead the underdeveloped nations to economic growth showing as a sample the rich countries. Therefore, many Latin American countries joined the neoliberalism that was proposed by the Washington Consensus in 1989, reduced trade barriers, opened up their markets to foreign capitals and followed many of the indications of the IEOs in order to find development through internationalization. National economies are linked together by a network of trade, investment and credit and this link is supposed to bring development. The IEOs said that the national market size does not matter anymore if a country focuses on larger international markets. Internalizing the Washington Consensus norms was difficult for Small Size Economies (SSE) because the rules of this Consensus took all the countries as a group of a unique size and established on common and non discriminatory rules to approach multilateralization. However, the SSE had no part of the cake and no power to influence the regulations of free trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization. The same, they do not have the capacity or power to change the norm structure inside the IEOs (where policies and international laws are suggested) that could take them into account with particular privileges according to their specific needs. This marginalization in the international arena is believed to have accentuated economic and social problems that now keep them in constant social turmoil and put in risk their government's stability. Several researches and governments do not perceive this problem and cannot foresee adequate reactions in international negotiations. Worst, SSE do not know themselves what are their weakness and how to asses them. With this thesis, we want to explore the power of SSE on international insertion. For this, the thesis is divided in two parts. The problem that we want to analyze in the first part is why after several years of multilateralism proposed by the IEOs, internationalization and development did not improve for some of the South American countries increasing poverty. It seem that the reason lies in the fact that the international arena was only ruled by the largest economies leaving aside to the majority of the developing countries and their needs. This is why we wanted to explore (main goal) under what circumstances multilateralism and the Washington Consensus was applied, which were the options to improve the situation within multilateralism and what was the impact of multilateralism as proposed by the IEOs in terms of internationalization and development. ; Depuis les années 60, l'Amérique Latine avait accueilli les suggestions des organismes économiques internationaux (OEIs) sur la façon de réussir le développement. Dans les années 70, les Nations Unies ont suggéré la politique où les pays pourraient définir indépendamment leur propre politique nationale et internationale pour atteindre leur développement. Cela n'a pas fonctionné en raison de l'interdépendance croissante (de quoi ?); donc, dans la deuxième moitié des années 80, le Consensus de Washington a remplacé cette politique. Le Consensus de Washington disait que, la globalisation favorise le multilatéralisme dans la mesure où un pays ne peut pas prendre unilatéralement des décisions qui affecteront d'autres pays. Et même que cela paraît-t il vraisemblable, il signifierait que le libre-échange doit régner en maître et au-dessus des actions des Etats, éliminant tout entrave aux échanges et aux investissements à l'étranger. Selon la Commission des Nations Unies pour le Commerce et le Développement (CNUCED), « la production internationale est devenue la caractéristique structurale centrale de l'économie mondiale ». Une plus grande liberté de commerce et une large ouverture aux mouvements de capitaux, pourrai mener les nations sous-développés à la croissance économique comparable à celle des pays riches. En conséquence, beaucoup de pays latino-américains qui avaient rejoint entretemps le néolibéralisme proposé par le Consensus de Washington en 1989, ont ainsi mise en place des mesures visant à réduire les entraves au commerce : ils ont ouvert leurs marchés aux capitaux étrangers et suivi plusieurs des indications des OEIs ; le but étant le développement par l'internationalisation. Des économies nationales rejoignent ainsi un réseau du commerce international, d'investissement et de crédit où le commerce devait apporter le développement. Les OEIs ont indiqué que la taille du marché national n'importe plus si un pays se focalise sur de plus grands marchés internationaux. L'internalisation des normes de Consensus de Washington était difficile pour les SSE parce que les règles de ce consensus les ont pris en tant que groupe « d'une taille unique, ouvert, juste, établie sur le terrain d'une régulation non discriminatoires » approchez pour la multilatéralisation du commerce et du développement. Cependant, les SSE n'ont pas tiré profit de ces mesures car ils ne faisaient pas le poids des puissances au point d'influencer les règlements du libre échange et de la libéralisation de l'investissement directe étrangère (ou IDE). Ils n´ont pas la capacité ni le pouvoir de changer la structure des normes à l'intérieur des OEIs, où les politiques et les lois internationales sont suggérées sans prendre en considération des privilèges particuliers ni les besoins propre à chacun. Cette marginalisation dans la scène internationale accentue les problèmes économiques et sociaux qui sont à l'origine de l'agitation sociale constante et mettent en péril la stabilité de leur gouvernement. Plusieurs chercheurs et gouvernements ne perçoivent pas ces vrais problèmes et ne peuvent pas ainsi prévoir des mesures proportionnées pendant les négociations internationales. Le pire est que, les EPT ne connaissent pas eux même leur faiblesses et comment les évaluez. Avec cette thèse, nous voulons explorer la capacité d'insertion des EPT sur la scène internationale. De ce fait, la thèse est divisée en deux parties : dans la première partie, nous analyserons pourquoi après plusieurs années de multilatéralisme proposé par les OEIs, aucune amélioration en termes de l'internationalisation et du développement de certains pays sud-américains n'a été constaté ; mais au contraire, il y a eu un accroissement de la pauvreté. Nous pensons que c'est le fait que la scène internationale a été ordonnée seulement par les plus grandes économies laissant de côte la majorité des pays en voie de développement et leurs besoins.
