Suchergebnisse

In 1996, four provinces of Iran experienced below replacement level fertility. Since the early 1980s, these provinces have recorded lower fertility than the national level. How and under what condition has fertility declined to such a low level in these provinces? It may be of considerable interest to examine whether these provinces can be regarded as the leaders of the fertility transition in Iran. What are the likely effects of below-replacement fertility on population growth in Iran in the short term? Will Iran, as a whole, experience below replacement fertility in the near future? What would be the reaction of the government if below-replacement level fertility is reached in the near future? This paper will first, assess and analyse the fertility trends in the provinces of Isfahan, Gilan, Semnan and Tehran as compared with the national level during the period 1972-1996. Using available data, an attempt will also be made to estimate recent fertility levels for these provinces. Second, demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as well as contraceptive use, in these provinces will be reviewed; female singulate mean age at marriage and age-specific proportions married for 1976, 1986 and 1996 will then be examined. Third, the prospects of low fertility in Iran as well as the likely reaction of the government on low fertility will be discussed thereafter.

International stereotypes tend to portray Iran as a 'traditional' society resistant to many aspects of social change. Based on this assumption, the generally held view is that Iran is experiencing one of the highest fertility rates in the world, and that demographic transition has not started yet. Recent statistics has proved, however, that the reality is profoundly different. Iran has experienced an astonishing fertility decline in recent years. This study aims to review the trends and changes in fertility over the period 1976 to 1996. The Islamic Republic of Iran experienced a moderate increase in fertility during 1976-1986, mainly due to the relaxation of family planning programs by the government. On the other hand, fertility began to decline in 1984, and has sharply declined since 1988. The question has arisen to what extent this significant change has been due to the changes in nuptiality and marital fertility. The own-children data from the 1986 and 1996 censuses allow us to analyse the change in fertility in the last two decades, and to decompose the change in fertility into two main components of nuptiality and marital fertility. The result has shown that around 85 percent of the changes is due to marital fertility, which suggests that most of the fertility of Iranian women has been controlled within marriage. Around 15 percent of the change is attributable to changes in nuptiality, specifically an increase in age at marriage and thus a reduction in the proportion of women married at early ages. After reviewing the literature on the demographic transition in Iran, the paper will first analyse the changes in nuptiality patterns during the last two decades. Second, the changes in fertility trends and levels will briefly be discussed for the period 1976 to 1996. Then the change of fertility will be decomposed into the two components of nuptiality and marital fertility. Tentative explanations for the dramatic decline in marital fertility will be put forward; and the future prospects of the fertility decline, policy implications and issues for further studies will be discussed.

Confounding all conventional wisdom, the fertility rate in the Islamic Republic of Iran fell from around 7.0 births per woman in the early 1980s to 2.1 births per woman in 2000. That this, the largest and fastest fall in fertility ever recorded, should have occurred in one of the world's few Islamic Republics demands explanation. The paper addresses this issue in three parts. The second part is its core: a description of fertility levels, trends and patterns in Iran by rural and urban areas and provinces in the 1972-2000 period. Own-children data from the 1986 and 1996 Censuses as well as the 2000 Iran Demographic and Health Survey (IDHS) allow us to analyse single-year movements of fertility over the last three decades. This demographic description is proceeded by a socio-political history of Iran in the years 1970-2000, providing a context for the demographic changes. We conclude with some speculations linking specific socio-economic and political changes to the demographic change. Our concluding arguments suggest continued low fertility in Iran.

Confounding all conventional wisdom, the fertility rate in the Islamic Republic of Iran fell from around 7.0 births per woman in the early 1980s to 2.1 births per woman in 2000. That this, the largest and fastest fall in fertility ever recorded, should have occurred in one of the world's few Islamic Republics demands explanation. The paper addresses this issue in three parts. The second part is its core: a description of fertility levels, trends and patterns in Iran by rural and urban areas and provinces in the 1972-2000 period. Own-children data from the 1986 and 1996 Censuses as well as the 2000 Iran Demographic and Health Survey (IDHS) allow us to analyse single-year movements of fertility over the last three decades. This demographic description is proceeded by a socio-political history of Iran in the years 1970-2000, providing a context for the demographic changes. We conclude with some speculations linking specific socio-economic and political changes to the demographic change. Our concluding arguments suggest continued low fertility in Iran.

AbstractThe long‐term settlement of Afghan immigrants in Iran, along with their high fertility, has produced an important shift in the composition of their population with the emergence of a "second generation". This article aims to examine how second‐generation Afghans have adapted to the host society and to what extent their adaptation patterns have correlated with demographic and contextual factors. The data is drawn from the 2010 Afghans Adaptation Survey which covered 520 second‐generation Afghans.Results revealed that second‐generation Afghans have a variety of adaptation patterns. Integration is the most prevalent pattern of adaptation and acculturation (which is observed among 35.8 per cent of respondents) followed by separation (33.3%), assimilation (17.1%) and marginalization (13.8%). Our multivariate analysis showed that such socio‐demographic factors as gender, education, ethnicity, perceived discrimination, family context, neighbourhood characteristics, length and city of residence are associated with their adaptation patterns.Policy Implications


Successful implementation of policies and durable solutions for Afghans in Iran rests on the diversity of the adaptation patterns of their second‐generation.

Restriction on employment opportunities has led to downward assimilation and marginalization of some of the Afghans in Iran. Improvement in labour laws would promote the integration of Afghans in the society.

Afghan females have relatively better access to a gender‐equitable environment in Iran than they do in Afghanistan, and are less willing to return to their homeland. The Government of Afghanistan should improve service and security provisions for women to ensure their voluntary repatriation.

Many Shi'a Afghan refugees and migrants—most of whom are Hazara—have intentionally settled in Mashhad, Iran, the home of the Shrine of Imam Reza. Hazara also make pilgrimage to the Shrine of Imam Hossein located in Kerbala, Iraq. Hazara comprise nearly half of all documented Afghans in Iran, yet until mid-2005, their returns comprised only one quarter of the total UNHCR-assisted return figures to Afghanistan. Drawing on literature from anthropology and refugee studies on the affect of religious practice in a context of displacement, this article considers whether pilgrimage aspirations and practices of Hazara Afghans in Iran might constitute a factor in their decision making about repatriation to Afghanistan. The study proposes that the decision to return to Afghanistan for certain categories of Hazara is influenced by their pilgrimage practices and attachment to Shrine locations in Iran.