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Establishing the supremacy of European law: the making of an international rule of law in Europe
In: Oxford studies in European law
The Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals. Edited by Cesare P. R. Romano. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 492p. $108.00 cloth, $36.99 paper
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 978-979
ISSN: 1541-0986
The Global Spread of European Style International Courts
In: Karen J. Alter (2012) The Global Spread of European Style International Courts, West European Politics, 35:1, 135-154
SSRN
The Evolving International Judiciary
In: Annual Review of Law & Social Science, Forthcoming
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Working paper
Tipping the Balance: International Courts and the Construction of International and Domestic Politics
In: The Cambridge yearbook of European legal studies: CYELS, Band 13, S. 1-21
ISSN: 2049-7636
AbstractThe proponents of international courts (ICs) expect that creating formal legal institutions will help to increase respect for international law. International relations scholars question such claims, since ICs have no tools to compel state compliance. Such views are premised on the notion that states have unique preferences that ICs must satisfy in order to be effective. The tipping point argument is premised on the notion that within each state are actors with numerous conflicting preferences. ICs can act as tipping point actors, building and giving resources to compliance constituencies—coalitions of actors within and outside of states—that favour policies that happen to also be congruent with international law.
The Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 978-979
ISSN: 1537-5927
The Evolving International Judiciary
In: Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Band 7, S. 387-415
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The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization and Governance. By Rachel A. Cichowski. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 310p. $39.99
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 698-699
ISSN: 1541-0986
The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization and Governance
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 698-699
ISSN: 1537-5927
Tipping the Balance: International Courts and the Construction of International and Domestic Politics
In: Cambridge Yearbook of International Studies, Forthcoming
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Working paper
The European Court's Political Power Across Time and Space
In: Revue Française de Science Politique, Band 59
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Working paper
Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context
In: European journal of international relations, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 33-63
ISSN: 1460-3713
In International Relations applications, theorists employing Principal— Agent (P—A) theory have posited that the fact of delegation defines a relationship between states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) where recontracting threats are the predominant way states influence IOs. Developing a category of delegation to international Trustees, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less effective at influencing the Trustees. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary. These three factors account for the different politics between Principals and Trustees, a politics aimed at either keeping issues outside of the domain of the Trustee or at rhetorically engaging the Trustee's authority in an effort to persuade the common `beneficiary' whose loyalty and respect both States and the Trustee seek. In explaining why recontracting threats are not central to Principal—Trustee relations, the analysis bounds the realm in which we might expect P—A theory to apply, and provides a theoretical basis to question the `rational expectations' claim that ICs are tailoring their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontracting.
Agents or trustees?: international courts in their political context
In: European journal of international relations, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 33-63
ISSN: 1354-0661
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