The Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 978-979
ISSN: 1537-5927
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In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 978-979
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Band 7, S. 387-415
SSRN
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 698-699
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 698-699
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Cambridge Yearbook of International Studies, Forthcoming
SSRN
Working paper
In: Revue Française de Science Politique, Band 59
SSRN
Working paper
In: European journal of international relations, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 33-63
ISSN: 1460-3713
In International Relations applications, theorists employing Principal— Agent (P—A) theory have posited that the fact of delegation defines a relationship between states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) where recontracting threats are the predominant way states influence IOs. Developing a category of delegation to international Trustees, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less effective at influencing the Trustees. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgment or professional criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary. These three factors account for the different politics between Principals and Trustees, a politics aimed at either keeping issues outside of the domain of the Trustee or at rhetorically engaging the Trustee's authority in an effort to persuade the common `beneficiary' whose loyalty and respect both States and the Trustee seek. In explaining why recontracting threats are not central to Principal—Trustee relations, the analysis bounds the realm in which we might expect P—A theory to apply, and provides a theoretical basis to question the `rational expectations' claim that ICs are tailoring their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontracting.
In: European journal of international relations, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 33-63
ISSN: 1354-0661
World Affairs Online
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 4, Heft 4
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 22-49
ISSN: 1552-3829
Scholars expect International Courts (ICs) with private access and compulsory jurisdiction to be more independent and effective. This article shows a trend of creating and using ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and private access, using as evidence the founding statutes and usage rates of 20 ICs created since 1945. Analyzing where and for what private actors are granted access to ICs, the author finds that what is driving the expansion of private access and compulsory jurisdiction is an attempt to extend the types of juridical checks found at the domestic level to the international governance level. Although this trend will likely lead to more rights claiming by private actors, limitations on the types of cases that can be raised combined with a lack of usage suggests that outside of Europe, private right claiming potentials have yet to be exploited.
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 813
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 22-49
ISSN: 0010-4140
World Affairs Online
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 4, Heft 4, S. 813-814
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 121-124
ISSN: 1552-3829
Principal-Agent (P-A) theory sees the fact of delegation as defining a relationship be-tween states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) with recon-tracting threats being the predominate way states influence IOs. Developing a category of Trustee-Agents, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less effective at influencing the Trustee-Agents. Trustee-Agents are 1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, 2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgement or professional criteria, and 3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary. Focusing on state-International Courts (IC) relations, the article develops an alternative explanation that highlights the need for international judges to balance legal fidelity with the significant international challenge of endeav-ouring compliance. The arguments are explored through three case studies of IC deci-sion-making that call into question the 'rational expectations' claim that ICs are tailor-ing their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontracting.
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