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ISPI. L'ISPI è un think tank indipendente dedicato allo studio delle dinamiche politiche ed economiche internazionali fondato nel 1934. È l'unico istituto italiano – e tra i pochissimi in Europa – ad affiancare all'attività di ricerca un significativo impegno nella formazione, nella convegnistica e nell'analisi dei rischi e delle opportunità a livello mondiale per le imprese e le istituzioni. L'ISPI privilegia un approccio interdisciplinare e "policy-oriented" reso possibile da un team di ricerca di oltre 50 analisti e può inoltre contare su un network internazionale di 70 università, think tank e centri di ricerca. Nella classifica redatta dall'Università di Pennsylvania, l'ISPI si è posizionato al primo posto al mondo tra i "Think Tank to Watch" nel 2019.

We provide an empirical analysis of host country determinants of Chinese outward FDI for the period 2003 to 2008, using data disaggregated by country and industry. We want to assess the relevance of market-seeking, resource-seeking and strategic asset seeking motivations suggested by the theory on FDI determinants. Our results show that only FDI in manufacturing is attracted by market seeking motivations. As expected, resource seeking is an important motivation for Chinese FDI in resource related sectors, which usually refers to countries with political fragile environments. Strategic asset seeking motivations are relevant for both manufacturing and services.

The coronavirus pandemic that has rocked China since December 2019 has posed a gruelling test for the resilience of the country's national economy. Now, as China emerges from its Covid-induced "recession", it feels like the worst is behind it. How did China manage to come out almost unscathed from the worst crisis in over a century? This Report examines how China designed and implemented its post-Covid recovery strategy, focussing on both the internal and external challenges the country had to face over the short- and medium-run. The book offers a comprehensive argument suggesting that, despite China having lost economic and political capital during the crisis, Beijing seems to have been strengthened by the "pandemic test", thus becoming an even more challenging "partner, competitor and rival" for Western countries.

As the Covid-19 pandemic strikes hard, protests in Hong Kong appear to have abated. Distant seem the days when yellow umbrellas and balaclavas saturated global media. And yet, just like at the start of what has now come to be known as the 2019 "global protest wave", Hong Kong remains at the frontline of political contestation worldwide. The protests against the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition law unearthed one of the main points of contention between Hong Kong and mainland China. Through the protests, China's increasingly assertive stance has found a counterweight, revealing how important the city is to Beijing. China's actions towards Hong Kong might serve as a litmus test for Beijing's ability to mediate and pacify its neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the Covid-19 pandemic risks further heightening tensions between the Hong Kong and the mainland. What makes Hong Kong so special? To what extent have the protests exacerbated or eased over time? How will the city's role in mainland China's outward-looking plans change, if the protests continue?

The current trade war between the US and China looks like a small piece in a much larger puzzle over world leadership in which China plays the part of the ascending challenger seeking to upset the existing balance of power. Technology and innovation seem to be Beijing's weapons of choice in its frontal assault on Washington in sectors traditionally led by the US. China is not only acquiring technology. Its ambitions include the regulation of international trade and global governance. Just what a China-led global order would look like is still unclear, but the inherent side-effects of technology need to be meticulously assessed, as they have the potential to alter the core values of modern societies. To what extent will technology facilitate China's rise?

This year marks the 40th anniversary of China's reforms and opening up. In four decades, China has learned how to grasp the benefits of globalisation and has become a world economic champion. As the world's second-largest economy, today China is no longer the factory of the world but an industrial power aiming at the forefront of major high-tech sectors, in direct competition with Europe and the US. In sharp contrast with Trump's scepticism on multilateralism, President Xi has renewed his commitment to growing an open global economy. But what does globalisation with Chinese characteristic look like? Is Beijing offering more risks or more opportunities to both mature and emerging economies? To what extent is China willing to comply with international rules and standards? Is Beijing trying to set its own global rules and institutions? Is the world destined to a new model of economic globalisation detached from political and cultural openness?

This year marks the 40th anniversary of China's reforms and opening up. In four decades, China has learned how to grasp the benefits of globalisation and has become a world economic champion. As the world's second-largest economy, today China is no longer the factory of the world but an industrial power aiming at the forefront of major high-tech sectors, in direct competition with Europe and the US. In sharp contrast with Trump's scepticism on multilateralism, President Xi has renewed his commitment to growing an open global economy. But what does globalisation with Chinese characteristic look like? Is Beijing offering more risks or more opportunities to both mature and emerging economies? To what extent is China willing to comply with international rules and standards? Is Beijing trying to set its own global rules and institutions? Is the world destined to a new model of economic globalisation detached from political and cultural openness?

We suggest a methodology that combines a refined conceptual approach with a theoretically-inspired empirical assessment, to analyse how Sinicised Marxist theory as well as practice has invariably emphasised Marx's philosophy of history, rather than any version of Marxist egalitarian political philosophy, and therefore developed a culturally distinctive version of Marxism as totalitarian and subsequently authoritarian (rather than democratic) socialism. We argue that Chinese socialism has appropriated and applied socialist ideals to China's post-cultural-revolution development into an economic reform agenda without political transition. We suggest that China today runs an ethically and politically problematic regime under which the people enjoy neither sufficient social justice nor decent community values. Such lack of equality and community represents a major inherent contradiction of "socialism with Chinese characteristics," which has to accept and even accommodate increasing inequality to drive future growth. This contradiction also makes the so-called Chinese Dream more one of national aggregate prosperity than a dream for the Chinese people. ; Za analizo sinizirane marksistične teorije ter prakse, ki je bolj kot katerokoli različico marksistične egalitarne politične filozofije poudarjala Marxovo filozofijo zgodovine in tako razvila kulturno razlikovalno različico marksizma kot totalitarnega in kasneje avtoritarnega (namesto demokratičnega) socializma, predlagamo metodologijo, ki izpopolnjen konceptualni pristop združuje s teoretsko navdahnjenim empiričnim ovrednotenjem. Zagovarjamo tezo, da kitajski socializem uporablja in si prisvaja socialistične ideje za program razvoja ekonomskih reform po kulturni revoluciji brez politične tranzicije. Menimo, da Kitajsko dandanes vodi etično in politično problematičen režim, ki ljudem ne zagotavlja niti zadostne družbene pravičnosti niti dostojnih vrednot skupnosti. Takšno pomanjkanje enakosti in skupnosti predstavlja pomembno inherentno protislovje »socializma s kitajskimi posebnostmi«, ki mora sprejeti in celo negovati povečanje neenakosti za doseganje prihodnje rasti. Tako imenovane »kitajske sanje« postanejo torej skozi to protislovje bolj sanje o skupni nacionalni blaginji kot pa sanje za kitajsko ljudstvo.