Certain "realist" views of the international economic regime construe international financial agencies as straightforward reflections of the power and interests of nation states. However, the World Bank's responsiveness to a wide range of demands for new development priorities and approaches also depends on the compliance of its huge staff. The staff's discretion in shaping, implementing, discrediting, or resisting these approaches requires an organizational-theoretic analysis of the sources of acceptance of or resistance to particular initiatives. Role-set theory accounts for many of the motivational sources of resistance. The capabilities to resist new initiatives through "bureaucratic politics" can be understood through March and Simon's emphasis on the importance of absorbing uncertainty. On the basis of these theories and findings on attitudes expressed by Bank staff, strategies can be developed to enhance the Bank's responsiveness to such initiatives as greater emphasis on the alleviation of poverty. Theory and findings also provide a basis for speculating on the characteristics required of an international agency to warrant treating it as an autonomous variable in the international system.
The nature & use of "complex" models for forecasting & policy simulation are analyzed on theoretical & empirical-performance grounds. While the accuracy of complex models in forecasting trends in such fields as economic & energy is undistinguished, their special virtues -- preserving counterintuitive results & representing subsystem interdependence -- could be used to better advantage than current practice permits. Suggestions for such improvements, through more diversified models, microprocess models in addition to the typical macro models, a mix of mechanically & judgmentally operated models, & the modeling of policy response, are reviewed. 26 References. Modified HA.