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Abstract:Contemporary global governance is organized around an odd pairing: care and control. On the one hand, much of global governance is designed to reduce human suffering and improve human flourishing, with the important caveat that individuals should be allowed to decide for themselves how they want to live their lives. On the other hand, these global practices of care are also entangled with acts of control. Peacebuilding, public health, emergency aid, human rights, and development are expressions of this tension between care and control. There is a concept that captures this tension: paternalism. Drawing on our moral intuitions, I argue that paternalism is the attempt by one actor to substitute his judgment for another actor's on the grounds that such an imposition will improve the welfare of the target actor. After discussing and defending this definition, I note how our unease with paternalism seems to grow as we scale up from the interpersonal to the international, which I argue owes to the evaporation of community and equality. After exploring the implications of this definition and distinguishing it from other forms of intervention, I consider how different elements of paternalism combine to generate different configurations. Specifically, I point to five dimensions that are most relevant for examining the paternalism found in contemporary global and humanitarian governance: the tools used to restrict another actor's liberty (force versus information); the scope of the interference (wide versus narrow); the purpose of the intervention (prevention of harm versus emancipation); the source of the paternalizer's confidence (faith versus evidence); and the mechanisms of accountability (internal versus external). These different elements often correlate historically, suggestive of two ideal types of global paternalism: strong and weak. Contemporary global and humanitarian governance is largely the weak variety: force is severely proscribed, interference is relatively restricted, the paternalizer's confidence has epistemic roots, and accountability to local populations remains a noble but rarely practiced goal. I further speculate that a major reason for this difference is the effects of liberalism and rationalization. I use this taxonomy to suggest how two different global efforts to improve the lives of those peoples living in what were perceived to be unstable and illiberal territories — the civilizing missions of the nineteenth century and the peacebuilding operations of the post-Cold War period — exhibited different kinds of paternalism. I conclude by reflecting on the ethics of international paternalism.

AbstractA standard view is that global governance institutions require strong accountability mechanisms to perform effectively and legitimately. Yet these institutions are much better at preaching than practicing accountability. A standard explanation for this gap references interests. For various reasons, institutions and their creators would rather be less than more accountable, and they are quite content to live with the hypocrisy. This article points to an alternative possibility: the public interest. An article of faith is that modern governance should be staffed by relatively autonomous experts who use their specialized knowledge for the greater good; accordingly, they cannot be accountable to those who are affected by their decisions. Too much democracy, therefore, can be a source of dysfunction. Yet expert authority's virtues also can become vices; namely, insulation from those affected by their decisions can also be a source of dysfunction, most closely associated with the "iron cage." Although the possibility that expertise is both a virtue (effectiveness) and a vice (dysfunction) is well known in the literature on domestic governance, it has been neglected in discussions of global governance. Indeed, the dangers of, and dysfunctions associated with the iron cage might be greater in global governance than in domestic governance precisely because of the absence of institutional checks that often are produced by a preexisting social contract between the rulers and the ruled. I probe this possibility in the area of humanitarian governance.

This paper develops two claims that follow from two general conclusions from recent re-search on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The first is that international peacebuilders are fairly good at ending violence and at producing stability, but are less talented at creating liberal states. In order to understand why, Section I develops the concept of the "peacebuilders' contract", which is intended to map the kinds of strategic interactions that are likely to unfold between peacebuilders and local élites and capture why these interactions are likely to favour the status quo preferred by local forces. Following on the general recognition that international peacebuilders are limited in what they can produce, the second conclusion concerns the need for peacebuilders to be more strategic in their thinking and to be satisfied with producing small victories that can sup-port the emergence of decent governments which provide the foundations for future movements towards a positive peace. These observations and their implications are applicable not only to post-war interventions, but also to the broader international agenda of fixing states.

AbstractThis article is part of a forum on Gareth Evans' book, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008). The forum features contributions from Michael Barnett, Chris Brown and Robert Jackson, and it concludes with a response from Gareth Evans.

This book provides a critical exploration of the politics and practice of global ethical interventions. Organized in four parts Michael Barnett examines the tensions in the relationship between global governance, ethics, and international order.

This review examines humanitarian governance, defined as the increasingly organized and internationalized attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce the suffering of the world's most vulnerable populations. Political scientists and international relations scholars are only now beginning to explain this rapidly growing global governance of humanity, which is particularly evident in the developing literatures on humanitarian intervention, emergency relief, peacebuilding, and refugee protection. As they increasingly engage this relatively unexplored area of global life, political scientists are using the familiar analytics of the global governance literature to explain the origins, design, and effectiveness of this collective activity. This essay, though, interjects an alternative perspective, one that draws from critical theory, to widen the research agenda of the study of humanitarian governance. Specifically, the essay raises six central questions: What kind of world is being imagined and produced? What accounts for the tremendous growth of humanitarian governance over the last century? Who governs? How is humanitarian governance organized and accomplished? What are the principal techniques of control? By what authority do humanitarians govern and what do they do with that authority?

This review examines humanitarian governance, defined as the increasingly organized and internationalized attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce the suffering of the world's most vulnerable populations. Political scientists and international relations scholars are only now beginning to explain this rapidly growing global governance of humanity, which is particularly evident in the developing literatures on humanitarian intervention, emergency relief, peacebuilding, and refugee protection. As they increasingly engage this relatively unexplored area of global life, political scientists are using the familiar analytics of the global governance literature to explain the origins, design, and effectiveness of this collective activity. This essay, though, interjects an alternative perspective, one that draws from critical theory, to widen the research agenda of the study of humanitarian governance. Specifically, the essay raises six central questions: What kind of world is being imagined and produced? What accounts for the tremendous growth of humanitarian governance over the last century? Who governs? How is humanitarian governance organized and accomplished? What are the principal techniques of control? By what authority do humanitarians govern and what do they do with that authority? Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article argues that paternalism is an organizing principle of the international humanitarian order. The international community is increasingly organized to preserve, protect, and promote human life, reflecting an ethics of care and impulse to intervene for the greater good. This mixture of care and control is captured by the concept of paternalism, which Gerald Dworkin famously defined as 'the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced'. Paternalism is either present or dormant in many (if not nearly all) interventions that are designed for the betterment of people and the good of humanity. This article has four goals: 1) to reassess and examine the analytical power of this much maligned and misunderstood concept; 2) to consider the dimensions upon which paternalism varies in order to develop the concept's value for empirical analysis; 3) to speculate how and why paternalism's form has moved from 'strong' to 'weak' over the last hundred years; and, 4) to consider whether, why, and when paternalism might be legitimate.