Can federalism stabilize Iraq?
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 5-21
ISSN: 1530-9177
In: The Washington quarterly, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 5-21
ISSN: 1530-9177
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 63, Heft 10, S. 2438-2449
ISSN: 1552-8766
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 63, Heft 10, S. 2354-2389
ISSN: 1552-8766
One of the primary international factors proposed to explain the geographic and temporal clustering of democracy is the diffusion of democracy protests. Democracy protests are thought to diffuse across countries, primarily, through a demonstration effect, whereby protests in one country cause protests in another based on the positive information that they convey about the likelihood of successful protests elsewhere and, secondarily, through the actions of transnational activists. In contrast to this view, we argue that, in general, democracy protests are not likely to diffuse across countries because the motivation for and the outcome of democracy protests result from domestic processes that are unaffected or undermined by the occurrence of democracy protests in other countries. Our statistical analysis supports this argument. Using daily data on the onset of democracy protests around the world between 1989 and 2011, we find that in this period, democracy protests were not significantly more likely to occur in countries when democracy protests had occurred in neighboring countries, either in general or in ways consistent with the expectations of diffusion arguments.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 67, Heft 5, S. 858-892
ISSN: 1552-8766
Political actors often resort to electoral violence to gain an edge over their competitors even though violence is harder to hide than fraud and more likely to delegitimize elections as a result. Existing explanations tend to analyze violence in terms of the same factors as fraud, or to treat violence as a means of last resorts given its overtness. We introduce a novel explanation that does neither, arguing that political actors often use violence for the very reason that it is hard to hide. Its overtness, we argue, allows political actors to observe whether the agents they enlist to manipulate elections for them do so and reduces these agents' likelihood of shirking in turn. We develop our argument through a formal model showing that electoral monitors, by exacerbating problems of moral hazard (shirking), can induce actors to increasingly turn to violence and use process tracing to examine the implications of this model through the example of Egypt.
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 67, Heft 5, S. 858-892
ISSN: 1552-8766
Political actors often resort to electoral violence to gain an edge over their competitors even though violence is harder to hide than fraud and more likely to delegitimize elections as a result. Existing explanations tend to analyze violence in terms of the same factors as fraud, or to treat violence as a means of last resorts given its overtness. We introduce a novel explanation that does neither, arguing that political actors often use violence for the very reason that it is hard to hide. Its overtness, we argue, allows political actors to observe whether the agents they enlist to manipulate elections for them do so and reduces these agents' likelihood of shirking in turn. We develop our argument through a formal model showing that electoral monitors, by exacerbating problems of moral hazard (shirking), can induce actors to increasingly turn to violence and use process tracing to examine the implications of this model through the example of Egypt.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 57, Heft 5, S. 822-853
ISSN: 1552-8766
Elections constitute a fundamental element of postconflict peacebuilding efforts in the post-cold war era and are often held soon after conflicts end. Yet, the impact of early elections on postconflict stability is the subject of sharp debate. While some argue that early elections facilitate peace agreements, hasten democratization, and ensure postconflict stability, others suggest that they undermine genuine democracy and spark a renewal in fighting. In this study, we argue that holding elections soon after a civil war ends generally increases the likelihood of renewed fighting, but that favorable conditions, including decisive victories, demobilization, peacekeeping, power sharing, and strong political, administrative and judicial institutions, can mitigate this risk. We attempt to reconcile the extant qualitative debate on postconflict elections through a quantitative analysis of all civil wars ending in the post-World War II period. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 57, Heft 5, S. 822-853
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 57, Heft 5, S. 822-853
ISSN: 1552-8766
Elections constitute a fundamental element of postconflict peacebuilding efforts in the post–cold war era and are often held soon after conflicts end. Yet, the impact of early elections on postconflict stability is the subject of sharp debate. While some argue that early elections facilitate peace agreements, hasten democratization, and ensure postconflict stability, others suggest that they undermine genuine democracy and spark a renewal in fighting. In this study, we argue that holding elections soon after a civil war ends generally increases the likelihood of renewed fighting, but that favorable conditions, including decisive victories, demobilization, peacekeeping, power sharing, and strong political, administrative and judicial institutions, can mitigate this risk. We attempt to reconcile the extant qualitative debate on postconflict elections through a quantitative analysis of all civil wars ending in the post–World War II period.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 55, Heft 3, S. 469-493
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 55, Heft 3, S. 469-492
ISSN: 1552-8766
In the post—cold war period, civil wars are increasingly likely to end with peace settlements brokered by international actors who press for early elections. However, elections held soon after wars end, when political institutions remain weak, are associated with an increased likelihood of a return to violence. International actors have a double-edged influence over election timing and the risk of war, often promoting precarious military stalemates and early elections but sometimes also working to prevent a return to war through peacekeeping, institution building, and powersharing. In this article, we develop and test quantitatively a model of the causes of early elections as a building block in evaluating the larger effect of election timing on the return to war.
In: American Political Science Review 2023 (open access)
SSRN
In: American political science review, Band 117, Heft 4, S. 1327-1343
ISSN: 1537-5943
Although the effects of non-state actor violence on public health outcomes are well known, the effects of public health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic on non-state actor violence are not. Lockdown measures, widely used to stop the spread of disease in crises, we argue, are likely to reduce non-state actor violence, especially in urban and non-base areas. These measures deplete actors' resources, reduce the number of high-value civilian targets, and make it logistically more difficult to conduct attacks. Using the example of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and taking advantage of the exogenous nature of COVID-19 lockdowns, we find that curfews and travel bans significantly reduce violence, especially in populated and non-base areas. These effects are most likely due to short-term changes in ISIS's targets and logistics rather than its resources. These findings provide important insights into the security aspects of public health crises and offer novel findings into the general effectiveness of two common counterinsurgency tools.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 63, Heft 10, S. 2354-2449
ISSN: 1552-8766
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of peace research, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 110-115
ISSN: 1460-3578
Protracted conflicts over the status and demands of ethnic and religious groups have caused more instability and loss of human life than any other type of local, regional, and international conflict since the end of World War II. Yet we still have accumulated little in the way of accepted knowledge about the ethnic landscape of the world. In part this is due to empirical reliance on the limited data in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, whose selection biases are well known. In this article we tackle the construction of a list of 'socially relevant' ethnic groups meeting newly justified criteria in a dataset we call AMAR (A for All). We find that one of the principal difficulties in constructing the list is determining the appropriate level of aggregation for groups. To address this issue, we enumerate subgroups of the commonly recognized groups meeting our criteria so that scholars can use the subgroup list as one reference in the construction of the list of ethnic groups most appropriate for their study. Our conclusion outlines future work on the data using this expanded dataset on ethnic groups. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: Journal of peace research, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 110-115
ISSN: 0022-3433