Suchergebnisse

Er sei ein Stadtmensch, denkt er, und schreibt über Metropolenthemen. Doch nach zehn Jahren in der Großstadt ist es Zeit für einen Schnitt. Nun setzt er ganz auf die Kombination Landleben und Web. Aus ihr erwächst eine neue Vorstellung von Autarkie. Hat die digitale Revolution die Unterschiede aufgehoben zwischen Stadt und Land? Die Technologie jedenfalls macht es möglich. Jetzt kann er sein Leben ändern. Raus aus der Großstadt und hinein ins digitale Landleben. Der Popjournalist Christoph Braun verlässt Berlin und siedelt sich im 1320-Seelen-Dorf Evessen im Landkreis Wolfenbüttel an. Erstaunt begegnet er dem Hightech in der Landwirtschaft. Doch was ihn mehr fasziniert, das ist die ökologische Lebensform, die er in Berlin noch belächelt hat. Zum ersten Mal nimmt er eine Pendelhacke in die Hand und hilft bei den Ökos aus: jäten, säen, gießen, ernten. Der sich bisher nur in digitalen Welten als Hacker begriff, greift nun mit der Hacke in sein Leben ein, und entdeckt eine neue unideologische Wunschvorstellung von Autarkie und Selbstbestimmung. Christoph Braun geboren 1970 im Saarland, zieht nach Stationen in Saarbrücken, Glasgow und Berlin 2005 in das Dorf Evessen. Von dort aus arbeitet er mit Berliner Musik-Mags und schwedischen Kunstmagazinen zusammen und pendelt ans Deutsche Theater Berlin, dessen Musikprogramm er drei Jahre lang gestaltet. Im August 2009 eröffnet Braun den Blog »hacken.spex.de« über Landarbeit und Popkultur. (Quelle: www.buchhandel.de 11.09.2012)

This dissertation is on optimal taxation of human capital and tackles the following leading question: How should the tax system be optimally designed to promote the accumulation of human capital to maximize economic well- being? Chapter 2 discusses results derived by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Richter (2009), who show the education efficiency theorem: In a second-best optimum, the education decision is undistorted if the function expressing the stock of human capital features a constant elasticity with respect to education. I drop this assumption. The household inherits an initial stock of human capital, implying that the aforementioned elasticity is increasing. In a two-period Ramsey model of optimal taxation, I show that the education efficiency theorem does not hold. In a second-best optimum, the discounted marginal social return to education is smaller than the marginal social cost. The household overinvests in human capital relative to thefirst best. The government effectively subsidizes the return to education. Chapter 3 studies a Ramsey optimal taxation model with human capital in an infinite-horizon setting. Contrary to Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), the human capital production function does not include the current stock of human capital as a production factor. As a result, the return to human capital, namely labor income, does not vanish in equilibrium. In a stationary state, the household underinvests in human capital relative to the first best, i.e., education is distorted. Human capital is effectively taxed. The optimal tax scheme prescribes making the cost of education not fully tax-deductible. Chapter 4 studies second best policies for education, saving, and labour in an OLG model in which endogenous growth results from human capi- tal accumulation. Government expenditures have to be financed by linear instruments so that growth equilibria are inefficient. The inefficiency is exacerbated if selfish individuals externalize the positive effect of education on descendents' productivity. It is shown to be second best to subsidize edu- cation even relative to the first best if the elasticity of the human capital investment function is strictly increasing. The analysis allows one to iden- tify fundamental differences in the efficient dynamic taxation of human and nonhuman capital. Chapter 5 presents a numerical analysis of chapter 4's underlying model with selfish individuals. It turns out that the case for subsidizing education to account for distortionary labor taxation is rather weak. The still dominant justification for subsidizing education is to internalize intergenerational externalities.

Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Richter (2009) derive the education effi ciency theorem: In a second-best optimum, the education decision is undistorted if the function expressing the stock of human capital features a constant elasticity with respect to education. I drop this assumption. The household inherits an initial stock of human capital, implying that the aforementioned elasticity is increasing. In a two-period Ramsey model of optimal taxation, I show that the education effi ciency theorem does not hold. In a second-best optimum, the discounted marginal social return to education is smaller than the marginal social cost. The household overinvests in human capital relative to the first best. The government eff ectively subsidizes the return to education. ; Bovenberg und Jacobs (2005) und Richter (2009) leiten das Bildunseffizienztheorem her: In einem zweitbesten Optimum ist die Bildungsentscheidung unverzerrt, wenn die Funktion, die den Bestand an Humankapital beschreibt, über eine konstante Elastizität in Bezug auf Bildung verfügt. Diese Annahme lasse ich fallen. Der Haushalt erbt einen Anfangsbestand an Humankapital, was dazu führt, dass die vorgenannte Elastizität steigend ist. In einem Ramsey-Modell der optimalen Besteuerung mit zwei Perioden zeige ich, dass das Bildunseffizienztheorem nicht gilt. In einem zweitbesten Optimum gilt, dass der abdiskontierte soziale Grenzertrag kleiner ist als die sozialen Grenzkosten. Der Haushalt überinvestiert in Humankapital relativ zur erstbesten Lösung. Die Regierung subventioniert effektiv den Ertrag der Bildung.

This paper studies second best policies for education, saving, and labour in an OLG model in which endogenous growth results from human capital accumulation. Government expenditures have to be financed by linear instruments so that growth equilibria are inefficient. The inefficiency is exacerbated if selfish individuals externalize the positive effect of education on descendents' productivity. It is shown to be second best to subsidize education even relative to the first best if the elasticity of the human capital investment function is strictly increasing.

This paper studies second best policies for education, saving, and labour in an OLG model in which endogenous growth results from human capital accumulation. Government expenditures have to be financed by linear instruments so that growth equilibria are inefficient. The inefficiency is exacerbated if selfish individuals externalize the positive effect of education on descendents' productivity. It is shown to be second best to subsidize education even relative to the first best if the elasticity of the human capital investment function is strictly increasing.