Suchergebnisse

This dissertation is on optimal taxation of human capital and tackles the following leading question: How should the tax system be optimally designed to promote the accumulation of human capital to maximize economic well- being? Chapter 2 discusses results derived by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Richter (2009), who show the education efficiency theorem: In a second-best optimum, the education decision is undistorted if the function expressing the stock of human capital features a constant elasticity with respect to education. I drop this assumption. The household inherits an initial stock of human capital, implying that the aforementioned elasticity is increasing. In a two-period Ramsey model of optimal taxation, I show that the education efficiency theorem does not hold. In a second-best optimum, the discounted marginal social return to education is smaller than the marginal social cost. The household overinvests in human capital relative to thefirst best. The government effectively subsidizes the return to education. Chapter 3 studies a Ramsey optimal taxation model with human capital in an infinite-horizon setting. Contrary to Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997), the human capital production function does not include the current stock of human capital as a production factor. As a result, the return to human capital, namely labor income, does not vanish in equilibrium. In a stationary state, the household underinvests in human capital relative to the first best, i.e., education is distorted. Human capital is effectively taxed. The optimal tax scheme prescribes making the cost of education not fully tax-deductible. Chapter 4 studies second best policies for education, saving, and labour in an OLG model in which endogenous growth results from human capi- tal accumulation. Government expenditures have to be financed by linear instruments so that growth equilibria are inefficient. The inefficiency is exacerbated if selfish individuals externalize the positive effect of education on descendents' productivity. It is shown to be second best to subsidize edu- cation even relative to the first best if the elasticity of the human capital investment function is strictly increasing. The analysis allows one to iden- tify fundamental differences in the efficient dynamic taxation of human and nonhuman capital. Chapter 5 presents a numerical analysis of chapter 4's underlying model with selfish individuals. It turns out that the case for subsidizing education to account for distortionary labor taxation is rather weak. The still dominant justification for subsidizing education is to internalize intergenerational externalities.

Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Richter (2009) derive the education effi ciency theorem: In a second-best optimum, the education decision is undistorted if the function expressing the stock of human capital features a constant elasticity with respect to education. I drop this assumption. The household inherits an initial stock of human capital, implying that the aforementioned elasticity is increasing. In a two-period Ramsey model of optimal taxation, I show that the education effi ciency theorem does not hold. In a second-best optimum, the discounted marginal social return to education is smaller than the marginal social cost. The household overinvests in human capital relative to the first best. The government eff ectively subsidizes the return to education. ; Bovenberg und Jacobs (2005) und Richter (2009) leiten das Bildunseffizienztheorem her: In einem zweitbesten Optimum ist die Bildungsentscheidung unverzerrt, wenn die Funktion, die den Bestand an Humankapital beschreibt, über eine konstante Elastizität in Bezug auf Bildung verfügt. Diese Annahme lasse ich fallen. Der Haushalt erbt einen Anfangsbestand an Humankapital, was dazu führt, dass die vorgenannte Elastizität steigend ist. In einem Ramsey-Modell der optimalen Besteuerung mit zwei Perioden zeige ich, dass das Bildunseffizienztheorem nicht gilt. In einem zweitbesten Optimum gilt, dass der abdiskontierte soziale Grenzertrag kleiner ist als die sozialen Grenzkosten. Der Haushalt überinvestiert in Humankapital relativ zur erstbesten Lösung. Die Regierung subventioniert effektiv den Ertrag der Bildung.

This paper studies second best policies for education, saving, and labour in an OLG model in which endogenous growth results from human capital accumulation. Government expenditures have to be financed by linear instruments so that growth equilibria are inefficient. The inefficiency is exacerbated if selfish individuals externalize the positive effect of education on descendents' productivity. It is shown to be second best to subsidize education even relative to the first best if the elasticity of the human capital investment function is strictly increasing.

This paper studies second best policies for education, saving, and labour in an OLG model in which endogenous growth results from human capital accumulation. Government expenditures have to be financed by linear instruments so that growth equilibria are inefficient. The inefficiency is exacerbated if selfish individuals externalize the positive effect of education on descendents' productivity. It is shown to be second best to subsidize education even relative to the first best if the elasticity of the human capital investment function is strictly increasing.

In den letzten Jahren hat sowohl die Anzahl der Studien zu den gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wirkungen von Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen als auch die Zahl der vorhandenen Indikatoren zur Messung dieser Institutionen sehr stark zugenommen. Gut zehn Jahre nach Nickells (1997) maßgeblichem Beitrag über den Zusammenhang von Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen und Arbeitslosigkeit ist es an der Zeit, sowohl die Indikatoren als auch die empirischen Ergebnisse der mit ihnen erstellten Studien einer kritischen Würdigung zu unterziehen. Mit dem vorliegende Beitrag verfolgen wir drei Ziele: Erstens geben wir einen Überblick über die Indikatoren, die zur Messung der zentralen Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen - Lohnfindungssystem, Beschäftigungsschutz, Lohnersatzleistungen, Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik, Steuern und Abgaben - in der Literatur verwendet werden. Zweitens fassen wir die wichtigsten makroökonometrischen Studien, die diese Indikatoren verwenden, zusammen. Und schließlich diskutieren wir drittens die Ergebnisse der verschiedenen Studien, und versuchen einen Ausblick auf die (notwendige) Weiterentwicklung der Indikatoren und die zukünftige Forschung mit ihnen zu geben.

Over the last decade, both the availability of quantitative indicators on labor market institutions and of studies trying to explain differences in national labor market performance through institutional variables have burgeoned significantly. It is now time to review these indicators and the empirical findings. Therefore, this paper has a threefold objective: first, we provide an overview of the aggregate indicators of core labor market institutions such as employment protection, the generosity of the benefit system, active labor market policies, taxation and collective bargaining. We assess the reliability of selected indicators. Second, we review the most relevant macro-econometric studies that made use of these indicators in order to explain diverging patterns of national employment performance. Third, and finally, this paper draws some preliminary conclusions regarding the further development of aggregate indicators and possible directions for future empirical research.

"Over the last decade, both the availability of quantitative indicators on labor market institutions and of studies trying to explain differences in national labor market performance through institutional variables have burgeoned significantly. It is now time to review these indicators and the empirical findings. Therefore, this paper has a threefold objective: first, we provide an overview of the aggregate indicators of core labor market institutions such as employment protection, the generosity of the benefit system, active labor market policies, taxation and collective bargaining. We assess the reliability of selected indicators. Second, we review the most relevant macro-econometric studies that made use of these indicators in order to explain diverging patterns of national employment performance. Third, and finally, this paper draws some preliminary conclusions regarding the further development of aggregate indicators and possible directions for future empirical research." (author's abstract)

Subjective tinnitus is the conscious perception of sound in the absence of any acoustic source. The literature suggests various tinnitus mechanisms, most of which invoke changes in spontaneous firing rates of central auditory neurons resulting from modification of neural gain. Here, we present an alternative model based on evidence that tinnitus is: (1) rare in people who are congenitally deaf, (2) common in people with acquired deafness, and (3) potentially suppressed by active cochlear implants used for hearing restoration. We propose that tinnitus can only develop after fast auditory fiber activity has stimulated the synapse formation between fast-spiking parvalbumin positive (PV+) interneurons and projecting neurons in the ascending auditory path and coactivated frontostriatal networks after hearing onset. Thereafter, fast auditory fiber activity promotes feedforward and feedback inhibition mediated by PV+ interneuron activity in auditory-specific circuits. This inhibitory network enables enhanced stimulus resolution, attention-driven contrast improvement, and augmentation of auditory responses in central auditory pathways (neural gain) after damage of slow auditory fibers. When fast auditory fiber activity is lost, tonic PV+ interneuron activity is diminished, resulting in the prolonged response latencies, sudden hyperexcitability, enhanced cortical synchrony, elevated spontaneous y oscillations, and impaired attention/stress-control that have been described in previous tinnitus models. Moreover, because fast processing is gained through sensory experience, tinnitus would not exist in congenital deafness. Electrical cochlear stimulation may have the potential to reestablish tonic inhibitory networks and thus suppress tinnitus. The proposed framework unites many ideas of tinnitus pathophysiology and may catalyze cooperative efforts to develop tinnitus therapies. ; German Research Foundation (DFG) DFG-Kni-316-4-1 SPP16-08 DFG Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica (CONICYT) CONICYT FONDECYT 1161155 Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT) BASAL FB008 ICM P09-015F European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant 764604 722046 National Institute for Health Research (NIHR)