Suchergebnisse

It is argued that the conceptual & practical differences of intent & application that characterize politics & science -- as professions & processes -- are so great as to render interaction between them problematic. In fact, analysis is postulated as a third distinct alternative, having its own imperatives, purposes, & uses: furthermore, the relationships between science, analysis, & politics are identified & found to be of potentially greater significance to those concerned with the policy process than is normally imagined. 2 Figures. HA.

Excessive attention over the years to issues contained within the confines of the concept of the strategic balance have had notable consequences—generally by limiting attention to but one perspective on an extraordinarily complex and dynamic problem and specifically by ignoring critical command and control aspects of the whole. This article elaborates the theme of neglect and its consequences and then identifies and assembles many of the missing, but essential, pieces of the "C3I Puzzle."

Prior to World War II, American national security policy was formed by a loosely connected elite that generally operated from a business-financial base in the northeastern United States. It was from this group that secretaries of state and war were drawn and among this group that serious long-range thinking on important security issues was undertaken. The power of this community continued after the war, probably reaching its zenith in the 1950s, when an important change occurred. Unversities like Harvard, Yale, and Chicago gained prominence at this time, but the more interesting phenomenon was the emergence of so-called "defense intellectuals" at places like the Rand Corporation and other think tanks.