Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Conflict and its management -- China, Algeria and Egypt : the War of Independence and the Suez Crisis to Camp David -- China and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation : from people's war to the Algiers Declaration, 1967-1988 -- China, the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula : from militancy to diplomacy during the Cold War -- China and the Iran-Iraq War -- China and Iraq : the Gulf Wars and the war against ISIS -- China and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since Oslo -- China and the Darfur Crisis in Sudan -- China and Libya : from Gaddafi to the uprising and after -- China and the Syrian Civil War -- China and contemporary conflict in Yemen and the Horn of Africa -- China and the Iran nuclear deal -- China and the Gulf crisis -- Conclusion.

AbstractHow do middle powers operate in uncertain multipolar international systems? Through the cases of Malaysia and Indonesia, the article examines their approach in the Middle East after the Arab uprisings. Particular reference is given to their actions in three main areas: the Gulf (especially relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran), the Syrian war (and its blowback in terms of domestic radicalization), and the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict. While the two middle powers' behavior demonstrated all three possible modes—whether to support, push back or stand apart—what distinguished them was their timing: under multipolarity these different forms of behavior occurred concurrently, in contrast to a more sequenced approach under (global) unipolarity and bipolarity. The findings point to Malaysian and Indonesian actions as examples of "hedging" whereby states seek good relations with all and minimize the risk of problematic entanglements.

How are rising powers like Russia, India and China responding to the pandemic among the Gulf monarchies and what are the implications for rising power behaviour more generally? Through an examination of these powers' established relations with the Gulf monarchies and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the regional energy and labour markets and the search for a vaccine, the article highlights the opportunities and constraints faced by each. The variety of approaches taken by rising powers in a volatile environment (like today's Middle East) challenges the assumption that they will adopt a singular strategy in relation to the international system, either as a supporter, spoiler or shirker in an international system. But this may change as the system becomes more settled.

La Chine peut-elle faire la différence dans le conflit israélo-palestinien ? Pour répondre à cela, l'article se réfère à deux formes principales de paix selon les travaux de Galtung : la paix négative (c'est-à-dire l'absence ou l'élimination de la violence) et la paix positive (c'est-à-dire la résolution des causes d'un conflit). Un certain nombre d'éléments nous permettent d'évaluer ce rôle : la présence croissante de la Chine dans la région, son souci de la stabilité et de l'ordre régionaux ; ses intérêts commerciaux croissants et approfondis avec les parties au conflit, son engagement dans le processus d'Oslo, ses contributions au dialogue entre les deux parties, et son manque d'engagement avec la dynamique locale en cours dans les sociétés politiques et civiles israéliennes et palestiniennes. Au final, ces facteurs, conjugués aux évolutions récentes, laissent penser que la Chine envisage un scénario de paix négative et qu'il est donc peu probable qu'elle joue un rôle important dans la résolution du conflit.