The WTO, economic interdependence, and conflict
In: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO 15
In: An Elgar reference collection
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In: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO 15
In: An Elgar reference collection
In: International organization, Band 61, Heft 4
ISSN: 1531-5088
In: Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System, S. 247-263
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 446-477
ISSN: 1086-3338
Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Consistent with the authors' argument, they find that third-party participationlowersthe prospects for early settlement. Controlling for this selection effect, the evidence also suggests that third-party support increases the chances of a legal victory at the WTO.
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 58, Heft 3, S. 446-477
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 713-730
ISSN: 1469-2112
Does the geographic concentration of industry 'matter' outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debate and weigh in with empirical evidence from a cross-sectional analysis of intended voter turnout in eight member-states of the European Union and a multi-year study of voter turnout in the Netherlands. These tests uniformly show that, across different types of electoral systems, including those in which voters vote as a national constituency, thereby removing any effects of electoral geography per se, workers in traded industries that are physically concentrated are, in fact, substantially more likely to vote than employees in traded but geographically dispersed sectors.
Does the geographic concentration of industry 'matter' outside the United States? Observers have long speculated that while geographically concentrated industries may be influential in American politics, this is probably not the case in countries where the electorate votes more as a national constituency. Others disagree, urging that clustered industries have an advantage regardless of how the political map is drawn. We sharpen the terms of debate and weigh in with empirical evidence from a cross-sectional analysis of intended voter turnout in eight member-states of the European Union and a multi-year study of voter turnout in the Netherlands. These tests uniformly show that, across different types of electoral systems, including those in which voters vote as a national constituency, thereby removing any effects of electoral geography per se, workers in traded industries that are physically concentrated are, in fact, substantially more likely to vote than employees in traded but geographically dispersed sectors.
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In: British journal of political science, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 713-730
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 1-42
ISSN: 1086-3338
The landscape of the global economy is dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. In recent years, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in particular, has grown at a torrid pace; practically every country is a member of at least one—if not many—of these institutions. For all the scholarly attention that these institutions have received, however, there is little research tying BITs and PTAs together. This is surprising, since both aim to increase commerce by making it more predictable. The authors seek to fill this gap in the literature. They argue that a BIT between a developed and a developing country should make it more likely that this pair of states will subsequently form a PTA. That said, the wrinkle in the story is that more is not better in this regard; the authors further argue that a developing country that has many BITs is less likely to conclude a PTA with a wealthy state. The authors test these hypotheses using annual data on pairs of developing and developed countries between 1960 and 2004 and find strong evidence in support of their argument.
In: The American journal of sociology, Band 111, Heft 3, S. 824-858
ISSN: 1537-5390
In: American political science review, Band 101, Heft 3, S. 573-589
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 61, Heft 3, S. 571-606
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: International organization, Band 61, Heft 4, S. 735-761
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online