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World Affairs Online
A BIT is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 62, Heft 1
ISSN: 1086-3338
The landscape of the global economy is dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. in recent years, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in particular, has grown at a torrid pace; practically every country is a member of at least one-if not many-of these institutions. For all the scholarly attention that these institutions have received, however, there is little research tying BITs and PTAs together. this is surprising, since both aim to increase commerce by making it more predictable. The authors seek to fill this gap in the literature. They argue that a BIT between a developed and a developing country should make it more likely that this pair of states will subsequently form a PTA. that said, the wrinkle in the story is that more is not better in this regard; the authors further argue that a developing country that has many BITs is less likely to conclude a PTA with a wealthy state. The authors test these hypotheses using annual data on pairs of developing and developed countries between 1960 and 2004 and find strong evidence in support of their argument. Adapted from the source document.
The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 257-279
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractInternational institutions often moderate the legal decisions they render. World Trade Organization (WTO) panels do this by exercising judicial economy. This practice, which is evident in 41 percent of all rulings, involves the decision not to rule on some of the litigants' arguments. The constraint is that it can be appealed. We argue that panels exercise judicial economy when the wider membership is ambivalent about the future consequences of a broader ruling. This is proxied by the "mixed" (that is, nonpartisan) third-party submissions, which are informative because they are costly, jeopardizing a more decisive legal victory that would benefit these governments too. We empirically test this hypothesis, and find that mixed third-party submissions increase the odds of judicial economy by upwards of 68 percent. This suggests that panels invoke judicial economy to politically appease the wider WTO membership, and not just to gain the litigants' compliance in the case at hand.
The politics of judicial economy at the World Trade Organization
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 257-279
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
A BIT is better than a lot: bilateral investment treaties and preferential trade agreements
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 62, Heft 1, S. 1-42
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
Trade: Determinants of Policies
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies
"Trade: Determinants of Policies" published on by Oxford University Press.