Examines whether geographic concentration makes individuals in industries exposed to international commerce more likely to mobilize politically; analysis of manufacturers, 1988 and 1990.
Explores relationship between industry location and incidence of import protection; uses economic model. Argues that geographically concentrated but politically dispersed industries are more likely to get relief, although some very large industries benefit from being politically concentrated.
Abstract The rulings of internationals courts are often reduced to "who won?," but much more is at stake. Like other institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers rulings that balance legal discipline against political constraints. We argue that one way in which the WTO handles politically sensitive issues is by increasing the amount of affect in their rulings. In doing so, judges provide national governments with discursive resources to persuade their domestic audiences of the legitimacy of compliance. To test our expectations, we conduct a text analysis of all rulings rendered by the institution since 1995. Specifically, we find that more politically charged decisions, such as the ones concerning nonfiscal rather than fiscal aspects of national treatment claims, are explained in qualitatively different terms. We also find that, as an issue gets ruled on repeatedly, the amount of affect deployed progressively decreases. In sum, the WTO chooses its words strategically to persuade litigants, and their domestic audiences, of the legitimacy of compliance in politically fraught disputes.
AbstractInternational institutions often moderate the legal decisions they render. World Trade Organization (WTO) panels do this by exercising judicial economy. This practice, which is evident in 41 percent of all rulings, involves the decision not to rule on some of the litigants' arguments. The constraint is that it can be appealed. We argue that panels exercise judicial economy when the wider membership is ambivalent about the future consequences of a broader ruling. This is proxied by the "mixed" (that is, nonpartisan) third-party submissions, which are informative because they are costly, jeopardizing a more decisive legal victory that would benefit these governments too. We empirically test this hypothesis, and find that mixed third-party submissions increase the odds of judicial economy by upwards of 68 percent. This suggests that panels invoke judicial economy to politically appease the wider WTO membership, and not just to gain the litigants' compliance in the case at hand.
The landscape of the global economy is dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. in recent years, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in particular, has grown at a torrid pace; practically every country is a member of at least one-if not many-of these institutions. For all the scholarly attention that these institutions have received, however, there is little research tying BITs and PTAs together. this is surprising, since both aim to increase commerce by making it more predictable. The authors seek to fill this gap in the literature. They argue that a BIT between a developed and a developing country should make it more likely that this pair of states will subsequently form a PTA. that said, the wrinkle in the story is that more is not better in this regard; the authors further argue that a developing country that has many BITs is less likely to conclude a PTA with a wealthy state. The authors test these hypotheses using annual data on pairs of developing and developed countries between 1960 and 2004 and find strong evidence in support of their argument. Adapted from the source document.
The landscape of the global economy is dotted with institutions that regulate investment and trade. In recent years, the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in particular, has grown at a torrid pace; practically every country is a member of at least one—if not many—of these institutions. For all the scholarly attention that these institutions have received, however, there is little research tying BITs and PTAs together. This is surprising, since both aim to increase commerce by making it more predictable. The authors seek to fill this gap in the literature. They argue that a BIT between a developed and a developing country should make it more likely that this pair of states will subsequently form a PTA. That said, the wrinkle in the story is that more is not better in this regard; the authors further argue that a developing country that has many BITs is less likely to conclude a PTA with a wealthy state. The authors test these hypotheses using annual data on pairs of developing and developed countries between 1960 and 2004 and find strong evidence in support of their argument.
Nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge. More attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross-national studies of trade policy.