Suchergebnisse

The book examines the progressive radicalization of modern Sunni jihadist movements from a comparative perspective. It links growing jihadist extremism to past failures and analyzes the rise and fall of the Islamic State's "caliphate" as the culmination of this evolution

"This examination of Al Qaeda's decline since the 9/11 attacks focuses on the terror organization's mutation and fragmentation. It looks at its partnership with the local and regional jihadist networks that played a pivotal role in the Madrid, London, and Fort Hood attacks, arguing that, although initially successful, such alliances actually unraveled following both anti-terror policies and a growing rejection of violent jihadism in the Muslim world. Challenging conventional theories about Al Qaeda and homegrown terrorism, the book claims that jihadist attacks are now organized by overlapping international and regional networks that have become frustrated in their inability to enforce regime change and their ideological goals. The discussion spans the war on terror, analyzing major post 9/11 attacks, the failed jihadist struggle in Iraq, Al Qaeda's affiliates, and the organization's future prospects after the death of Osama Bin Laden and the Arab Spring. This assessment of the future of the jihadist struggle against Muslim governments and homegrown Islamic terrorism in the West will be an invaluable resource to anyone studying terrorism and Islamic extremism"--

This essay studies the rise, decline, and rebirth of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its transformation into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). It first examines AQI's distinctive vision and its defiance of al Qaeda central. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's anti-Shiite jihadist perspective, dramatized by AQI's use of social media, attracted thousands of foreign fighters to Iraq. The Jordanian's struggle against Shiite apostates and 2006 martyrdom in a US airstrike continues to dazzle young militants. Second, the essay analyzes AQI's regeneration and metamorphosis into ISIS and its challenge to al Qaeda's central command. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's refusal to recognize the authority of al Qaeda's Ayman al Zawahiri and Baghdadi's violent resistance to reconciliation measures has sparked destabilizing intrajihadist warfare. Third, the essay examines ISIS's position as it resists attacks by Iraqi regime forces, rebel groups, Kurdish militants, and US-led coalition air strikes. The essay's concluding observations analyze the parallels and differences between the Armed Islamic Group's campaign in Algeria in the 1990s and ISIS's position in Iraq and Syria in 2015.

The Barack Obama administration's May 2013 assessment of al Qaeda's weakness and fracturing in the post-bin Laden era has been greeted with indignation by both liberals and conservatives. They believe al Qaeda is stronger than ever in the wake of the Arab Spring. These critics, however, misunderstand the network's dysfunctional direction. Al Qaeda's "resurgence" is likely to lead to its failure. The argument proceeds on four levels: (1) the dramatic growth of the al Qaeda network masks its internal weakness and organizational splintering; (2) the Arab Spring has led to a burst of al Qaeda activism that is likely to undermine its jihadist cause; (3) al Qaeda's fragmentation and its multiple trajectories in the post-9/11 era violate bin Laden's original intent and are beyond al Qaeda Central's direction; and (4) the dysfunctional nature of al Qaeda's ideology and its excessive reliance on takfiri violence is paradoxically a source of both persistence and failure.