Suchergebnisse

En avril 2014, la Commission européenne a révisé ses lignes directrices sur les aides d'État en matière de soutien aux énergies renouvelables et de protection de l'environnement. Dans cet article, nous montrons dans quelle mesure l'approche plus économique de l'évaluation des aides qui y est proposée peut contribuer à l'appréciation des aides publiques. La publication des nouvelles lignes fixe un cadre général quant à la procédure de contrôle des aides, qui a été cependant troublé par une série d'affaires qui ont pu être interprétées comme une source d'insécurité juridique.

The China - Raw Materials dispute recently arbitrated by the WTO opposed China as defendant to the US, the EU and Mexico as claimants on the somewhat unusual issue of export restrictions on natural resources. For the claimants, Chinese export restrictions on various raw materials, of which the country is a major producer, create shortages in foreign markets increasing the prices of these goods. China defends export limitations by presenting them as a natural resource conserving policy. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the dispute with the help of a model of a monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the domestic and foreign markets. The theoretical results focus on the effects of imposing an export quota on quantities, prices and price distortion. Given the crucial importance of demand elasticity in this theoretical understanding of the conflict, the empirical part of the paper provides estimates of import demand elasticity of the parties for each product concerned in the case. The model and the empirical results challenge the ideas that an export quota always favours conservation of natural resource, that a higher foreign price necessarily follows this policy and that it inherently increases price distortion and therefore discrimination.

Faced with the energy transition imperative, governments have to decide about public policy to promote renewable electrical energy production and to protect domestic power generation equipment industries. For example, the Canada – Renewable energy dispute is over Feed-in tariff (FIT) programs in Ontario that have a local content requirement (LCR). The EU and Japan claimed that FIT programs constitutesubsidies that go against the SCM Agreement, and that the LCR is incompatible with the non-discrimination principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper investigates this issue using an international quality differentiated duopoly model in which power generation equipment producers compete on price. FIT programs including those with a LCR are compared for their impacts on trade, profits, amount of renewable electricity produced, and welfare. When 'quantities' are taken into account, the results confirm discrimination. However, introducing a difference in the quality of the power generation equipment produced on both sides of the border provides more mitigated results. Finally, the results enable discussion of the question of whether environmental protection can be put forward as a reason for subsidizing renewable energy producers in light of the SCM Agreement.

Le Règlement Européen 834/2007, en charge de définir le label Biologique européen depuis janvier 2009, autorise un seuil de 0,9 % de présence fortuite d'OGM dans les produits Biologiques (Bio). Un seuil d'OGM différent de zero permet aux agriculteurs de préserver leur label dans le cas d'une faible contamination OGM mais risque de discréditer une filière de réputation « sans OGM ». Dans la Recommandation 2003/556/CE la Commission européenne propose de faire supporter aux agriculteurs d'OGM les mesures de protection visant à limiter la contamination OGM – principe dit du newcomer – mais laisse le choix aux États membres d'appliquer ce principe. Ce papier présente une analyse économique des conséquences de ce seuil d'OGM sur le bien-être de la société avec et sans le principe du newcomer. Il étudie comment le régulateur impartial, face à des consommateurs hétérogènes, détermine le seuil d'OGM autorisé pour assurer la coexistence des deux formes d'agriculture, en tenant compte du discrédit mais aussi de la flexibilité qu'il engendre pour le maintien du label Bio. Après avoir défini les conditions de la coexistence des agricultures, nous montrons que i) le seuil d'OGM devrait être différent de zero lorsque les agriculteurs Bio supportent les mesures de coexistence et que ii) le seuil d'OGM autorisé devrait être nul lorsque le principe du newcomer est retenu dans la réglementation.

The China - Raw Materials dispute recently arbitrated by the WTO opposed China as defendant to the US and the EU as claimants, on the somewhat unusual issue of export restrictions. For the claimants, Chinese export restrictions on various raw materials of which the country is a major producer create shortages in foreign markets. This scarcity does not prevail in the Chinese market and the price in the foreign markets increases, providing a cost advantage to the Chinese industries using these raw materials. China defends export limitations using Article XX of the GATT 1994 on possible exceptions to the prohibition of quantitative restrictions to conserve natural resources. This paper oers a theoretical analysis of the dispute with the help of a model of a monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the domestic and foreign markets using Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004)'s framework. The theoretical results focus on the eects of imposing an export quota on quantities, prices and ecacy, and are used to comment on the claims of the parties and on the ndings of the Panel and Appellate Body. Given the crucial importance of demand elasticities in this theoretical understanding of the con ict, the empirical part of the paper provides estimates of import demand elasticity of the claimants as well as of China { for each product concerned in the case, dened at the HS6 level. The empirical results show that among the products concerned in the dispute, twogroups can be dierentiated depending on China's export position. When China is a major or rst exporter, there is no evident sign of the distortionary eect of an exportquota. When China is a weak exporter, but a strong producer and consumer, thereis evidence coherent with the model according to which China is imposing a quotaexport restriction that is inecient.

The China - Raw Materials dispute recently arbitrated by the WTO opposed China as defendant to the US and the EU as claimants, on the somewhat unusual issue of export restrictions. For the claimants, Chinese export restrictions on various raw materials of which the country is a major producer create shortages in foreign markets. This scarcity does not prevail in the Chinese market and the price in the foreign markets increases, providing a cost advantage to the Chinese industries using these raw materials. China defends export limitations using Article XX of the GATT 1994 on possible exceptions to the prohibition of quantitative restrictions to conserve natural resources. This paper oers a theoretical analysis of the dispute with the help of a model of a monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the domestic and foreign markets using Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004)'s framework. The theoretical results focus on the eects of imposing an export quota on quantities, prices and ecacy, and are used to comment on the claims of the parties and on the ndings of the Panel and Appellate Body. Given the crucial importance of demand elasticities in this theoretical understanding of the con ict, the empirical part of the paper provides estimates of import demand elasticity of the claimants as well as of China { for each product concerned in the case, dened at the HS6 level. The empirical results show that among the products concerned in the dispute, twogroups can be dierentiated depending on China's export position. When China is a major or rst exporter, there is no evident sign of the distortionary eect of an exportquota. When China is a weak exporter, but a strong producer and consumer, thereis evidence coherent with the model according to which China is imposing a quotaexport restriction that is inecient.

The China - Raw Materials dispute recently arbitrated by the WTO opposed China as defendant to the US and the EU as claimants, on the somewhat unusual issue of export restrictions. For the claimants, Chinese export restrictions on various raw materials of which the country is a major producer create shortages in foreign markets. This scarcity does not prevail in the Chinese market and the price in the foreign markets increases, providing a cost advantage to the Chinese industries using these raw materials. China defends export limitations using Article XX of the GATT 1994 on possible exceptions to the prohibition of quantitative restrictions to conserve natural resources. This paper oers a theoretical analysis of the dispute with the help of a model of a monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the domestic and foreign markets using Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004)'s framework. The theoretical results focus on the eects of imposing an export quota on quantities, prices and ecacy, and are used to comment on the claims of the parties and on the ndings of the Panel and Appellate Body. Given the crucial importance of demand elasticities in this theoretical understanding of the con ict, the empirical part of the paper provides estimates of import demand elasticity of the claimants as well as of China { for each product concerned in the case, dened at the HS6 level. The empirical results show that among the products concerned in the dispute, twogroups can be dierentiated depending on China's export position. When China is a major or rst exporter, there is no evident sign of the distortionary eect of an exportquota. When China is a weak exporter, but a strong producer and consumer, thereis evidence coherent with the model according to which China is imposing a quotaexport restriction that is inecient.

The China - Raw Materials dispute recently arbitrated by the WTO opposed China as defendant to the US and the EU as claimants, on the somewhat unusual issue of export restrictions. For the claimants, Chinese export restrictions on various raw materials of which the country is a major producer create shortages in foreign markets. This scarcity does not prevail in the Chinese market and the price in the foreign markets increases, providing a cost advantage to the Chinese industries using these raw materials. China defends export limitations using Article XX of the GATT 1994 on possible exceptions to the prohibition of quantitative restrictions to conserve natural resources. This paper oers a theoretical analysis of the dispute with the help of a model of a monopoly extracting a non-renewable resource and selling it on both the domestic and foreign markets using Fischer and Laxminarayan (2004)'s framework. The theoretical results focus on the eects of imposing an export quota on quantities, prices and ecacy, and are used to comment on the claims of the parties and on the ndings of the Panel and Appellate Body. Given the crucial importance of demand elasticities in this theoretical understanding of the con ict, the empirical part of the paper provides estimates of import demand elasticity of the claimants as well as of China { for each product concerned in the case, dened at the HS6 level. The empirical results show that among the products concerned in the dispute, twogroups can be dierentiated depending on China's export position. When China is a major or rst exporter, there is no evident sign of the distortionary eect of an exportquota. When China is a weak exporter, but a strong producer and consumer, thereis evidence coherent with the model according to which China is imposing a quotaexport restriction that is inecient.