Suchergebnisse

If debtors prisons were still in fashion, many countries around the world would now be in jail. Poland, Rumania, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico—all recently have found themselves teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, unable to pay even the interest on the money they owe to Western governments and banks. And the list keeps growing longer. Over the last year nearly three dozen Third World and East European nations have fallen into arrears' on their foreign loans. Never before have so many countries come so close to default on so much debt.

What do machine tools, motorcycles, and mushrooms have in common? All are industries that, threatened by foreign competition, have recently applied to Washington for import protection. And American manufacturers are not alone. Industries across the globe are pressing their governments to restrict purchases from abroad as a way of saving jobs at home. The story is an old one; When times are bad, cut imports; export unemployment instead.That times are bad is obvious. Since the first oil shock a decade ago, global economic growth has slowed to a snail's pace. Not even the erstwhile "miracle" economies of Japan and Germany have been able to escape the harsh grip of recession. In the United States, one worker in ten is out of a job. In the industrial world as a whole, 30 million people are now looking for work.

Summary in English p. 19.

The regime for payments financing embedded in the postwar Bretton Woods system was based on the principle, formally articulated in the Charter of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that nations should be assured of an adequate but not unlimited supply of supplementary financing for balance-of-payments purposes. Norms included the obligation to avoid policies inconsistent with the IMF Charter (i.e., to play by the agreed rules of the game). In the 1970s the regime seemingly underwent profound change, as the private credit markets emerged as an increasingly important rival to the IMF as a source of payments financing. Nonetheless, this change fell short of a transformation of kind, insofar as the Fund continues to play a role as informal certifier of creditworthiness in the markets. Rather, it represents an example of 'norm-governed change.' Despite greater ambiguity in rules and decision-making procedures, a strong element of continuity in basic principles and norms remains.

About the International Monetary System, by Benjamin J. Cohen
The outlook for the world financial system is clouded by a variety of problems - volatility of floating exchange rates, inefficient management of the multiple-reserve-asset standard, the massive burden of balance-of-payments financing. No doubt it would be excessively pessimistic, not to say alarmist, to predict outright collapse: the system has shown considerable resiliency, after all, in recent years. The potential for improvement exists in our international monetary arrangements, but it is not infinite. The system could be better managed, both efficiency and consistency could be promoted. Why not begin? But nothing can ensure that monetary relations will always remain stable and free of policy conflict. So long as there will be politically sovereign states and formally independent national currencies, there will be international monetary problems.

Le SME, le dollar et l'avenir du système monétaire international, par Benjamin J. Cohen
Benjamin J. Cohen ne critique pas le principe même du SME : les Etats-Unis ne sont plus à même d'assurer, avec une légitimité suffisante le bon fonctionnement du système monétaire international et l'Europe doit prendre des initiatives. Les Etats-Unis seraient mal venus de se plaindre puisqu'ils portent une très large part de responsabilité dans l'effondrement du système précédent. L'"hégémonie" américaine ayant cessé d'être un principe acceptable de régulation monétaire, il faut lui substituer une nouvelle organisation qui, faute d'une solution supranationale impensable dans les circonstances actuelles, ne peut reposer que sur la négociation. Mais le SME ne sera pas l'élément espéré du renouveau monétaire. Les Européens n'ont tiré qu'au niveau des déclarations officielles, et non de la pratique, les conséquences du désordre monétaire. Les Européens ne sont pas vraiment préparés à engager une discussion d'égal à égal avec les Etats-Unis. Cela supposerait qu'ils acceptent de jouer un rôle majeur dans le maintien de la stabilité d'ensemble du système monétaire, rôle qui ne va pas sans effort et sacrifices et sans une confiance réciproque. Au total, le SME risque fort de créer notamment par les interventions sur le marché des changes plus de problèmes qu'il n'en résoudra.