Suchergebnisse

How do campaigns and elections affect evaluations of democracy in transitional settings? Little research has been conducted on this topic in transitional settings, where citizens' evaluations of regime performance might be especially fluid and where popular dissatisfaction with democratic institutions could inhibit political development. Furthermore, previous studies' reliance on cross-sectional data has made it difficult to make valid causal inferences in this area. Drawing upon unique data from the 2010–2011 Uganda Campaign Panel Study, the first panel on campaign effects in Africa, we measure changes in individuals' satisfaction with democracy. We find that individuals who supported a losing presidential candidate are more likely to show decreases in satisfaction over the course of the campaign than those who supported the winner. Importantly, we find that previous political participation does not necessarily result in increases in democratic satisfaction: rather, it is associated with decreased satisfaction for losers. Finally, there is no evidence that declines in satisfaction with democracy are associated with decreased support for democracy as a regime. This study furthers understanding of political development by identifying factors that affect how citizens evaluate their political regime.

ABSTRACTIn February 2011, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni resoundingly won re-election. In the aftermath of the vote, which many had predicted would be competitive, analysts and opposition supporters ascribed Museveni's victory to massive pre-election spending on public goods, creation of new administrative districts, and vote buying. While the opposition could not compete with Museveni and his National Resistance Movement in access to resources, our analyses of survey data, from two pre-election surveys conducted by Afrobarometer in November/December 2010 and January 2011, and a pre- and post-election panel study, find little evidence that Museveni benefited significantly from public goods outlays, district creation, and vote buying. Additionally, we find little evidence that fear and intimidation were responsible for the results. Instead, the data suggest that Museveni's re-election was driven by an uninspiring opposition slate, widespread satisfaction with macro-economic growth, and an improved security situation, particularly in the Northern Region.