Suchergebnisse

The federal government is now the lead responder when a major natural disaster strikes and the president frequently visits the scene, performing the role of consoler in chief. Both of these developments are relatively recent: before the 1960s, disaster response was dominated by subnational governments and the Red Cross, while the federal role was discharged mostly by mid‐level bureaucrats. This article argues that the Johnson presidency was a decisive turning point in terms of the first development and that Johnson also broke new ground by making a regular habit of visiting disaster scenes. However, it attributes the latter pattern more to LBJ's unique political approach than to external pressure, arguing that the expectation that presidents will provide emotional support to disaster victims has developed more recently.

AbstractThe European Union is unique among jurisdictions in having constitutionalized its policy goals and methods, by embedding these in the Treaties. As a result, the legislature is far more constrained in its activities than is the case in other constitutional orders. Yet the Treaties are indeterminate, and it is the Court of Justice which interprets and delimits them, and instructs the legislature on how and to what extent it may pursue them. There is, in substance, a principal–agent relationship between the Court and the EU legislature, enforceable by the Court's capacity to annul legislation contrary to its preferences. An examination of internal market legislation shows that indeed it consists of codification of prior case law. The judicial constraints on the EU legislature are sufficiently tight that the legislature is more akin to a subordinate implementing regulator than to an autonomous political policy‐maker.

AbstractMartha Derthick, one of the nation's foremost scholars of federalism and public administration, died on January 12. Gareth Davies, one of her former students, reflects here on her intellectual legacy, especially as reflected in her publications, but also, more briefly, on her approach to mentoring.

If the ECJ delivers politically unwelcome judgments, can the legislature override these by adopting new laws? The question goes to the balance of power between legislators and courts, and to which organs are capable of steering the integration process. The answer in the EU context is distinctive, because the Union is so highly constitutionalized: most important legal questions are reducible to Treaty interpretation, which apparently excludes the legislature from their resolution. Drawing on American scholarship which advocates co-interpretation of the constitution by both legal and political branches, and using actual and hypothetical examples of situations where the legislature and the ECJ have wished to take different directions (e.g. citizenship, general principles, non-discrimination) this article examines three Court techniques to avoid legislative constraints: annulment, emasculatory interpretation, and avoidance. It also considers the ways in which legislation can be drafted to maximize its influence upon the Court.

Abstract: Free movement law follows the contours of freedom of contract very closely. It prevents public or private parties from interfering with the contractual freedom of others. It does not, however, appear to be understood by the Court of Justice to apply to contractual preferences as such. Thus, the gradual extension of its horizontal effect, culminating in Viking Line, does not represent a gradual encroachment on freedom of contract but a gradual extension of its power to prevent this freedom being restricted. This contractual orientation has liberalizing consequences that are probably economically inefficient, since they ignore the existing preferences of consumers, who do not always want liberalization. Nor can it be seen as a moral liberalism rooted in principled attachment to liberty: Freedom of contract appears to be instrumentally viewed by the Court, as a tool of integration. Rather, this article suggests that the contractual orientation of free movement reveals it to be an exercise in social engineering, seeking to nudge Europeans into changing their domestic preferences for more European ones. Résumé: Le droit de la libre circulation suit les contours de la liberté contractuelle de très près. Il empêche les parties publiques ou privées d'interférer avec la liberté contractuelle des autres. Il n'apparaît cependant pas être compris par la Cour de Justice comme s'applicant aux préférences contractuelles en tant que telles. Ainsi, l'extension progressive de son effet horizontal, aboutissant à Viking Line, ne représente pas un empiétement progressif sur la liberté contractuelle, mais plutôt une extension progressive de son pouvoir; afin d'empêcher cette liberté d'être restreinte. Cette orientation contractuelle a des conséquences concourant à la libéralisation qui sont probablement économiquement inefficaces, car elles ignorent les préférences existantes des consommateurs, qui ne souhaitent pas toujours la libéralisation. L'orientation contractuelle du droit de la libre circulation ne peut non plus être considérée comme un libéralisme moral enraciné dans l'attachement au principe de liberté. La liberté de contrat semble être considérée instrumentalement par la Cour, qui la voit comme un outil d'intégration. Cette analyse suggère plutôt que l'orientation contractuelle de la libre circulation révèle qu'il s'agit d'un exercice d'ingénierie sociale, cherchant à pousser les Européens à modifier leurs préférences nationales pour des choix plus Européens.